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Abstract
This thesis analyses inequaliƟes in access to Higher EducaƟon (HE) in England. In parƟc-
ular, it provides new evidence about this issue in three major ways.
First, it esƟmates the family income gradient in university parƟcipaƟon overall, and at a
group of high status insƟtuƟons. It also analyses the income gradient in university appli-
caƟons. While there are substanƟal income gradients in university aƩendance, and at-
tendance at high status insƟtuƟons, most of these diﬀerences are driven by applicaƟon
decisions, parƟcularly once we control for ‘ability’ at age 11. This suggests that univer-
siƟes do not discriminate against students from poorer backgrounds; such students are
less likely to apply.
Second, it assesses the role of socio-economic status in explaining changes in university
expectaƟons across the teenage years. It analyses transiƟons in young people’s expecta-
Ɵons from being ‘likely to apply’ to being ‘unlikely to apply’ and vice versa, using duraƟon
modelling techniques. Young people’s socio-economic background has a signiﬁcant as-
sociaƟon with changes in expectaƟons, even controlling for prior academic aƩainment
and other potenƟal confounding factors. This suggests more could usefully be done to
maintain the educaƟonal expectaƟons of academically able young people from less ad-
vantaged families.
Finally, it looks at the impact of apƟtude tests as a screening device for entry to elite uni-
versiƟes by looking at the eﬀect on the proporƟon of successful applicants by school type
(state versus private) and gender. The esƟmates are obtained by applying a diﬀerence in
diﬀerences approach to administraƟve data from the University of Oxford. Although in-
troducing the test increased the proporƟon of interviewees geƫng an oﬀer overall, this
is not the case for women. Nevertheless, the policy has no apparent eﬀect on the overall
chances of applicants being oﬀered a place by school type or gender.
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Chapter 1
InvesƟgaƟng access to Higher EducaƟon
in England
1.1 IntroducƟon
Socioeconomic status (SES) has a strong associaƟon with applicaƟon to university, aƩen-
dance at university, and aƩendance at the most selecƟve universiƟes. For example, in
2011-12, only 20% of 18-19 year olds entered higher educaƟon from the boƩom ﬁŌh of
local areas ranked by the percentage of parents who are university graduates compared
to 60% of those in the top ﬁŌh (HEFCE, 2013, Figure 19). Similarly, secondary school
pupils who are eligible for Free School Meals are less than half as likely to go to university
as other young people (BIS, 2012, Table 1). When the extent of inequality is so stark, the
causes of this relaƟonship are clearly a maƩer of academic, and public, interest.
In this thesis, I provide important new evidence about inequaliƟes in access to Higher
EducaƟon (HE) in England in three areas. First, I assess the extent of socioeconomic
inequaliƟes for a recent cohort of students, taking advantage of rich survey data from
the Longitudinal Study of Young People in England to contrast the inequality associated
with applying to university with the inequality associated with aƩending, condiƟonal on
having applied. Second, I explore young people’s expectaƟons of applying to university,
taking the innovaƟve step of using duraƟon modelling to analyse the inﬂuence of SES
on changes in young people’s expectaƟons during a criƟcal stage of their educaƟonal ca-
reers. Third, I use new data from the University of Oxford to esƟmate the causal eﬀect of
a change in admissions policy, speciﬁcally the introducƟon of an apƟtude test, on relaƟve
15
chances of applicants depending on their socio-economic status and gender.
However, before I proceed, this chapter provides important background for the analyses
that follow. SecƟon 1.2 further sets out the importance of studying inequality in access
to HE, including explaining the economic principles that make fair access to HE desirable.
SecƟon 1.3 then assesses trends in parƟcipaƟon in HE, in parƟcular concentraƟng on
evidence of changes in inequaliƟes over Ɵme. SecƟon 1.4 then moves on to describe the
insƟtuƟonal context of the English Higher EducaƟon system. Finally, SecƟon 1.5 outlines
the structure of the remainder of this thesis.
This thesis is part of a wider body of research into this issue that I have undertaken. This
includes an in depth study of the Longitudinal Study of Young People in England (LSYPE)
and its use for analysing access to Higher EducaƟon (Anders, 2012b) and joint work with
John Micklewright exploring young people’s expectaƟons of applying to university (An-
ders and Micklewright, 2013).
1.2 Why study access to Higher EducaƟon in England?
Reducing inequaliƟes in parƟcipaƟon in Higher EducaƟon is important to economists for
reasons of both equity and eﬃciency. There are signiﬁcant economic returns to Higher
EducaƟon (Blundell et al., 2000, 2005; Devereux and Fan, 2011), although we should
not overlook the existence of diﬀerences in returns by insƟtuƟon (Chevalier and Conlon,
2003; Chevalier, 2014), by subject studied (Braƫ et al., 2008), by demographic character-
isƟcs (Sloane andO’Leary, 2004;Machin et al., 2009), by socio-economic status (Crawford
and Vignoles, 2014), and between graduates with apparently similar characterisƟcs (Fe-
instein and Vignoles, 2008; Green and Zhu, 2010). Much of the return will accrue to the
individual obtaining the HE, through improved earning power aŌer graduaƟon. As such,
access to HE that is unfairly socially graded feeds through to inequality of opportunity in
the labour market, and hence economic inequaliƟes.
Even seƫng aside equity concerns, there are issues of economic eﬃciency, not least due
to a lack of perfect informaƟon among individuals choosing whether or not to aƩend HE
(Barr, 2004, ch.14). Furthermore, inequality in access to HE imposes economic costs on
the UK, as there are societal beneﬁts from achieving fair access (Wößmann and Schültz,
2006). Human capital is a scarce resource: failure to maximise the producƟvity of this
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resource reduces economic growth (Holland et al., 2013). The UK government invests
a signiﬁcant amount in HE; it presumably wishes to maximise the economic gains from
doing so. Furthermore, increased take-up of HE also has indirect beneﬁts to society and
government (BIS, 2013a) such as reduced crime (Lochner and Moreƫ, 2004), increased
tax revenue (Conlon and Patrignani, 2011; Walker and Zhu, 2013) and increased public
health (Grossman, 2006). All of these beneﬁts will be maximised when the individuals
who receive HE are those who stand to generate the most beneﬁt from doing so, regard-
less of characterisƟcs such as SES, ethnicity and gender.
However, there is sƟllmuch thatwe do not knowabout these inequaliƟes in England. Pre-
vious literature draws on data with important limitaƟons. For example, while previous
literature suggests that prior aƩainment at age 16 explains much of the SES gradient in
parƟcipaƟon (Chowdry et al., 2013), this thesis tests the robustness of this using rich sur-
vey data on, rather than administraƟve proxies for, SES. While many previous analyses of
access to Higher EducaƟon have concentrated only on enrolment (Marcenaro-GuƟerrez
et al., 2007), this thesis uses data that idenƟfy whether young people apply to university
in the ﬁrst place.
Furthermore, there have been many changes in policy over the past twenty years (see
SecƟon 1.4, below). Since these may have resulted in changes in inequality, the evidence
for a recent cohort of young people presented by this thesis is important in updaƟngwork
that focuses on earlier cohorts.
1.3 Trends in HE parƟcipaƟon and inequaliƟes
There has been a large growth in the number of individuals who obtain Higher Educa-
Ɵon in the UK (see Figure 1.1). While the focus of this thesis is England (as a result of
insƟtuƟonal diﬀerences between the countries of the UK and limitaƟons of the datasets
used), this paƩern is unlikely to be that diﬀerent when we remove Wales, Scotland and
Northern Ireland. Growth in the parƟcipaƟon rate¹ follows a slightly diﬀerent path, due
to diﬀerenƟal birth rates over the Ɵme period. Nevertheless, the paƩern is the same
(Elias and Purcell, 2004, Figure 1).
¹The parƟcipaƟon rate was measured for many years using the Age ParƟcipaƟon Index (API). This re-
ports the number of ﬁrst Ɵme entrants to full-Ɵme and sandwich undergraduate courses, divided by the
average of the 18 year old populaƟon and 19 year old populaƟon of Great Britain.
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Figure 1.1: Number of students obtaining university degrees in the UK (thousands)
Notes: Source: Bolton (2012, p.14)
There was poliƟcal support for this expansion, exempliﬁed by the Labour Party’s 2001
manifesto promise of a 50 percent HE parƟcipaƟon rate by 2011. This goal was essenƟally
met, although perhaps partly due to changes in measurement (Heath et al., 2013, p.238-
239). Theoﬃcial targetwas theHigher EducaƟon IniƟal ParƟcipaƟonRate (HEIPR),²which
climbed from 39% in 1999 to 49% in 2011 (Bolton, 2013b; BIS, 2013b).
Focusing on the period from 1994 onwards (and concentraƟng on entry, as this thesis
does, rather than compleƟon), Figure 1.2 shows conƟnuing large increases in the number
of acceptances for places at Higher EducaƟon insƟtuƟons. However, it also shows the
increasing number of individuals applying to university, with the gap between the two
appearing towiden somewhat in very recent years. This would appear to imply increased
compeƟƟon for the available places.
Turning to the issue of trends in inequaliƟes in access to HE over Ɵme, an issue is that
ﬁnding comparable data on parƟcipaƟon and a measure of SES over Ɵme is diﬃcult.
Nevertheless, a number of studies have looked at short and long term trends in diﬀer-
ing ways. One broad ﬁnding from this work has been that this long-term expansion has,
in some ways, worsened educaƟonal inequality (Galindo-Rueda et al., 2004), perhaps
²The HEIPRmeasures the parƟcipaƟon of 17-30 year olds in HE. It is constructed by dividing the number
of iniƟal entrants to HE at each age between 17 and 30 by the total populaƟon of the relevant age (e.g.
dividing the number of iniƟal entrants aged 18 by the populaƟon of 18 year olds), then summing up each
age’s IniƟal ParƟcipaƟon Rate to get the overall HEIPR. A change inmethod in 2006 boosted the HEIPR from
40% to 42%, meaning that the ﬁgures from 1999 and 2011 are not quite comparable.
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Figure 1.2: Number of applicants and acceptances to UK HE insƟtuƟons (thousands)
Notes: Source: Bolton (2013a, p.3)
because addiƟonal places have predominantly been taken by young people from advan-
taged backgrounds (Machin and Vignoles, 2004; Blanden andMachin, 2004), rather than
being spread throughout the SES distribuƟon. However, the direcƟon of travel since the
mid-1990s to some extent depends upon the way one looks at the data (Bekhradnia,
2003).
Blanden andMachin (2004) andMachin andVignoles (2004) both describe clear evidence
of widening in the parƟcipaƟon gap by parental educaƟon and parental posiƟon in the
income distribuƟon between 1981 and 1993. The gap widens in both absolute and rela-
Ɵve terms. However, between 1993 and 1999 while the gap widens in absolute terms it
narrows in relaƟve terms. Kelly and Cook (2007), this Ɵme looking at diﬀerences by social
class, also ﬁnds evidence of an upward trend in the parƟcipaƟon gap in absolute terms
between 1940 and 2000. However, contrasƟngly, Kelly and Cook ﬁnds that the gap has
been declining in relaƟve terms since the 1960s.
More recently, consistent data on inequality in HE parƟcipaƟon are available using amea-
sure of the percentage of parents in an area who have parƟcipated in HE (HEFCE ParƟci-
paƟonOf Local AReas or POLAR³). Figure 1.3 shows the parƟcipaƟon rate of young people
³Speciﬁcally, the POLAR classiﬁcaƟon is formed by ranking Census Area StaƟsƟcs wards by their young
parƟcipaƟon rates (dividing the number of young people from the wards who aƩended Higher EducaƟon
according to records from the Higher EducaƟon StaƟsƟcs Agency by the young populaƟon of the ward
according to Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs) for recent cohorts, then spliƫng these into quinƟle
groups (HEFCE, 2012, 2014).
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Figure 1.3: Trend in young parƟcipaƟon rate by area-level HE parƟcipaƟon rates
Notes: Source: HEFCE (2013, Figure 10, p.13). Areas assigned quinƟle groups using HEFCE ParƟcipaƟon Of
Local Areas (POLAR3) data.
by quinƟle groups deﬁned using this measure of area-level HE parƟcipaƟon. Across the
period from 1998/99 to 2011/12, for which these data are available, we see a slight in-
crease in the absolute gap (two percentage points) between the most advantaged ﬁŌh
and the least advantaged ﬁŌh deﬁned in this way. However, we do see a reducƟon in the
size of the relaƟve gap between these groups, since the proporƟonal size of the change
for the least advantaged group is signiﬁcantly larger than it is for the most advantaged
group.
1.4 InsƟtuƟonal background
Addressing inequaliƟes in HE parƟcipaƟon has oŌen been divided into issues of ‘widening
parƟcipaƟon’ and ‘fair access’. The deﬁniƟons of these terms are not used consistently
in the literature or by policymakers, indeed they are someƟmes used interchangeably.
OŌen, one is seen as a consƟtuent of the other (HEFCE, 2014). However, it is important to
note that they are diﬀerent concepts, which tend to be focused on diﬀerent elements of
the issue of access to higher educaƟon andwhich can lead to diﬀering policy conclusions.
Bekhradnia points out that “On the one hand, it is quite possible to widen parƟcipaƟon
without having fair access [...]. On the other hand, it is possible to concentrate on fair
20
access in a way that detracts from a broader eﬀort to widen parƟcipaƟon” (Bekhradnia,
2003, p.2). For example, it may be argued that removing contextual informaƟon from
university applicaƟonsmight in some sense be “fairer”, but seems highly likely to hamper
eﬀorts to widen parƟcipaƟon.
A common thread in descripƟons of the diﬀerence between the two concepts, is that
widening parƟcipaƟon encompasses naƟonal or sector-wide changes, while fair access is
about changes at the level of individual universiƟes (and, hence, the diﬀerences in the dis-
tribuƟon of students from less advantaged backgrounds across insƟtuƟons) (Bekhradnia,
2003; OfFA). As a result of being about the policies and pracƟces of universiƟes, discus-
sions of fair access have tended to focus ensuring that admissions processes are organ-
ised such that nothing other than academic ability has a bearing on university applicants
chances of being oﬀered a place.
For the purposes of this thesis, I deﬁne ‘widening parƟcipaƟon’ as a broad term cover-
ing eﬀorts through naƟonal policy to increase the proporƟon of young people from less
advantaged backgrounds who receive Higher EducaƟon. I deﬁne ‘fair access’ as eﬀorts
by universiƟes to remove barriers to aƩendance, including, but not limited to, ensuring
that nothing other than academic ability has a bearing on applicants’ chances of being
oﬀered a place. This thesis has a bearing on issues of both ‘widening parƟcipaƟon’ and
‘fair access’, as deﬁned here.
No English student, however well qualiﬁed at age 18, has the right to aƩend any given
Higher EducaƟon InsƟtuƟon (HEI). This is unlike the situaƟon in some European coun-
tries, such as Italy. Students choose whether to apply to university at all, and universiƟes
choose whether to accept the applicaƟon an individual makes. As seen in Figure 1.2, not
all individuals who apply to university are accepted. Partly for this reason, drop-out rates
are relaƟvely low, compared to other developed countries (Barr, 2004, p.332).
While the issue ofmeasuring quality inHigher EducaƟon is certainly diﬃcult and, to some,
controversial, it is empirically true that there is variaƟon in the labour market outcomes
of individuals who have aƩended diﬀerent English universiƟes (Power andWhiƩy, 2008).
While this will partly be driven by non-random selecƟon into diﬀerent insƟtuƟons, work
that has aƩempted to deal with this issue has found that otherwise similar individuals
who aƩend higher quality HEIs do have improved labour market outcomes (Chevalier
and Conlon, 2003; Hussain et al., 2009; Chevalier, 2014). While it is far from a perfect
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division, universiƟes are oŌen divided into three broad groups, in increasing order of
presƟge: newuniversiƟes, old universiƟes, and Russell Group universiƟes. The ﬁrst group
comprises former polytechnic insƟtuƟons, which were granted degree-awarding powers
in 1992. All other insƟtuƟons are old universiƟes, from which the Russell Group is a self-
selected group of 19 research-intensive insƟtuƟons. Given the seemingly higher rates of
return to an educaƟon at a Russell Group university, there has been parƟcular aƩenƟon
paid to whether individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds apply to and receive a fair
hearing from these presƟgious insƟtuƟons (Boliver, 2013).
An emerging trend in Higher EducaƟon in England, is the increasing use of addiƟonal
tests as part of the admissions processes for more compeƟƟve insƟtuƟons (Admissions
TesƟng Service, 2014), such as members of the Russell Group, and more compeƟƟve
courses, such as medicine (UKCAT ConsorƟum, 2014) and law (LNAT ConsorƟum, 2014).
In the case of compeƟƟve insƟtuƟons, this may be seen as a parƟal return to the earlier
approach of Oxford and Cambridge where an entrance exam was previously used unƟl
the 1980s, in the case of Cambridge, and 1995, in the case of Oxford.
The introducƟon of such tests is a response to two important concerns about relying
on school examinaƟon results. First, it has become more and more diﬃcult for univer-
siƟes to diﬀerenƟate between an increasing number of applicants to Higher EducaƟon
when there is less and less to choose between highly performing applicants in terms of
their grades at ‘A-Level’ (school exams taken at ages 17-18). For example, the propor-
Ɵon of exam entries being awarded the then top grade (A) increased from 16.2% in 1996
to 26.8% in 2009⁴ (for EducaƟon, 2013, Table 14). Second, a growing recogniƟon that
school examinaƟon results may be ‘biased’ by school type, in that applicants from state
schools with a given set of school grades on average outperform applicants from inde-
pendent schoolswith the same set of school grades once they get to university (Crawford,
2014, p.55). However, there is liƩle evidence on the implicaƟons for fair access of the
trend.
In order to fund the growth in student numbers seen above, an increasing proporƟon
of the costs of HE have been moved from taxpayers to students/graduates. This began
with the introducƟon of up-front tuiƟon fees of £1,000⁵ in 1998 (Goodman and Kaplan,
2003), switching to a system of income conƟngent loans for tuiƟon fees of up to £3,000⁶
⁴In 2010 a new top grade (A*) was introduced to help miƟgate this problem.
⁵In 1998 prices.
⁶In 2005 prices.
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in 2006 (Dearden et al., 2005), and, most recently, to fees of up to £9,000⁷ in 2012. While
each of these changes in funding policy has sparked fears of reduced parƟcipaƟon (e.g.
The SuƩon Trust, 2013), parƟcularly among those from less advantaged backgrounds,
they have yet to result in any sustained reducƟon in parƟcipaƟon rates (HEFCE, 2013;
UCAS, 2013). Analyses suggest that while fees in isolaƟon are likely to put individuals
oﬀ university parƟcipaƟon, such eﬀects are oﬀset by the impact of increasing grants and
loans alongside them (Wyness, 2009; Dearden et al., 2010, 2013).
Alongside the increase in fees in 2006-07, the Oﬃce for Fair Access (OfFA) was estab-
lished, charged with promoƟng and safeguarding fair access to English HE insƟtuƟons:
one of its core aims is to secure “improvements in the number and/or proporƟons of stu-
dents in higher educaƟon from low income and other under-represented groups” (Oﬃce
for Fair Access, 2014). Its role was increased as part of the further increase in tuiƟon
fees in 2012: in order to charge fees above £6,000 universiƟes are required to agree “ac-
cess agreements” with OfFA, detailing the acƟons they will take to promote fair access to
their insƟtuƟon. At present, not all English universiƟes charge fees of £9,000, but all do
charge above £6,000, meaning that OfFA must have approved an access agreement for
all English universiƟes.
1.5 Thesis outline
By showing the current extent of inequality and the beneﬁts of aƩending Higher Educa-
Ɵon, I have demonstrated the importance of understanding socio-economic inequaliƟes
in access to Higher EducaƟon in England. Furthermore, I have highlighted ways in which
the previous literature does not address important issues, such as the relaƟve impor-
tance of inequaliƟes in applicaƟon and inequaliƟes in whether applicants go on to aƩend
university. This thesis makes several important contribuƟons to the ﬁeld, proceeding as
follows.
In Chapter 2 I provide important new evidence on the extent of inequaliƟes in access to
English universiƟes using longitudinal data for a recent cohort. I esƟmate the associaƟon
between household income and young people’s chances of aƩending university, esƟmat-
ing both the uncondiƟonal income gradient and the income gradient condiƟonal on a rich
⁷In 2012 prices.
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set of background characterisƟcs, including young people’s prior academic aƩainment. I
analyse the extent of these inequaliƟes in applicaƟon, in aƩendance, and in aƩendance
condiƟonal on applicaƟon. Spliƫng the admissions process into these two steps and
analysing them separately, as well as together, yields important new insights about the
point at which inequality in access to university emerges. Also in this chapter, speciﬁ-
cally SecƟon 2.5, I analyse the diﬀerences in the SES gradient in access to Russell Group
universiƟes, some of the most compeƟƟve English insƟtuƟons, relaƟve to the overall SES
inequaliƟes. A version of this chapter has been published in the journal Fiscal Studies as
Anders (2012a) and an earlier version was published as Anders (2012c).
The analysis in Chapter 2 splits access to HE into two main parts. First, the emergence
of socio-economic inequaliƟes in the years running up to making an applicaƟon. Sec-
ondly, whether applicants’ chances are aﬀected by their social background at the point
of applicaƟon. The remaining two chapters concentrate on an aspect of each of these in
turn.
Chapter 3 looks at the former. In order to get a beƩer understanding of why young people
from poorer backgrounds are less likely ulƟmately to make an applicaƟon, I explore the
inﬂuence of SES on changes in young people’s expectaƟons during their teenage years of
applying to university. I make use of duraƟonmodelling techniques to analyse transiƟons
in young people’s expectaƟons both from being ‘likely to apply’ to being ‘unlikely to ap-
ply’ and vice versa, since it is quite possible that the factors associated with young people
raising their expectaƟons and starƟng to think that they are likely to apply to university
are diﬀerent from the factors inﬂuencing movement in the other direcƟon. A version of
this chapter was awarded the Helen Robinson Prize for Best Paper by a Young Researcher
at the WPEG⁸ Conference 2014, while related work was published as Anders and Mick-
lewright (2013).
In contrast to Chapter 3, Chapter 4 considers an issue of fair access among applicants.
I address a potenƟal implicaƟon of the increasing use of selecƟon tests as part of the
admissions processes of the most compeƟƟve English universiƟes. Applying the quasi-
experimental method of diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences to administraƟve data from the Uni-
versity of Oxford never before used for evaluaƟon purposes, I esƟmate the eﬀects of
the introducƟon of an apƟtude test as part of the admissions processes for Economics
courses at this university. Speciﬁcally, I assess whether the eﬀects diﬀer depending on
⁸Work, Pensions and Labour Economics Study Group, Department of Economics, University of Sheﬃeld
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applicants SES (using school type as a proxy) and gender. A version of this chapter was
previously published as Anders (2014).
Finally, Chapter 5 summarises and restates the main conclusions from the three substan-
Ɵve chapters.
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Chapter 2
The link between household income,
university applicaƟon, and university
aƩendance
2.1 IntroducƟon
An intergeneraƟonally mobile society is one in which an individual’s life chances do not
depend solely on their parents’ socioeconomic status, but also on the individual’s own
abiliƟes, eﬀorts and luck (Blanden et al., 2005, p.4). Given the high rewards to university
qualiﬁcaƟons in the labour market, discussed in Chapter 1.2, the link between house-
hold income and university aƩendance will have important implicaƟons for the extent
of intergeneraƟonal social mobility in society and is thus an issue of key public policy
concern.
Finding the causal impact of income on educaƟon or university aƩendance is a diﬃcult
task. One ideally requires some sort of exogenous variaƟon in permanent household in-
come that is uncorrelated with other characterisƟcs usually associated with parƟcular
income levels, such as policy changes over Ɵme, across regions or for diﬀerent types of
people. Very few studies have had access to such variaƟon, with a notable excepƟon be-
ing Acemoglu and Pischke (2001) for the US, which uses changes in the extent of income
inequality over Ɵme as a source of variaƟon.
For the UK, Blanden and Gregg (2004) compare a range of strategies to get around this
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problem, including controlling for sibling ﬁxed eﬀects and controlling for parental income
post-childhood as a proxy for permanent income. However, the more typical approach
(e.g. Blanden and Machin (2004); Gayle et al. (2003); Marcenaro-GuƟerrez et al. (2007);
Chowdry et al. (2013)) is to use a rich set of controls to try to account for the other ways
in which children from richer and poorer families diﬀer from one another in order to get
as close as possible to a causal esƟmate of income on educaƟonal aƩainment or higher
educaƟon (HE) parƟcipaƟon. Due to the problemof omiƩed variable bias, esƟmates from
this method cannot be treated as truly causal. I follow a similar approach in this chapter,
using rich data from a recent cohort of young people, the Longitudinal Study of Young
People in England (LSYPE), whose parƟcipants turned age 18 (and could therefore start
university) in academic year 2008-09.
This chapter makes three important contribuƟons to the conƟnuing policy debate in this
area. First, I demonstrate the extent of diﬀerences in university parƟcipaƟon by house-
hold income (as opposed to other measures of socioeconomic status) for a very recent
cohort of young people, using a large longitudinal dataset with income measured across
mulƟple waves, as well as myriad other measures of socioeconomic and family back-
ground characterisƟcs, school characterisƟcs and rich measures of prior aƩainment. This
is in stark contrast to much previous research, which has tended to use either much
older cohorts operaƟng under very diﬀerent HE systems (e.g. Blanden andMachin, 2004)
and/or where available income data have been of low quality or not present at all (e.g.
Gayle et al. (2003); Marcenaro-GuƟerrez et al. (2007); Chowdry et al. (2013)). This allows
me to look in more detail than has hitherto been possible in the UK at the ways in which
income both directly and indirectly impacts on university parƟcipaƟon for a recent co-
hort of university entrants. QuanƟfying the extent of inequality in a meaningful way is
important, giving us a beƩer understanding of the issue than from poorly-deﬁned com-
parisons such as: “a person who is well-oﬀ is seven Ɵmes more likely to go to university
than someone from a poor background” (Cameron, 2010).
Second, I am able to examine the relaƟonship between household income (and other
factors) and the decision to apply to university, as well as the decision to aƩend. This
enables me to invesƟgate whether the socioeconomic gradient in university aƩendance
(which many other studies in the UK have found) is primarily driven by diﬀerences in the
propensity of young people from diﬀerent backgrounds to apply to university, or whether
it is driven by factors that come aŌer the point of applicaƟon, such as accepted applicants
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from less advantaged backgrounds choosing not to take up their places or universiƟes
discriminaƟng against students frompoorer backgrounds. This is an important disƟncƟon
from a policy viewpoint, since the appropriate response will vary depending on the stage
at which one observes income gradients emerging.
Finally, building on the analysis of access to any university, I analyse the diﬀerences in
parƟcipaƟon rates by household income for a select group of ‘high quality’ universiƟes in
the UK known as the Russell Group, exploiƟng the large size of the dataset, and the fact
that the young people interviewed were asked which university they aƩend. Alongside
concerns about the overall HE parƟcipaƟon gap, more speciﬁc concerns have been raised
that young people from poorer socioeconomic backgrounds are disproporƟonately likely
to aƩend less presƟgious insƟtuƟons (The SuƩon Trust, 2008, p.7), which are likely to
garner lower returns in the labour market (e.g. Chevalier and Conlon, 2003).
This chapter proceeds as follows: SecƟon 2.2 brieﬂy summarises the ﬁndings of previ-
ous research looking at the relaƟonship between income (or proxies of income) and HE
parƟcipaƟon. SecƟon 2.3 describes the data and models that I use. SecƟon 2.4 reports
the main results showing how household income aﬀects both the probability of a young
person applying to university and parƟcipaƟon condiƟonal on applying. SecƟon 2.5 ex-
tends the analysis to look at whether income plays a role in determining the probability
of aƩending a Russell Group university. SecƟon 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Theory and previous research
Whymight one expect to see a relaƟonship between household income and university at-
tendance? Human capital theory (Becker and Tomes, 1986) is amodel of the transmission
of income from parents to children under the assumpƟon that parents maximise uƟlity,
but care for their children. Under this model, parents’ income should not be related to
children’s outcomes unless there are credit constraints or children’s human capital is in-
cluded in their parent’s uƟlity funcƟon. In such cases, the model predicts a direct eﬀect
of parental income on children’s outcomes (Becker and Tomes, 1986, p. 12).
In using the term credit constraints, this chapter refers primarily to its long run con-
cept, as disƟnguished by Carneiro and Heckman (2002). Short run credit constraints are
the more familiar constraints on ﬁnancing available at a parƟcular point in Ɵme, while
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long run credit constraints are ‘the inability of the child to buy the parental environ-
ment and genes that form the cogniƟve and non-cogniƟve abiliƟes required for success’
(Carneiro and Heckman, 2002, p.705-706). Other research suggests that short-run credit
constraints are not a parƟcularly big problem (e.g. Carneiro and Heckman (2002) for the
U.S. and Dearden et al. (2004) for the U.K.) and other evidence on this issue (Chowdry
et al., 2012) shows that the new HE funding regime in the UK is parƟcularly generous to
students from poorer backgrounds. Blau (1999, p.263), summarising the US literature
on the impact of income on educaƟonal outcomes concludes, among other points, that
permanent income is more important than transitory income in explaining educaƟonal
outcomes (and thus that long-run credit constraints are more important than short-run
credit constraints), though sƟll less important than other parental characterisƟcs (such
as parental educaƟon).
This chapter extends previous analysis looking at the link between household income
(or proxies of income) on the probability of aƩending university. As discussed above,
ﬁnding the causal impact of income on educaƟon or university aƩendance is diﬃcult
to do robustly. Acemoglu and Pischke (2001) aƩempt to do so by using changes in the
overall income distribuƟon over Ɵme in the US to directly address the role of household
income in determining college enrolment. By examining shiŌs in enrolment across the
income distribuƟon during the same period they argue that the causal impact of house-
hold income may be idenƟﬁed. They ﬁnd that a 10 percent increase in family income
increases college enrolments by 1-1.4 percentage points (Acemoglu and Pischke, 2001,
p.903). They also compare these causal esƟmates with esƟmates that include wider fam-
ily background eﬀects suggesƟng that family income, rather than other factors related to
family background, explains 27 percentage points of the 36 percentage point diﬀerence
in the enrolment rates of children from the top and boƩom quarƟles in 1992 (Acemoglu
and Pischke, 2001, p.901).
Previous empirical studies from the UK have also suggested a link between household in-
come and higher levels of university aƩendance. For example, Blanden and Gregg (2004)
apply a variety of methods, including sibling ﬁxed eﬀects esƟmaƟon, to a variety of UK
cohort datasets and ﬁnd a small impact of household income on educaƟonal outcomes,
including the probability of gaining a degree. Blanden and Machin (2004) use several
cohorts of data spanning diﬀerent cohorts to examine the changing relaƟonship as the
proporƟon of the populaƟon who aƩend university greatly increased. They use several
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methods, with diﬀering measures of parƟcipaƟon and income inequality, to show that
the expansion of parƟcipaƟon has not been equally distributed across the populaƟon.
Rather it has disproporƟonately resulted in increased parƟcipaƟon rates among young
people from beƩer oﬀ families.
Gayle et al. (2003) use a single cohort of the Youth Cohort Study (YCS)¹ to model demand
for HE. AŌer controlling for prior aƩainment at age 16, their models suggest that ethnic-
ity, housing tenure, region and parental educaƟon show a conƟnued associaƟon with the
probability of HE aƩendance. They argue that in the absence of a beƩer alternaƟve in
the YCS, one can view housing tenure as a proxy for parental wealth, and hence that there
is an associaƟon between parental wealth and university aƩendance. On the contrary,
Marcenaro-GuƟerrez et al. (2007) also use data from the YCS, but this Ɵme take advan-
tage of mulƟple cohorts between 1994 and 2000 to analyse the socioeconomic gradients
associated with the probability of aƩending university. They ﬁnd no associaƟon between
socioeconomic factors and the probability of aƩending university once they condiƟon on
academic aƩainment at 16 or 18 and, hence, conclude that the socioeconomic inequality
in university aƩendance arises earlier in the educaƟon system.
Chowdry et al. (2013) use administraƟvedata, formedby linking theNaƟonal Pupil Database
(NPD) and Higher EducaƟon StaƟsƟcs Authority (HESA) data, to consider the associaƟon
between an index of socioeconomic status and HE aƩendance. They ﬁnd a raw gap in the
probability of university aƩendance between the top and boƩom socioeconomic quinƟle
groups of 40.7 percentage points for boys and 44.6 percentage point for girls. They use
linear probability regression models with school ﬁxed eﬀects to esƟmate the remaining
socioeconomic gap controlling for other factors. The gap between the top and boƩom
quinƟle groups is signiﬁcantly reduced once other individual and school controls are in-
cluded, with the gap standing at 29.9 percentage points for boys and 35.8 for girls. This
is reduced sƟll further once prior aƩainment is controlled for, ﬁrst at age 11 with the
gap at 21.1 percentage points for boys and 25.6 for girls, then at age 16 with gaps of 8.7
percentage points for boys and 11.3 percentage points for girls (Chowdry et al., 2013,
p.15).
These UK studies have all found sizeable gaps in parƟcipaƟon between young people
from higher and lower socioeconomic backgrounds, which are substanƟally reduced or
¹Unlike the LSYPE, the YCS covers both England and Wales. Gayle et al. (2003) analyse YCS cohort 9,
surveying children eligible to leave school in 1997. University parƟcipaƟon is hence measured in autumn
2000.
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even eliminated enƟrely once prior aƩainment (usually up to age 16) is accounted for.
On this basis, they generally conclude that socioeconomic status aﬀects HE parƟcipaƟon
only indirectly through its impact on academic results up to 16, but has no addiƟonal
direct impact. I am able to test this ﬁnding more thoroughly in this chapter, by using a
measure of permanent income rather than someproxymeasure of socioeconomic status,
by being able to include a variety of other background controls, including othermeasures
of socioeconomic and family background, school characterisƟcs and rich measures of
prior aƩainment in the model, and also by being able to separate out the applicaƟon and
aƩendance decisions.
Very few previous studies have invesƟgated socioeconomic gaps in university applica-
Ɵons. Using data from the University and College Admissions Service, who broker almost
all applicaƟons for undergraduate study at UK universiƟes, the Department for Business,
InnovaƟon & Skills (2009) presented evidence of how university applicaƟons to ‘SuƩon
13’² insƟtuƟons varied according to school type (which they used as a proxy for socio-
economic status). They found that, for a given level of aƩainment, those who applied to
a ‘SuƩon 13’ university were nomore or less likely to receive an oﬀer dependent on their
school type. However, the probability of applicaƟon to a ‘SuƩon 13’ insƟtuƟon did vary
by school type, even aŌer condiƟoning on average aƩainment within schools. This re-
searchwas carried out at school level and did not have the rich individual socio¬economic
background data available in the LSYPE though. More recently, both Shiner and Noden
(2014) and Boliver (2013) ﬁnd that social class has an “inﬂuence in orienƟng candidates
towards diﬀerent types of university” (Shiner and Noden, 2014, p.19), even aŌer condi-
Ɵoning on ethnicity, school type and academic aƩainment at A-Level.
Boliver (2013) also ﬁnds that young people from higher social class groups aremore likely
to receive an oﬀer from a Russell Group university, condiƟonal on having applied to one,
than their peers with more disadvantaged backgrounds, aŌer having controlled from A-
Level grades. By contrast, Chowdry et al. (2013) also invesƟgated the relaƟonship be-
tween socioeconomic status and aƩendance at a group of high status insƟtuƟons, cov-
ering 35% of HE parƟcipants who aƩend either a Russell Group insƟtuƟon or a university
with a higher Research Assessment Exercise score than the lowest amongst the Russell
²The ‘SuƩon 13’ is an alternaƟve grouping of ‘elite’ universiƟes drawn up by the SuƩon Trust. It in-
cludes the following insƟtuƟons: University of Birmingham, University of Bristol, University of Cambridge,
Durham University, University of Edinburgh, Imperial College, London School of Economics, University of
Noƫngham, University of Oxford, University of St Andrews, University College London, University of War-
wick and University of York.
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Group. They ﬁnd evidence of substanƟal socioeconomic diﬀerences in the likelihood of
aƩending a high status insƟtuƟon, condiƟonal on going to university, of just over 30 per-
centage points between males and females in the top and boƩom SES quinƟles. How-
ever, in line with their ﬁndings on HE parƟcipaƟon overall, they are able to explain the
vast majority of these diﬀerences by controlling for a limited set of individual charac-
terisƟcs, school ﬁxed eﬀects and rich measures of prior aƩainment from age 11 to age
18.
A major determinant of an individual’s decision to apply to university at all or to a Russell
Group insƟtuƟon will be their underlying ‘innate’ ability and factors like parental moƟva-
Ɵon and support. Clearly if these factors are correlated with family income and HE par-
ƟcipaƟon then esƟmates of the eﬀects of income will be upward biased (Haveman and
Wolfe, 1995, p.1833). To minimise the risk of this happening I follow much of the previ-
ous literature in this area by including a proxy of ability in the analysis (here measured
by naƟonal achievement test scores in Maths, English and Science at age 11). This does
have drawbacks. Household income and parental moƟvaƟon are likely to have already
impacted on the academic achievement of children at 11. As a result, models which in-
clude such controls will potenƟally underesƟmate the true impact of household income
on university applicaƟons and aƩendance. I discuss this in more detail in the next sec-
Ɵon.
2.3 Data and models
2.3.1 Data
The Longitudinal Study of Young People in England (LSYPE) (Department for EducaƟon
and NaƟonal Centre for Social Research, 2011) was iniƟally funded by the Department for
EducaƟon for seven ‘waves’ of data, which were collected annually, beginning in Summer
2004 when cohort members were in Year 9 (aged 13-14).³ Interviews were conducted
with young people and their parents, covering informaƟon about the cohort members
themselves and the households in which they grew up. This is linked with administra-
Ɵve data from the NaƟonal Pupil Database (NPD) to provide informaƟon on the young
³The LSYPE has now been extended for an addiƟonal wave at age 25, funded by the Economic and
Social Research Council and managed by the Centre for Longitudinal Studies at the InsƟtute of EducaƟon.
For more informaƟon see http://www.cls.ioe.ac.uk/lsype.
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person’s schooling experiences and aƩainment, including data from naƟonal achieve-
ment tests sat at the end of Key Stage 2 (age 10-11, the end of primary school) and Key
Stage 4 (age 15-16, the end of compulsory secondary school). Having high quality data
on prior aƩainment with low non-response is a major advantage compared to many pre-
vious studies based on survey data.
Wave 7 (currently themost recentwave) covers young people aged 19-20 and allows us to
model entry to university at age 18-19 or 19-20, i.e. going from sixth form or further ed-
ucaƟon college to university immediately or aŌer a single gap year. This includes the vast
majority of thosewho go to university. To the extent that pupils frompoorer backgrounds
are more likely to go to university later, however, this chapter may potenƟally overstate
the magnitude of any income gap in parƟcipaƟon (Bekhradnia, 2003, p.2).
Table 2.1: Percentages of Young People Achieving Key ApplicaƟon Milestones for the
sample with variables used in determinants models
Overall Female Male
University aƩend 39.3 ( 0.55) 43.0 ( 0.78) 35.6 ( 0.77)
Sample size 7875 4048 3827
HE aƩend 44.0 ( 0.56) 47.7 ( 0.79) 40.2 ( 0.79)
Sample size 7875 4048 3827
University apply 51.1 ( 0.56) 55.0 ( 0.78) 47.0 ( 0.81)
Sample size 7875 4048 3827
Uni. aƩend, condiƟonal on applying 77.0 ( 0.60) 78.1 ( 0.80) 75.7 ( 0.91)
Sample size 4855 2641 2214
Russell Group aƩend 9.9 ( 0.34) 11.0 ( 0.49) 8.9 ( 0.46)
Sample size 7864 4043 3821
Russell Group, condiƟonal on university 25.3 ( 0.70) 25.5 ( 0.95) 25.0 ( 1.04)
Sample size 3844 2120 1724
Russell Group, condiƟonal on uni. apply 19.4 ( 0.57) 19.9 ( 0.78) 18.9 ( 0.83)
Sample size 4855 2641 2214
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Weighted usingWave 7 LSYPEWeights, which aƩempt to adjust for
oversampling and aƩriƟon. ApplicaƟon, Oﬀers, Acceptances and AƩendance calculated across Wave 5, 6
and 7. Sample: Wave 7 respondents with valid income data from at least one of Waves 1-4, ethnic group,
month of birth, parental educaƟon, KS3 school type.
Table 2.1 shows the percentage of individuals who reach the milestones in the univer-
sity applicaƟon process that I will be analysing. My sample includes individuals in Wave
7 with non-missing data on university applicaƟons from Waves 5 and 6, university at-
tendance from Waves 6 and 7, household equivalised income, ethnic group, month of
birth, parental educaƟon and KS3 school type. Measurement of university applicaƟon,
aƩendance and household income are criƟcal to this chapter’s analysis. Exclusions due
to missing data on other variables occur where use of missing variable dummies would
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not be possible due to the small number of missing values.
I analyse university aƩendance, rather thanHE aƩendance, so that I can use the sequence
of quesƟons asked about the university applicaƟon process in the LSYPE. However, Table
2.1 also shows, for comparison purposes, the proporƟon who undertake HE. This is a
broader deﬁniƟon than those who go to university, includes those taking HE courses at
Further EducaƟon colleges, and canbemore readily comparedwith oﬃcial data. It is clear
from the table that parƟcipaƟon rates in the LSYPE appear to be higher than one would
anƟcipate from published data. The Higher EducaƟon IniƟal ParƟcipaƟon Rate (HEIPR)
for ages 17-19 in 2008/09 is 32.9% and in 2009/10 is 34.1% (Department for Business,
InnovaƟon & Skills, 2011). Since the LSYPE measurement spans these two years one
would expect its esƟmate of HE aƩendance to lie somewhere between these two ﬁgures.
In the LSYPE it is notably larger at 44% (with a standard error of 0.56).
This is probably related to aƩriƟon in the LSYPE sample (just 62.4% of the iniƟal sample
remain by Wave 7). While I use the sampling and non-response weights provided in the
data, these do not appear to be suﬃcient to replicate HE parƟcipaƟon rates observed
in the populaƟon. To the extent that students from poorer families are more likely to
drop out of the survey, this may mean that this analysis overstates the magnitude of the
income gaps in university parƟcipaƟon.
The Russell Group refers to a group of twenty research intensive UK insƟtuƟons which
are oŌen considered to be amongst the most presƟgious universiƟes in the UK.⁴ Table
2.1 shows that the proporƟon of the whole cohort who aƩend a Russell Group univer-
sity is just short of 10%, while the proporƟon of university aƩendees at a Russell Group
university is 25%. Another comparison worth drawing here is that while 77% of those
who apply to university get into one, only 19% of those who apply to university get into
a Russell Group insƟtuƟon. The truly comparable measure is missing here, since I do not
observe whether individuals apply to a Russell Group university or not.
The LSYPEmeasures household income at eachwave between 1 and 4 (i.e. between ages
14 and 17), although the quesƟons asked vary across thewaves. An approximaƟon to per-
⁴In March 2012 four addiƟonal insƟtuƟons joined the Russell Group. However, given the Ɵmeframe
of the data collecƟon, for my purposes the Russell Group is made up of the following twenty universiƟes:
University of Birmingham, University of Bristol, University of Cambridge, Cardiﬀ University, University of
Edinburgh, University of Glasgow, Imperial College London, King’s College London, University of Leeds,
University of Liverpool, London School of Economics and PoliƟcal Science, University of Manchester, New-
castle University, University of Noƫngham, University of Oxford, Queen’s University Belfast, University of
Sheﬃeld, University of Southampton, University College London and University of Warwick.
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manent income is calculated by averaging across as many waves as are available for each
individual (Blau, 1999, p.263). If income data is not missing at random, this could bias
my esƟmates, but feel this is preferable to reducing the sample size. Summary staƟsƟcs
of household equivalised income are shown in Table 2.2. Income has been equivalised
(i.e. adjusted to account for household composiƟon) by dividing by the square root of
household size at the Ɵme of each data collecƟon point.
Table 2.2: LSYPE vs. FRS equivalised gross family income summary staƟsƟcs
CharacterisƟc LSYPE FRS
Mean 15,909 19,376
Standard DeviaƟon 11,883 19,615
Minimum 226 81
Maximum 146,707 572,261
1st PercenƟle 2,555 3,054
10th PercenƟle 4,990 7,006
25th PercenƟle 7,780 9,617
Median 13,013 14,942
75th PercenƟle 20,104 23,177
90th PercenƟle 31,573 34,528
99th PercenƟle 53,568 85,242
N 8,682 9,811
Notes: LSYPE: Incomes adjusted to Wave 1 (2004) prices using Annual RPI. ApproximaƟon to permanent
income by averaging across available income measurements between waves 1 and 4. Equivalised by divid-
ing incomemeasure at each Ɵme point by square root of family size at relevant Ɵme point. Weighted using
LSYPEWave 7 Respondent weights. Sample: Wave 7 respondents with valid income data from at least one
ofWaves 1-4. FRS: Income is Total Gross Household Income. Household with no children between the ages
of 13 and 15 or outside England have been excluded. All incomes in 2004 prices, adjusted using annual
RPI. Weighted using gross3 grossing factor.
In order to check that the income distribuƟon generated through the above process, I
derive a simple comparisonmeasure from the Family Resources Survey (FRS) for the same
years: household income is a major focus in the FRS. The comparaƟve variables were
constructed using the FRS derived family income variable. Only families with dependent
children between the ages of 13 and 15, living in England (the FRS covers the whole of
the UK) were included in the calculaƟons to make the sample more comparable. Unlike
the LSYPE measure, the FRS income measure is based on only one year’s data, meaning
one would expect greater variaƟon in measurement.
Overall, the LSYPE appears to underesƟmate household incomes relaƟve to esƟmates ob-
tained from the Family Resources Survey (FRS) (see Table 2.2 for a comparison between
the LSYPE and the FRS). However, to the extent that under-reporƟng of household in-
come is relaƟvely constant across the true income distribuƟon, this should not change
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the relaƟve ranking of individuals. Given that my regression models account for house-
hold income by focusing on diﬀerences in parƟcipaƟon rates between individuals who fall
into diﬀerent quinƟles of the income distribuƟon, my main results should be unaﬀected
by this under-reporƟng.
2.3.2 University admissions as sequenƟal decisions
Previous research has considered diﬀerences in university parƟcipaƟon according to var-
ious measures of socioeconomic status. However, the story is more complicated: the
process of university admissions is a set of sequenƟal decisions. Although there are in
fact many nuances to this model, andmanymore hurdles in the process, I have chosen to
simplify these into three steps: applicaƟon, aƩendance, and aƩendance at a high-status
university.
Mydecision to simplify in thiswaywasmade for reasons both of clarity and the limitaƟons
of the data. In exploring the data I discovered that very few applicants fail to receive any
oﬀers and very few of those oﬀered a place do not accept any of them. The quesƟons
in the LSYPE then do not allow us to disƟnguish between those who do not aƩend due
to failing to fulﬁl their condiƟonal oﬀers and those who choose not to aƩend for some
other reason.
Nevertheless, assumpƟon of even a simple sequenƟal model like this allows me to de-
compose the probability of aƩending into the probability of applying and the probability
of aƩending, condiƟonal on having applied, as shown in EquaƟon 2.1. This allows us to
look at the mechanism(s) by which income may aﬀect aƩendance, which has not been
done in the literature before.
P (AƩend) = P (Apply)  P (AƩendjApply) (2.1)
Of course, this model treats these two decisions as independent. However, those stu-
dents applying to university presumably do so because they feel they have some chance
of receiving an oﬀer and fulﬁlling any condiƟons required. I hope that the richness of
the data and the controls used in the models (discussed in more detail below) will make
this assumpƟon plausible. A second consideraƟon is that the inevitably smaller sam-
ple size of the condiƟonal models means that standard errors of esƟmates will be larger
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simply for this reason. This means that comparisons between the condiƟonal and uncon-
diƟonal models on the basis of changes in signiﬁcance are not reliable (Gayle et al., 2000,
p.63).
2.3.3 Methods and models
I begin by exploring the ‘raw’ relaƟonship between household income and university ad-
mission (applicaƟon, aƩendance and the condiƟonal relaƟonship). In order to do so I use
the non-parametric technique of local polynomial smoothing. It allows me to assess the
relaƟonship without making any funcƟonal form assumpƟons. I have chosen to esƟmate
the appropriate bandwidth using the method suggested by Silverman (1986, p.48) to ﬁt
the local polynomial.
I then move on to consider how this relaƟonship changes once I control for other ways
in which young people from richer and poorer families diﬀer. To do so, I adopt a simple
regression approach in which I account for household income by assigning individuals to
quinƟle groups of equivalised permanent household income⁵ and then control for diﬀer-
ent factors. The diﬀerent model speciﬁcaƟons I use are discussed in more detail in the
next secƟon.
I esƟmate regression models of university applicaƟon (Apply), university aƩendance (At-
tend) anduniversity aƩendance condiƟonal onhaving applied (CondiƟonal AƩend). Given
the binary nature of each of these decisions, I use probit regressionmodels. This is prefer-
able to using linear probability models, where there is no constraint on the predicted
probabiliƟes falling between 0 and 1 (Thomas, 2005, pp.445-450).
I proceed in a sequenƟal fashion. The ﬁrst model (M1) simply includes dummy variables
for quinƟle groups of equivalised household income. This shows the ‘raw’ gap inHE aƩen-
dance, applicaƟon or condiƟonal aƩendance by quinƟles of income before other factors
that are correlated with both income and HE decisions are accounted for, and can be
thought of as the “total” eﬀect of income on HE decisions. The following models add a
series of other characterisƟcs to the model, which are designed to account for the other
ways in which young people from richer and poorer families diﬀer from one another.
These factors can be thought of as “transmission mechanisms” between family income
⁵In Anders (2012c) I used piecewise-linear parametric speciﬁcaƟons for income, nevertheless obtaining
similar results.
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and university parƟcipaƟon decisions. To the extent that they are socially graded, their
inclusion will reduce the “direct” eﬀect of household income on university parƟcipaƟon.
Their primary purpose is thus to beƩer understand the routes through which family in-
comes aﬀects educaƟon choices.
In the second model (M2) I add controls for average prior aƩainment in English, maths
and science at Key Stage 2 in an aƩempt to proxy for innate ability. As outlined above, to
the extent that income has already aﬀected aƩainment at age 11, however, its inclusion
will downward bias esƟmates of the direct eﬀect of income on university parƟcipaƟon
decisions, such that the coeﬃcient on household income now refers to its addiƟonal ef-
fect aŌer the point at which prior aƩainment is measured. This is known as a ‘value-
added’ model. While it is clear that there are drawbacks to such speciﬁcaƟons (Todd
andWolpin, 2004, p.7-9) the available data do not provide the necessary informaƟon for
more demanding speciﬁcaƟons, such as the so called ‘cumulaƟve’ speciﬁcaƟon. Such a
speciﬁcaƟon would, for example allow for the possibility of correlaƟon between aƩain-
ment measures and future family inputs.
In the third model (M3) I add a variety of other observed socioeconomic factors: month
of birth, ethnic group, government oﬃce region, number of siblings, number of older
siblings, whether family type is lone parent or couple, and parental educaƟon. These
are primarily measured at Wave 1 (age 14), but data from later waves are subsƟtuted
where Wave 1 data were missing. Since most are Ɵme invariant I assume that this is
not problemaƟc. This model provides insight into the role of family income in determin-
ing university parƟcipaƟon for a young person with otherwise idenƟcal characterisƟcs in
early secondary school.
In the fourth model (M4) I addiƟonally account for the eﬀects of a young person’s sec-
ondary school experience on university applicaƟon and parƟcipaƟon decisions. Again,
this is likely to reduce the direct eﬀect of household income on educaƟon choices, be-
cause a young person’s socio-economic characterisƟcs help to determine the secondary
school that they aƩend. The most extreme example of this will be independent schools:
an individual’s household income is highly correlated with their probability of aƩending
this school type.
When accounƟng for secondary school aƩended, I use dummy variables for school type,
including whether the school is a community school, a community technology college,
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a foundaƟon school, an independent school, a voluntary aided school or a voluntary
controlled school. AddiƟonally, dummy variables were included indicaƟng whether the
school is a grammar school (i.e. has a selecƟve admissions policy) and whether it has an
aƩached sixth form. This should allow us to idenƟfy the impact of speciﬁc school charac-
terisƟcs on university admissions. To test whether other observed or unobserved school
characterisƟcs were important determinants of university parƟcipaƟon decisions, I also
esƟmated linear probability models with school ﬁxed eﬀects,⁶ reported in the Appendix
A. These gave broadly similar results.
My ﬁŌh and subsequent models invesƟgate the quesƟon of whether permanent income
conƟnues to play a role in determining university applicaƟon and parƟcipaƟon decisions
over and above its eﬀect on aƩainment at age 16. Previous research has suggested that,
conƟngent on aƩainment at age 16, socioeconomic background plays very liƩle addi-
Ɵonal role in HE parƟcipaƟon decisions. In model ﬁve (M5) I return to simply controlling
for prior aƩainment, this Ɵme at both Key Stage 2 and Key Stage 4, using individuals’
capped GCSE point scores. I do not use Key Stage 5 results in this analysis, since they
are not available to universiƟes at the Ɵme they make their decisions. One might also be
more concerned about endogeneity here than for earlier measures of aƩainment: indi-
viduals who have decided to go to universitymay put inmore eﬀort in an aƩempt tomake
sure theymeet their university oﬀer and hence obtain beƩer grades than individuals who
have decided not to go to university.
In the sixth model (M6), I once again add controls for other socioeconomic and demo-
graphic factors, so this model is comparable to M3 except that I now control for GCSE
results.
For the ﬁnal model (M7), I once again add school characterisƟcs. The model is compa-
rable with M4 except that I now control for GCSE results. As with M4, linear probability
models with school ﬁxed eﬀects were esƟmated as a robustness check, and these gave
broadly similar results.
I esƟmate the same speciﬁcaƟons when considering parƟcipaƟon at a Russell Group in-
sƟtuƟon in SecƟon 2.5, but there I only consider models of aƩendance and aƩendance
condiƟonal on going to university. Unlike for the analysis of aƩendance at any university,
separate models for males and females are not esƟmated and reported in Appendix A,
⁶I used linear probability models when including school ﬁxed eﬀects due to the inconsistency of the
probit esƟmator including ﬁxed eﬀects.
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due to the smaller sample size in the model condiƟonal on university aƩendance.
I do not observe the universiƟes individuals have applied to. This means that I cannot be
sure how much of any socioeconomic gradient in aƩendance at a Russell Group insƟtu-
Ɵon emerges because of the diﬀering applicaƟon choices of individuals across the house-
hold income distribuƟon. An individual cannot, aŌer all, aƩend a Russell Group university
unless he or she applied to one or more of them. The ﬁndings from Department for Busi-
ness, InnovaƟon & Skills (2009) suggest this could well drive a socioeconomic gradient in
the presƟge of university aƩended.
2.4 Analysis of the decision process
2.4.1 Non-parametric analysis
I ﬁrst consider the simple uncondiƟonal university aƩendance model, which is compara-
ble to much previous research in this area. Figure 2.1 presents new informaƟon on the
relaƟonship between university parƟcipaƟon and equivalised household income in the
UK. It demonstrates graphically that university parƟcipaƟon increases with equivalised
household income, roughly doubling between the 20th and 80th percenƟles. For a large
porƟon of the income distribuƟon the relaƟonship appears linear, however two features
of the relaƟonship seem parƟcularly worthy of note.
First, at the boƩom of the distribuƟon (below approximately £6,000 equivalised house-
hold income, within approximately the boƩom decile group) parƟcipaƟon rates iniƟally
fall as household income rises. Further invesƟgaƟon suggests it is related to diﬀerences
in university aƩendance rates by ethnic groups and measurement error of certain kinds
of income amongst lone parent families⁷ (see Anders (2012b) for more details). Regard-
less, a formal Wald test of the hypothesis of a diﬀerent linear slope for the secƟon below
£6,000 fails to reject the null hypothesis of no diﬀerence at the 5% level. Furthermore,
there are very few young people with household income in this boƩom secƟon, as wit-
nessed by the large conﬁdence intervals.
Second, the aƩendance rate seems to plateau at about 75%. This corresponds with an
⁷Brewer et al. (2013b) discuss the reasons for this ‘Ɵck’ further, concluding that it is mainly accounted
for by under-reporƟng of income.
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Figure 2.1: University aƩendance at age 18-19 or 19-20 and household equivalised income
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Notes: Weighted using LSYPEWave 7 ParƟcipantWeights. Local polynomial smoothing using Epanechnikov
kernel and Silverman’s opƟmal bandwidth of 1590.738. Sample size: 7791. VerƟcal lines show 20th, 40th,
60th and 80th percenƟles of income.
equivalised income of roughly £40,000, around the 92nd percenƟle of the income dis-
tribuƟon. Such a ﬁnding is consistent with a story of credit constraints driving the re-
laƟonship, at least in part, but it is also possible that preferences, parƟcipaƟon at later
ages or parƟcipaƟon in HE rather than university may help to explain why parƟcipaƟon
is below 100% even for those from families at the very top of the income distribuƟon.
It does, however, accord with previous evidence for the US on the non-linearity of the
relaƟonship between income and children’s outcomes (Mayer, 2002, pp.25-27).
Table 2.3: Probability of university applicaƟon or aƩendance by equivalised income
quinƟle group
Variable Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q5-Q1 N
University aƩend 0.23 0.26 0.34 0.45 0.66 0.43 8261
University apply 0.34 0.38 0.46 0.57 0.77 0.43 8261
Uni. aƩend (condiƟonal on applying) 0.68 0.69 0.73 0.78 0.86 0.18 5073
Notes: Adjusted using LSYPE Wave 7 respondent weights, which aƩempt to adjust for oversampling and
aƩriƟon. Sample: Wave 7 ParƟcipants with valid responses for variables used in models.
This analysis alone tells us nothing about the point in the applicaƟon process at which
the gap emerges. One could, for example, take from this that young people from across
the income spectrum are applying to university, but those with lower household incomes
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do not get places. To invesƟgate whether this is true or not, I use the addiƟonal infor-
maƟon available in the LSYPE to look at the relaƟonship between household income and
university applicaƟon, and by extension university aƩendance condiƟonal on having ap-
plied.
As Figure 2.2 shows, a strikingly similar relaƟonship holds as for the uncondiƟonal aƩen-
dance model. It is interesƟng to note that the percentage of young people who apply to
university is approximately 10 percentage points higher than the percentage who aƩend
(shown in Figure 2.1) across the income range, implying that even young people from the
richest families who have applied to university are not guaranteed to go.
Taken together, Figures 2.1 and2.2mean it is unsurprising that incomehas amuch smaller
associaƟon with aƩending university, condiƟonal on having applied, as shown in Figure
2.3. The bulk of the raw gap arises at or before the decision to apply. Once a young
person has applied to university the probability that someone in the top quinƟle group
will aƩend is just 1.2 Ɵmes larger than someone in the boƩom quinƟle group. Moreover,
this is before any confounding factors have been considered.
However, the extent to which this is self-selecƟon on the basis of other characterisƟcs
cannot be idenƟﬁed by looking simply at this correlaƟon. To understand the role of other
characterisƟcs in transmiƫng the relaƟonship between household income and university
applicaƟons and aƩendance, I turn now to regression modelling.
2.4.2 Regression models of university admissions
Table 2.4 presents the predicted probabiliƟes of university applicaƟon, aƩendance and
aƩendance condiƟonal on applicaƟon for hypotheƟcal individuals within each household
income quinƟle group, whose other characterisƟcs are held constant at sample means.
Results tables reporƟng marginal eﬀects of being in each quinƟle group (relaƟve to the
middle quinƟle group) at sample means, along with the marginal eﬀects of other co-
variates in the models, are given in Appendix A. Also reported there are similar models
esƟmated separately for males and females.
Considering ﬁrst the aƩendance models,⁸ the ‘raw’ relaƟonship between household in-
come and university parƟcipaƟon shows that young people in the top quinƟle group are
⁸See Table A.1 in Appendix A.
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Figure 2.2: University applicaƟon and household equivalised income
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Notes: Weighted using LSYPEWave 7 ParƟcipantWeights. Local polynomial smoothing using Epanechnikov
kernel and Silverman’s opƟmal bandwidth of 1590.738. Sample size: 7791. VerƟcal lines show 20th, 40th,
60th and 80th percenƟles of income.
Figure 2.3: University aƩendance, condiƟonal on applicaƟon, and household equivalised
income
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Notes: Weighted using LSYPEWave 7 ParƟcipantWeights. Local polynomial smoothing using Epanechnikov
kernel and Silverman’s opƟmal bandwidth of 2295.6094. Sample size: 4780. VerƟcal lines show 20th, 40th,
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Table 2.4: Predicted probabiliƟes by income quinƟle group
University aƩend M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7
Q1 0.23 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.41 0.38 0.38
Q2 0.27 0.31 0.33 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.37
Q3 0.34 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.38
Q4 0.45 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.38 0.39 0.39
Q5 0.66 0.55 0.49 0.46 0.44 0.44 0.43
Q5 - Q1 0.43 0.22 0.15 0.11 0.03 0.05 0.05
P > jF j 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 7,939 7,939 7,939 7,939 7,939 7,939 7,939
University applicaƟon M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7
Q1 0.34 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.52 0.49 0.49
Q2 0.38 0.43 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.49
Q3 0.46 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.50
Q4 0.57 0.53 0.52 0.53 0.50 0.51 0.51
Q5 0.77 0.69 0.63 0.60 0.57 0.57 0.56
Q5 - Q1 0.43 0.25 0.18 0.14 0.05 0.08 0.07
P > jF j 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 7,939 7,939 7,939 7,939 7,939 7,939 7,939
AƩending, condiƟonal on applying M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7
Q1 0.68 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.78 0.78 0.77
Q2 0.69 0.72 0.74 0.74 0.76 0.76 0.76
Q3 0.73 0.74 0.75 0.76 0.75 0.75 0.76
Q4 0.78 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.77 0.77
Q5 0.86 0.82 0.80 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79
Q5 - Q1 0.18 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01
P > jF j 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.36 0.22 0.53 0.58
N 4,887 4,887 4,887 4,887 4,887 4,887 4,887
Variables M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7
Income QuinƟle Dummies p p p p p p p
KS2 AƩainment p p p p p p
KS4 AƩainment p p p
Other Socioeconomic Chars. p p p p
KS3 School CharacterisƟcs p p
Notes: P > jF j shows p-value for test of joint signiﬁcance of income group dummies in the probit regres-
sions used to generate the predicted probabiliƟes. Other characterisƟcs held constant at sample means.
Adjusted using LSYPE Wave 7 respondent weights. Full regression tables for these models are reported in
Appendix A, Tables A.1, A.4 and A.7, respecƟvely.
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43 percentage points or just over 2.5 Ɵmes more likely to aƩend university than those
in the boƩom quinƟle group. Comparing this with the Apply models,⁹ I ﬁnd that the gap
between the top and boƩom quinƟle groups is exactly the same. It comes as no surprise
then thatmy ﬁrst CondiƟonal AƩendmodel¹⁰ idenƟﬁes a smaller (but signiﬁcant) associa-
Ɵon between household income and university parƟcipaƟon amongst thosewho applied,
even with no controlling factors: those in the top quinƟle group are 18 percentage points
more likely to get into university, condiƟonal on having applied.
These associaƟons are much reduced once addiƟonal covariates are controlled for. The
base regression model takes no account of prior aƩainment, which acts both as an im-
perfect measure of underlying ability and as a funcƟon of socioeconomic characterisƟcs
on aƩainment up to that point. Once Key Stage 2 aƩainment is included (in M2), the
aƩendance gap between top and boƩom quinƟle groups falls to 22 percentage points.
The relaƟvely small associaƟon between income and aƩendance, condiƟonal on having
applied, becomes even smaller, with the gap between top and boƩom quinƟle groups
closing to 7 percentage points.
Further drops are seen once socioeconomic characterisƟcs are added in M3 and the
marginal eﬀects for condiƟonal aƩendance become insigniﬁcant. It is interesƟng to ex-
amine the other signiﬁcant associaƟons in the aƩendance model (reported in Table A.1
of Appendix A). There are signiﬁcant marginal eﬀects for the ethnicity dummy variables,
showing higher parƟcipaƟon rates amongst non-white groups. The sibling eﬀect dummy
variables suggest a negaƟve associaƟon between being a younger sibling and university
aƩendance, condiƟonal on family size. I also idenƟfy a signiﬁcant esƟmated negaƟve
eﬀect of 7 percentage points for lone parent family status. Some parental educaƟon
variables are also signiﬁcant: father having a degree relaƟve to holding GCSE qualiﬁca-
Ɵons, in parƟcular, shows a large and signiﬁcant posiƟve marginal eﬀect comparable to
moving from the boƩom to the top income quinƟle group.
In M4, the gap in aƩendance between the top and boƩom income quinƟle groups falls
to 11 percentage points. Even holding school characterisƟcs constant and for individ-
uals with otherwise very similar socioeconomic characterisƟcs, a signiﬁcant associaƟon
between household income and university aƩendance is sƟll idenƟﬁed.¹¹
⁹See Table A.4 in Appendix A.
¹⁰See Table A.7 in Appendix A.
¹¹This is also true if I use school ﬁxed eﬀects instead of school type dummies to account for school
characterisƟcs. These results may be found as M8 in Table A.1 in Appendix A
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For M5, I return to controlling for just prior aƩainment, this Ɵme at both Key Stage 2 and
Key Stage 4/GCSE. In terms of university aƩendance, the gap between the top and boƩom
income quinƟle groups drops to 3 percentage points, although a test of joint signiﬁcance
of all income quinƟles suggests the associaƟon is sƟll signiﬁcant. This is in contrast to
much previous research which has tended to ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect of socioeconomic
status is generally idenƟﬁed once educaƟonal aƩainment at the age of 16 is accounted
for (e.g. Marcenaro-GuƟerrez et al., 2007, p.351). These results suggest that a substan-
Ɵal majority of the associaƟon between household income and university aƩendance
found in previous models is channelled via educaƟonal performance earlier in the young
person’s school career. Nonetheless, there remains a small, but signiﬁcant, associaƟon
between household income and university aƩendance, even aŌer controlling for prior
aƩainment at the age of 16. I can again use the applicaƟon and condiƟonal aƩendance
models to show that this seems to be driven by the applicaƟon decision: for condiƟonal
aƩendance the remaining gaps are small and not staƟsƟcally signiﬁcant.
The further inclusion of other socioeconomic and demographic characterisƟcs in M6 and
school characterisƟcs in M7 do not substanƟally alter my conclusions, with models M5,
M6 and M7 producing very similar results. This suggests that, along with income, much
of the eﬀect of these other characterisƟcs on university parƟcipaƟon is accounted for by
its eﬀect on GCSE aƩainment.
There are generally very few staƟsƟcally signiﬁcant coeﬃcients in the condiƟonal aƩen-
dance models. In all models in which they are included, the coeﬃcients on prior aƩain-
ment are jointly signiﬁcant.¹² In M4, in addiƟon to prior aƩainment the model idenƟﬁes
a posiƟve signiﬁcant eﬀect on aƩending either an independent or grammar school and
father having educaƟon to degree level. Overall, however, the picture is of very liƩle
other than prior aƩainment playing a role in the probability of aƩendance condiƟonal on
having applied, providing liƩle evidence that universiƟes are discriminaƟng on any char-
acterisƟcs other than how qualiﬁed the young person is to aƩend their insƟtuƟon.
The applicaƟon models are interesƟng for perhaps the opposite reason. Despite con-
trolling for a large number of potenƟally confounding variables, including school ﬁxed
eﬀects, they conƟnue to provide esƟmates of a staƟsƟcally signiﬁcant associaƟon be-
tween household equivalised income and applying to university. Even holding very many
¹²Prior aƩainment is modelled using a quadraƟc and/or piecewise linear funcƟon. Although individual
coeﬃcients may not be signiﬁcant a Wald test of joint signiﬁcance always rejects the null hypothesis of no
associaƟon.
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other characterisƟcs constant young people from richer backgrounds remain more likely
to submit an applicaƟon to go to university, although the size of the gap between the
top and boƩom quinƟle groups has reduced signiﬁcantly from 43 percentage points to 7
percentage points.
The ﬁnding of small and oŌen insigniﬁcant gradients for household income condiƟonal on
having applied is reassuring, on the assumpƟon that otherwise similar individuals should
not be advantaged or disadvantaged in the admissions process by their household in-
come. However, a key quesƟon is leŌ unanswered. Although individuals with diﬀerent
household incomes seem to stand a similar chance of geƫng into university, so long as
they apply, do they get into similar universiƟes? The next secƟon provides some insight
into this important issue.
2.5 Comparison between Russell Group and others
This secƟon considers the relaƟonship between equivalised household income and at-
tendance at a Russell Group insƟtuƟon. Since they are a ‘high status’ group, one might
expect the determinants of aƩending a Russell Group university to be diﬀerent from the
determinants of aƩending university in general. In parƟcular, it is possible that although
I saw only small associaƟons between income and achieving a place at university overall
(aŌer condiƟoning on prior aƩainment up to age 16), those with high levels of income
could be disproporƟonately aƩending high quality insƟtuƟons. This maƩers for social
mobility because, as noted in Chapter 1.4, university quality aﬀects the returns that can
be achieved in the labour market: if only students from richer families go to high status
universiƟes, then their advantage will be propagated.
Figure 2.4 shows the ‘raw’ associaƟon between household income and aƩendance at a
Russell Group university. Since this encompasses the socioeconomic gradient in both
aƩending university and geƫng a place at a Russell Group insƟtuƟon it is unsurprising
(given my main analysis showed the existence of the former) that I see a household in-
come gradient here too. Individuals whose household equivalised income is at the top
quinƟle are approximately 10 percentage points more likely to aƩend than those at the
boƩom quinƟle.
Figure 2.5 shows the same associaƟon amongst those who go to any university. The
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upward slope across much of the income range shows that, amongst parƟcipants, indi-
viduals from households with higher incomes are more likely to aƩend a Russell Group
insƟtuƟon.
I see this conﬁrmed in speciﬁcaƟon M1 of Table 2.5, which presents the uncondiƟonal
eﬀect of household income quinƟle on aƩendance at a Russell Group insƟtuƟon, and
shows that those in the top quinƟle group are 20 percentage points more likely to go to
a Russell Group university than those in the boƩom quinƟle group.¹³ There is also the
same gap amongst those who go to any university.¹⁴
Table 2.5: Predicted probabiliƟes of aƩendance at Russell Group universiƟes by income
quinƟle group
Russell Group aƩend M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7
Q1 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10
Q2 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08
Q3 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Q4 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
Q5 0.24 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11
Q5 - Q1 0.20 0.10 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01
P > jF j 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.04
N 7,927 7,927 7,927 7,927 7,927 7,927 7,927
Russell Group, condiƟonal on uni. M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7
Q1 0.16 0.21 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.25
Q2 0.15 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22
Q3 0.19 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.24
Q4 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.24
Q5 0.36 0.32 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.27
Q5 - Q1 0.20 0.11 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.02
P > jF j 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.22 0.02 0.21 0.29
N 3,856 3,856 3,856 3,856 3,856 3,856 3,856
Variables M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7
Income QuinƟle Dummies p p p p p p p
KS2 AƩainment p p p p p p
KS4 AƩainment p p p
Other Socioeconomic Chars. p p p p
KS3 School CharacterisƟcs p p
Notes: P > jF j shows p-value for test of joint signiﬁcance of income group dummies in the probit regres-
sions used to generate the predicted probabiliƟes. Other characterisƟcs held constant at sample means.
Adjusted using LSYPE Wave 7 respondent weights. Full regression tables for these models are reported in
Appendix A, Tables A.10, and A.11, respecƟvely.
However, once I control for other factors this gap becomes much smaller and, in the case
of going to a Russell Group university condiƟonal on aƩending an university, becomes
staƟsƟcally insigniﬁcant in M4, M6, and M7. As one would expect, ‘ability’ measured
¹³For full results from this model see Table A.10 in Appendix A.
¹⁴For full results from this model see Table A.11 in Appendix A.
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Figure 2.4: Russell Group university aƩendance at age 18-19 or 19-20 and household
equivalised income
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Notes: Weighted using LSYPEWave 7 ParƟcipantWeights. Local polynomial smoothing using Epanechnikov
kernel and Silverman’s opƟmal bandwidth of 1577.335. Sample size: 7780. VerƟcal lines show 20th, 40th,
60th, and 80th percenƟles of equivalised household income.
Figure 2.5: Russell Group university aƩendance, condiƟonal on aƩending any university, and
household equivalised income
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Notes: Weighted using LSYPEWave 7 ParƟcipantWeights. Local polynomial smoothing using Epanechnikov
kernel and Silverman’s opƟmal bandwidth of 2485.145. Sample size: 3771. VerƟcal lines show 20th, 40th,
60th and 80th percenƟles of household equivalised income.
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by prior aƩainment at age 11 (M2) explains a good proporƟon, but not all. However,
it is when the other socioeconomic status characterisƟcs are added in M3 that the gap
narrows most strikingly. In these models, parental educaƟon to degree level is strongly
posiƟvely associated with the likelihood of aƩending a Russell Group insƟtuƟon, perhaps
suggesƟng that a parental familiarity with the university system is important in encour-
aging young people to apply to a Russell Group insƟtuƟon.
These ﬁndings suggest that the Russell Group aƩendance gap, condiƟonal on aƩending
university, is explicable by parental educaƟon and prior aƩainment at age 16. These
results do not suggest that Russell Group universiƟes discriminate against poorer appli-
cants, but rather that pupils from poorer backgrounds either have lower aƩainment or
choose not to apply for some other reason.
2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, I have invesƟgated the relaƟonship between permanent household equiv-
alised income and university applicaƟons and aƩendance for a recent cohort of young
people in England. My research has gone beyond previous work in this area in several
important respects. First, I have quanƟﬁed the relaƟonship between permanent house-
hold income and university aƩendance for a recent cohort of students in England. My
results suggest that those in the top ﬁŌh of the income distribuƟon are almost three
Ɵmes as likely to aƩend university as those in the boƩom ﬁŌh. This relaƟonship is re-
duced dramaƟcally, but does remain staƟsƟcally signiﬁcant, once I control for a range of
other confounding factors, including some that seem likely to lead to an underesƟmate
of the direct eﬀect of income on university parƟcipaƟon decisions.
Second, by analysing the probability of applicaƟon and the probability of aƩendance
condiƟonal on having applied separately, I demonstrate that the link is predominantly
driven by the applicaƟon decision. Even aŌer controlling for prior aƩainment and socio-
economic background a signiﬁcant applicaƟon gap remains. On the contrary, I idenƟfy
a relaƟvely smaller household income gradient for aƩendance condiƟonal on having ap-
plied and show that, condiƟonal on having applied, those in the top ﬁŌh of the income
distribuƟon are approximately 1.3 Ɵmes more likely to aƩend than those in the boƩom
ﬁŌh. Moreover, this diﬀerence disappears rapidly once controls for earlier educaƟonal
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aƩainment are added to the model.
Finally, I analysed aƩendance at Russell Group universiƟes, a group of presƟgious ‘high
quality’ insƟtuƟons. The gradient in aƩendance at a Russell Group university, condiƟonal
on aƩending any university, closes completely once prior aƩainment and other socio-
economic characterisƟcs have been controlled for. However, without beƩer data on the
insƟtuƟon choices of university applicants, it is impossible to analyse fully this Russell
Group admissions process. Nonetheless, I have been able to provide more detailed ev-
idence than has hitherto been possible on the relaƟonship between household income
and parƟcipaƟon at high status universiƟes in the UK.
A key ﬁnding of this chapter is that the university parƟcipaƟon gap largely emerges at
or before young people apply. This shows that narrowing the gap through policy inter-
venƟon at the point of admissions will be very diﬃcult. Such policies could only have a
signiﬁcant eﬀect if they led to a change in the desire to go to university or percepƟons
of the university applicaƟon process, in turn leading to a broader applicaƟon populaƟon.
Nevertheless, I analyse the implicaƟons for one such policy, introduced to an ‘elite’ uni-
versity, in Chapter 4.
More likely to be successful are policies that intervene earlier to ensure that those from
poorer backgrounds reach their potenƟal during their academic career and hence are
more likely to acquire the appropriate qualiﬁcaƟons to apply to university. I now turn
to this maƩer in more depth, analysing changes in young people’s expectaƟons of ap-
plying to university during their teenage years as a way of beƩer understanding the pre-
applicaƟon relaƟonship between socioeconomic status and the decision to apply to uni-
versity.
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Chapter 3
The inﬂuence of socio-economic status
on changes to young people’s
expectaƟons of applying to university
3.1 IntroducƟon
In Chapter 2, I found a large socio-economic gradient in university applicaƟon in Eng-
land. Much of this inequality can be explained by diﬀerences in academic achievement
that emerge long before the point at which young people apply to university (see also
Chowdry et al., 2013). However, even condiƟoning on these earlier academic outcomes
and other potenƟal confounding factors, a socio-economic gradient in whether or not in-
dividuals make an applicaƟon to university remains. This is despite the fact that a larger
proporƟon of English 14-year-olds from disadvantaged backgrounds expect to apply to
university than the overall proporƟon who have ulƟmately done so by age 21 (Anders
and Micklewright, 2013, pp.42-43).
This raises the quesƟon of when and why young people from less advantaged families
change theirminds aboutmaking an applicaƟon to university. Are their changes in expec-
taƟons explicable by other factors, such as academic aƩainment, or does socio-economic
status conƟnue to have an inﬂuence? Given the previous evidence that much of the
socio-economic gap in university aƩendance opens at or before the point of applicaƟon,
a beƩer understanding of the dynamics of whether or not individuals expect to apply is
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of signiﬁcant importance to the formulaƟon of policy on reducing the socio-economic
gradient in access to Higher EducaƟon.
Rather than following previous authors in using expectaƟons data as an explanatory fac-
tor for later outcomes, in this chapter I take a step back, addressing the issue directly
by analysing the inﬂuence of socio-economic status on the large number of changes in
young people’s expectaƟons of applying to university between ages 14 and 17, just be-
fore young people start making applicaƟons to university. Using rich panel data from the
Longitudinal Study of Young People in England (LSYPE), I take the novel approach of using
duraƟon modelling to analyse the dynamics of young people’s expectaƟons.
The research quesƟon and data used lend themselves naturally to this approach. Dura-
Ɵonmodelling allows the ﬂexibility to make use of all available informaƟon on the Ɵming
of events (including the possibility of mulƟple transiƟons back and forth between report-
ing ‘likely’ and ‘unlikely’ by an individual), it can take account of changes in young people’s
circumstances during the period under consideraƟon, and allows for more ﬂexible han-
dling of some missing outcomes data. The technique also allows separate analysis of
both transiƟons from being ‘likely to apply’ to being ‘unlikely to apply’ and vice versa.
This is important, since the factors which cause young people to raise their expectaƟons
and start thinking that they are likely to apply to university may be quite diﬀerent from
the causes of movement in the other direcƟon. Despite this, duraƟon modelling is not
regularly used in such seƫngs and, to my knowledge, has not been used before to model
changes in young people’s educaƟonal expectaƟons over Ɵme.
This chapter makes an important contribuƟon to the literature on access to Higher Ed-
ucaƟon. Using the longitudinal nature of the data, I provide non-parametric esƟmates
of changes in young people’s expectaƟons between the ages of 14 and 17, quanƟfying
the extent of changes in expectaƟons during this period. Making minimal assumpƟons,
I also use this technique to examine whether young people from less advantaged back-
grounds are more likely to stop, and less likely to start, thinking they are likely to apply to
university than their more advantaged peers. Furthermore, taking advantage of the rich
survey data and retaining the ﬂexibility of duraƟon modelling, I provide esƟmates of the
conƟnued inﬂuence of socio-economic status, aŌer controlling for potenƟally confound-
ing factors including prior academic aƩainment and demographic characterisƟcs. Finally,
I explore the interplay between SES and new informaƟon on academic aƩainment at age
16.
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The chapter proceeds as follows. SecƟon 3.2 reviews the literature on the socio-economic
paƩerning of educaƟonal expectaƟons and lays out a modelling strategy for idenƟfying
the inﬂuence of socio-economic status on changes in expectaƟons. SecƟon 3.3 describes
the dataset andmeasures used in this chapter. SecƟon 3.4 introduces duraƟonmodelling
as applicable to these data and sets out the beneﬁts of using it to analyse changes in
expectaƟons. Non-parametric duraƟon modelling methods are applied in SecƟon 3.5 to
explore how young people’s expectaƟons change during their teenage years and how this
is associated with socio-economic status. This iniƟal analysis is extended through use of
mulƟple regressionmodels, introduced in SecƟon 3.6 and with the results of this analysis
reported in SecƟon 3.7. Finally, SecƟon 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Background and idenƟﬁcaƟon strategy
This chapter, rather than aƩempƟng to idenƟfy the eﬀect of young people’s expectaƟons
on university aƩendance, takes a step back. It explores the role of socio-economic sta-
tus (SES) in determining the paths of young people’s expectaƟons in the ﬁrst place. The
importance of young people’s expectaƟons, parƟcularly in explaining the SES gradient
in academic aƩainment, has increasingly aƩracted academic interest over the past few
years. This has been accompanied by policy makers emphasising the need to ‘raise as-
piraƟons’, parƟcularly among high aƩaining, but low SES, young people.¹ Such policies,
in the UK, have included the now-defunct ‘Aimhigher’ programme and requirements for
outreach work by universiƟes charging more than £6,000 in tuiƟon fees in their Access
Agreements with the Oﬃce For Fair Access (OFFA).
It is important to disƟnguish upfront between young people’s expectaƟons and their as-
piraƟons. Jerrim (2011, p.6-7) summarises the diﬀerence between the two as being that
expectaƟons “implies a realisƟc assessment of future outcomes, while [aspiraƟons] re-
ﬂects children’s hopes and dreams”. For this chapter’s applicaƟon, young people might
hope to apply to university (an aspiraƟon), without expecƟng that theywill be in a realisƟc
posiƟon to do so. Although much of the policy discourse focuses on ‘raising aspiraƟons’
rather than ‘raising expectaƟons’, expectaƟons seem more likely to be informaƟve for
¹A DfE-funded study reﬂecƟng this concern found that most schools it surveyed indicated that “encour-
aging their students to apply to higher educaƟon [...] was one of their highest prioriƟes” (Thornton et al.,
2014, p.146).
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the purposes of this chapter, but understanding both aspiraƟons and expectaƟons pose
many of the same challenges.
Regardless of the interest of policymakers, studying expectaƟons is not worthwhile if
they are just an individual’s whim. However, Morgan (1998) argues that “educaƟonal
expectaƟons are not ‘ﬂights of fancy’ or ‘vague preferences’ [but rather,] because they
can be explained by a reasonable theory of raƟonal behavior, should be considered ra-
Ɵonal” (Morgan, 1998, p.157) and hence, presumably, informaƟve. Certainly, previous
work has shown a correlaƟon between educaƟonal expectaƟons and later outcomes.
Chowdry et al. (2011) ﬁnd a correlaƟon between young people thinking it likely that they
will apply to university and academic performance at age 16, even aŌer controlling for
long-run family background factors and prior aƩainment. Elsewhere in the world, analy-
sis of the Longitudinal Survey of Australian Youth esƟmates that the “correlaƟon between
intenƟon and entry to higher educaƟon is moderately strong (r = 0.59)” (Khoo and Ain-
ley, 2005, p.v). Similarly, in the US, Reynolds and Pemberton (2001) report that while
29% of those who expect to complete a college degree when asked in 1979 (age 15-16)
had done so by 1994 (aged 30-31), under 3% of those who did not expect to complete a
college degree had done so (Reynolds and Pemberton, 2001, p.723).
Using data from the Programme of InternaƟonal Student Achievement (PISA) survey, Jer-
rim (2011) examined the socio-economic paƩerning of young people’s expectaƟons of
compleƟng Higher EducaƟon. He ﬁnds that that there are large diﬀerences between ad-
vantaged and disadvantaged children’s expectaƟons in most countries throughout the
developed world. He ﬁnds that England is no excepƟon to this paƩern, with only a hand-
ful of OECD countries having signiﬁcant diﬀerences (on either side) in the strength of
the relaƟonship. By contrast, the correlaƟon between socio-economic advantage and
expectaƟons is signiﬁcantly weaker in the US than most other OECD countries, including
England.
Why do these associaƟons between expectaƟons and outcomes exist? One potenƟal ex-
planaƟon is that young people who grow up in more deprived households “may expect
less of themselves and may not fully develop their academic potenƟal because they see
liƩle hope of ever being able to complete college or using their schooling in any eﬀecƟve
way” (Cameron and Heckman, 1999, p.86). However, others, such as Gorard (2012), are
highly criƟcal of the jump from these plausible explanaƟons and observed correlaƟons
between aƫtudes and academic outcomes to seeing the relaƟonship as playing a truly
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causal role. Gorard argues that formulaƟng policy on this basis, when evidence of cau-
saƟon is so weak, is misguided because of the opportunity costs and potenƟal negaƟve
side eﬀects of policies aimed at raising aspiraƟons and expectaƟons.
Given this chapter’s focus on the inﬂuence of SES on the pathways of young people’s
expectaƟons, expectaƟons data are used as an outcome variable. Doing so means taking
a step back from its use as an explanatory variable, as was the case in the studies above.
The focus on expectaƟons as an outcome variable means that there is no need to take a
view on whether or not expectaƟons have a causal impact on academic aƩainment and
progression. Instead, it is enough to be convinced that young people’s expectaƟons are at
least symptomaƟc of the underlying social processes leading from SES, prior aƩainment,
and other background characterisƟcs to the ulƟmate decision as to whether or not to
apply to university.
This chapter contributes to a literature on the formaƟon and correlates of young people’s
educaƟonal expectaƟons and aspiraƟons. Previous work has considered similar issues in
diﬀering contexts or applying diﬀering methods. However, this is the ﬁrst analysis to con-
sider a dynamic relaƟonship between SES and young people’s expectaƟons. Rampino and
Taylor (2013) analyse young people’s educaƟonal aspiraƟons using data from the BriƟsh
Household Panel Study (BHPS), focusing in parƟcular on diﬀerences by gender, using re-
sponses to quesƟons such as “Would you like to go on to do further full-Ɵme educaƟon
at a college or University aŌer you ﬁnish school?”.² They do not consider changes in aspi-
raƟons, but do take advantage of the panel nature of the data, esƟmaƟng probit models
with individual-level random eﬀects. Fumagalli (2012) also esƟmates binary choice mod-
els of young people’s expectaƟons of geƫng a place at university (with adjustment for
selecƟon eﬀects in who is asked the quesƟon of interest) using the same dataset as that
which I use. Perhaps the paper closest in aims to this chapter is Kao and Tienda (1998):
using data from the US, they esƟmate logisƟc regression models of the associaƟon be-
tween young people’s background characterisƟcs and changes in educaƟonal aspiraƟons
(including an aspiraƟons variable lagged by one Ɵme period as a covariate).
These previous studies have all found a role for socio-economic status. Kao and Tienda
ﬁnd that socio-economic background “exerts a strong inﬂuence on educaƟonal aspira-
Ɵons and is vital to their maintenance through the high school years” (Kao and Tienda,
²The BHPS lacks data on young people’s prior academic aƩainment, which is available in the dataset
used in this chapter, and which would be strongly expected to be relevant to educaƟonal expectaƟons.
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1998, p.370). Rampino and Taylor report that “the educaƟonal aspiraƟons of boys are
more posiƟvely aﬀected by parental educaƟon than those of girls” (Rampino and Taylor,
2013, p.34), also noƟng that the eﬀect of parental aƫtudes varies by gender in the same
way. Fumagalli ﬁnds that young people from families with higher parental educaƟon are
more responsive to new informaƟon about their academic aƩainment in updaƟng their
expectaƟons of both applying to university and ulƟmately geƫng a place. In addiƟon,
she ﬁnds that, contrary to popular belief, “young people from free school meal eligible
families have more posiƟve expectaƟons [of being accepted to university, condiƟonal on
having applied], even when grades are controlled for” (Fumagalli, 2012, p.41-42).
This chapter builds on the previous literature in two important respects. First, through
use of duraƟon modelling, this chapter analyses the dynamic relaƟonship between SES
and young people’s expectaƟons in a ﬂexible way. Importantly, it allows for diﬀerent re-
laƟonships between characterisƟcs of interest and whether young people make a transi-
Ɵon depending on direcƟon of the transiƟon (i.e., ‘likely to unlikely’ or ‘unlikely to likely’).
Second, both Kao and Tienda and Rampino and Taylor focus on aspiraƟons rather than
expectaƟons, while Fumagalli analyses formaƟon of young people’s expectaƟons of be-
ing admiƩed to university, condiƟonal on having made an applicaƟon.³ Here, the focus
is on expectaƟons of applying to university, which is disƟnct from any of these.
To analyse the inﬂuence of SES on the likelihood of changes in young people’s expec-
taƟons, one must ﬁrst have some idea of the relaƟonship between the two. Drawing
on others’ ﬁndings about the determinants of expectaƟons (for example Kao and Tienda,
1998; Fumagalli, 2012; Anders andMicklewright, 2013; Rampino and Taylor, 2013) I treat
the probability of transiƟon as a funcƟon of SES and various other characterisƟcs:
Pr(ExpectaƟons) = f(SES; X) (3.1)
whereX is a vector of characterisƟcs including young people’s age, academic ability, de-
mographic characterisƟcs, school characterisƟcs, traumaƟc experiences, and local labour
market condiƟons.
The strategy is to isolate the role of SES by controlling for elements ofX . However, there
³As the quesƟon on likelihood of admission, condiƟonal on applicaƟon, is only asked to individuals who
indicate that they are more than ‘not at all likely’ to apply, Fumagalli does esƟmate models of likelihood of
applying (focusing on the probability of being at least ‘not very likely’ to apply) to deal with this selecƟon
problem.
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are several challenges to achieving this. Several of these are discussed in SecƟon 3.3.4
below, where the measurement of these variables in the dataset is considered. Most
fundamentally, one cannot be sure that other unobserved or unobservable elements do
not also appear in the funcƟon. In the absence of exogenous variaƟon in SES (which is
conceptually, let alone pracƟcally, challenging) one cannot be certain that this problem
has been dealt with. However, an alternaƟve strategy, making use of random eﬀects
(modelled either as having a normal distribuƟon or a discrete mixing distribuƟon), to
help deal with unobserved heterogeneity is discussed and applied in Appendix B. The
results obtained when I apply this method do not substanƟvely alter the ﬁndings from
this analysis in this chapter, giving me some conﬁdence in the qualitaƟve story from my
esƟmates.
3.3 Data
The Longitudinal Study of Young People in England (LSYPE) is amajor panel survey, funded
to age 20 by the UK Department of EducaƟon. The LSYPE tracks the experiences of one
cohort of young people over seven years (with one interview per year), from approxi-
mately age 14 (in 2004) to age 20 (in 2010),⁴ including interviews with the young people
themselves (throughout) and their parents (up to age 17). It collected a wide variety of
data on parƟcipants, including details on their socio-economic background, educaƟonal
aƩainment, and educaƟonal expectaƟons. Only aspects of the LSYPE relevant to the re-
search quesƟons of this chapter are discussed here; more in depth descripƟon of the
LSYPE was provided in Chapter 2.3 and is also available in Anders (2012b).
As with any longitudinal survey, the LSYPE suﬀers from aƩriƟon. One of the advantages
of duraƟon modelling is the opƟon of treaƟng missing outcome data as ‘censored’ (dis-
cussed further in SecƟon 3.4). This is preferable to having to drop respondents that aƩrit
from from the analysis, aswas necessary in Chapter 2, whichwouldmean being restricted
to a complete case sample of 8,029.⁵ Individuals who are not present in both Waves 1
and 2 are excluded, to ensure that at least one potenƟal transiƟon is observed for all
⁴Further waves following the young people as they enter the labour market are now planned, funded
by the Economic and Social Research Council. For more informaƟon visit http://www.cls.ioe.ac.uk/
lsype.
⁵This complete case sample is used (applying appropriate aƩriƟon weights) in Figure 3.1 and as a ro-
bustness check, reported in Appendix B.
58
individuals included the analysis. The number of parƟcipants at Wave 2 is 13,447 out
of the 15,770 who iniƟally responded at Wave 1 (i.e. an 85% response rate). However,
missing data for key variables reduce the sample size in the analyses to those reported
in the results tables. I weight the data for my analysis using the LSYPE-provided aƩriƟon
and non-response weights for Wave 2.
This secƟon discusses four main aspects of the data. First, the measurement of the out-
come variable (young people’s expectaƟons of applying to university), including speciﬁcs
of measurement in this dataset and more general challenges posed by use of expecta-
Ɵons data as an outcome in duraƟon modelling. Second, the sequences of expectaƟons
observed in the data. Third, the measurement of the main explanatory variable of inter-
est (young people’s SES), including construcƟon of an index of SES fromvarious indicators.
Finally, the measurement of other characterisƟcs that may confound the relaƟonship be-
tween SES and changes in expectaƟons.
3.3.1 Measurement of expectaƟons
The LSYPE begins recording young people’s expectaƟons of applying to university from
approximately age 14. Conveniently, given that this is the earliest point in the data, previ-
ous psychological and sociological literature has argued that this is also the age at which
young people “relinquish their most preferred [occupaƟonal] choices and seƩle for more
acceptable, available, choices” (Gutman and Akerman, 2008, p.5). Similarly, Goƪredson
(2002, p.98-101) argues that by the age of 14, young people have completed ‘circum-
scripƟon’ of their aspiraƟons, whereby they rule out unacceptable career aspiraƟons,
and begin ‘compromise’ by “adjusƟng their aspiraƟons to accommodate an external re-
ality” (Goƪredson, 2002, p.100). It follows that age 14 is a natural point from which to
analyse young people’s expectaƟons in a meaningful way; as such, I treat young people’s
periods of reporƟng their expectaƟons as starƟng at this point at the earliest.
The LSYPE measures young people’s expectaƟons of applying to university through a sin-
gle quesƟon repeated in most of the waves of the survey. Young people are asked “How
likely do you think it is that you will apply to university?” and are asked to choose from
the opƟons ‘very likely’, ‘fairly likely’, ‘not very likely’,⁶ and ‘not at all likely’.
⁶In colloquial English, the expression ‘not very likely’ means ‘fairly unlikely’, rather than its more literal
interpretaƟon of anything less than ‘very likely’.
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To get an iniƟal impression of the evoluƟon of young people’s expectaƟons during this pe-
riod, Figure 3.1 shows for each wave, 1 to 7, the percentages of young people who report
being ‘very likely’, ‘fairly likely’, ‘not very likely’ and ‘not at all likely’ to apply to univer-
sity.⁷ For the purposes of this graph, only individuals with expectaƟons data throughout
the survey are included (i.e. a balanced panel or complete case sample). However, as
discussed above, this restricƟon is relaxed aŌer this point. From Wave 5 onwards it is
necessary to include an addiƟonal category for those who have actually applied. InWave
7, only ameasure of having actually applied to university by this point is reliably available.
The overall percentage who are ‘likely’ (or who have already applied in later waves) can
be seen by following the cumulaƟve percentage above the ‘fairly likely’ blocks in Figure
3.1.
Figure 3.1: Young people’s expectaƟons of university applicaƟon, Wave 1 (age 13-14) to
Wave 7 (age 19-20)
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Notes: Sample: Wave 7 respondents with non-missing data on university expectaƟons and university ap-
plicaƟon at each wave (complete case analysis). ‘Don’t know’ (4.4% of weighted Wave 1 respondents)
treated as ‘not very likely’. Wave 7 aƩriƟon and non-response weights applied. Unweighted sample size =
8,029. Data labels show cumulaƟve percentages.
Overall, the proporƟon reporƟng that they are ‘likely’ to apply to university declines sub-
stanƟally from 68% in Wave 1 to 57% in Wave 4, at the end of the ﬁrst year following
⁷Individuals may also respond that they ‘don’t know’ whether they are likely to apply to university;
however, this is not a common response (4.4% of weighted Wave 1 respondents) and I choose to classify
those who report ‘don’t know’ as being ‘not very likely’ to apply to university.
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GCSEs. There is essenƟally no change in Wave 5, when actual applicaƟons begin to be
included (treated, for this purpose, as ‘likely’ to apply, given that they are eﬀecƟvely ‘cer-
tain’ to apply), before a small rise inWave 6 when the studymembers would be complet-
ing any Further EducaƟon (two years of post-compulsory educaƟon). There is no reliable
quesƟon on expectaƟons of applicaƟon to university in Wave 7, only a report of whether
individuals have already applied. However, individuals will conƟnue to enter university
over the subsequent few years (or even later as mature students) (UCAS, 2012). It is
therefore probable that a small percentage of the sample would have responded that
they were likely to expect to apply to university if they had been asked in Wave 7.
In any case, as the aim of this chapter is to understand changes in young people’s expec-
taƟons in the period leading up to making an applicaƟon, the analysis in this chapter is
deliberately curtailed at the last wave in which individuals have not yet started applying
to university (Wave 4, or roughly age 17). Analysing the period in which individuals apply
to university would introduce bias from non-randommovement of individuals out of the
sample, caused by having actually made an applicaƟon. I discuss this, along with other
kinds of ‘right-censoring’ in SecƟon 3.4.
For the analysis in this chapter, I dichotomise the expectaƟons variable into a disƟncƟon
between young people who are ‘likely’ (‘very likely’ or ‘fairly likely’) or ‘unlikely’ (‘not
very likely’ or ‘not at all likely’) to apply to university.⁸ Assuming that young people are
uƟlity maximising (and that they give honest responses), they will report that they think
it is likely that they will apply to university if they judge that the beneﬁts they will derive
from making an applicaƟon exceed the costs they will experience as a result of doing so.
They switch to thinking that it is unlikely that they will apply if their assessment of these
costs and beneﬁts changes to the point that the balance has shiŌed in the other direcƟon.
Many of the factors that will inﬂuence these decisions are not observed. However, I use
those that are observed to assesswhich factors seem important in altering youngpeople’s
percepƟons of their potenƟal to gain from higher educaƟon.
One problem with analysing expectaƟons, rather than observed behaviour, is that ‘talk is
cheap’. This is an analysis of individual’s stated preferences, rather than the revealed pref-
⁸Anders and Micklewright (2013) analyse the trends of those who report being ‘very likely’ to apply to
university, ﬁnding that, unlike the overall proporƟon who report being ‘likely’, this in fact rises over Ɵme.
This appears to be driven by a tendency for individuals’ expectaƟons to ‘harden’ over Ɵme, with those who
report being ‘fairly likely’ tending towards reporƟng ‘very likely’, while those who report being ‘not very
likely’ tend towards reporƟng ‘not at all likely’.
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erences indicated by their acƟons i.e. actually making an applicaƟon to university. Cog-
niƟve biases, such as social desirability bias, may aﬀect the responses. However, young
people’s reported expectaƟons do seem informaƟve as to the applicaƟon behaviour ob-
served in later waves of the LSYPE. 64% of those who say they think it is likely (‘very’ or
‘fairly’) that they will apply to university at age 14 have done so by the last point of obser-
vaƟon (and more may do so at a later date), while only 22% of those who say they think
it is unlikely have done so by the same Ɵme.
Use of a stated preference measure as an outcome variable in duraƟon modelling in this
way is innovaƟve,⁹ but raises some issues. The method is more normally employed to
analyse transiƟons between clearly deﬁnable states, such as movement between em-
ployment and unemployment. Individuals’ evaluaƟon of their probability of applying to
university will be subject to far more measurement error than transiƟons between such
states. For example, factors such as an individual’s bad mood on the day of the interview
could Ɵp them from reporƟng ‘fairly likely’ to reporƟng ‘not very likely’, if their general
assessment of the costs and beneﬁts of applying to university are ﬁnely balanced. Un-
like in a standard binary regression model this does not just cause dependent variable
measurement error. Since the sample for duraƟon models depends on the reported ex-
pectaƟon of applicaƟon in the previous period, measurement error could also aﬀect this.
This will bias overall transiƟon rates upwards, and may also aﬀect esƟmated coeﬃcients
if groups are diﬀerenƟally aﬀected by measurement error.
3.3.2 Sequences of expectaƟons
To illustrate the form of data used in duraƟon analysis, in Figure 3.2 I present the tenmost
common sequences of individuals’ expectaƟons between ages 14 and 17 observed in the
dataset, which account for around 85% of the sample. Solid lines represent periods when
the individual reports being likely to apply to university; doƩed lines represent periods
when individuals report being unlikely to apply to university; the absence of any line indi-
cates missing data (including due to item non-response, unit non-response and aƩriƟon)
at this Ɵme point. I have chosen to highlight the start and end of periods of being ‘likely
to apply’: a verƟcal tail to the line represents the point at which the spell is observed to
begin; and an arrowhead represents the point at which the spell is observed to end in a
⁹Some precedent is provided by studies of the dynamics of poverty (Bane and Ellwood, 1986, for ex-
ample) where measurement of income may aﬀect movement in or out of poverty.
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Figure 3.2: Ten most common sequences of individuals’ expectaƟons from age 14 to 17
and the percentage of the total sample with each sequence
Age
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
14 15 16 17
Percentage
39.8
16.7
6.1
4.9
4.3
3.0
2.6
2.4
2.2
2.0
Notes: A solid line indicates that the individual reported they were ‘very likely’ or ‘fairly likely’ to apply
to university at the most recent wave. A doƩed line indicates that the individual reported that they were
‘not very likely’ or ‘not at all likely’ to apply to university at the most recent wave. The absence of a line
indicates that there was no report from the individual at the most recent wave. An arrow tail at the start
of a spell highlights that in the previous wave the negaƟve outcome was observed. An arrow head at
the end of a spell highlights that in the following wave a negaƟve outcome was observed. The verƟcal
line at age 17 highlights that this is the ﬁnal point of observaƟon and hence data beyond this point only
provide informaƟon on whether the spell was censored (whether by no change or missing data) at this
point. CalculaƟon of frequency of spell types was weighted using LSYPEWave 2 aƩriƟon and non-response
weights. Individuals with missing data in either of Waves 1 or 2 are excluded. Percentages based on total
sample size of 11,249.
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transiƟon to the person reporƟng that they are ‘unlikely to apply’ to university.¹⁰
AŌer exclusions, there are a theoreƟcal maximum of 35 possible sequences of expec-
taƟons during this period, all of which are observed in the data. The most frequent
sequence of expectaƟons (40% of the sample) is for individuals to report being ‘likely
to apply’ at every interview from age 14 to age 17. The second most frequent (17% of
the sample) is reporƟng being ‘unlikely to apply’ at every interview from age 14 to age
17.
Table 3.1: Summary staƟsƟcs about sequences of expectaƟons
Group N Percentage SES Index
1 4,503 40.2 0.45
2 1,857 16.6 -0.49
3 673 6.0 -0.35
4 547 4.9 -0.07
5 478 4.3 -0.23
6 342 3.1 0.04
7 279 2.5 -0.04
8 269 2.4 -0.53
9 249 2.2 0.05
10 225 2.0 -0.27
Other 1,828 15.9 -0.30
All 11,249 100 0.00
Notes: Adjusted using LSYPE-provided Wave 2 survey design, aƩriƟon and non-response weights. Individ-
uals with missing data in either of Waves 1 or 2 are excluded.
To provide context to these records, in Table 3.1 I provide summary staƟsƟcs about indi-
viduals who have the sequences of spells in Figure 3.2. I also include a category for all
remaining groups, which makes up about 16% of the sample and is somewhat less ad-
vantaged than the average individual. The SES index (discussed further in SecƟon 3.3.3)
is standardised such that the sample mean is 0 and the standard deviaƟon is 1. Individ-
uals who always report being likely to apply to university (type 1) are, on average, half
a standard deviaƟon more advantaged than the sample as a whole. Conversely, those
who always report being unlikely to apply (type 2) are roughly the same amount less
advantaged than the sample as a whole.
Another important feature of the data is that, although an individual’s changes in ex-
pectaƟons seem more likely to be a conƟnuous underlying process, I only observe their
reported expectaƟons in surveys once a year. This is, therefore, ‘discrete Ɵme’, as op-
¹⁰I could just as easily have highlighted the start and end points of periods of being ‘unlikely to apply’,
but could not do both without loss of clarity.
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posed to ‘conƟnuous Ɵme’, data. This is illustrated in Figure 3.2: spells only start or end
at exact ages, never somewhere in between. It follows that the models in this chapter
esƟmate the probability of transiƟon between these observaƟon Ɵmes, rather than at
any arbitrary Ɵme point. A further limitaƟon of discrete Ɵme data is that some transi-
Ɵons back and forth between the observaƟon points are hidden, which may bias overall
transiƟon rates downwards. The issues arising from use of discrete Ɵme data in duraƟon
modelling are discussed further in SecƟon 3.4.
3.3.3 Measurement of SES
The LSYPE includes a rich set of data on parƟcipants’ characterisƟcs. These will be impor-
tant in measuring young people’s socio-economic status (SES) well, in order to assess its
associaƟon with changes in their expectaƟons of applying to university. Household in-
come, parental educaƟon, and parental occupaƟonal status are all important in measur-
ing SES (Hauser, 1994). The rich datawill also be important in controlling for other factors
correlatedwith SES, butwhich seem likely tomake an important contribuƟon in their own
right, such as demographic characterisƟcs, school characterisƟcs, local area, and prior
academic aƩainment. I return to these in the following secƟon (SecƟon 3.3.4).
Household income is measured at each wave between 1 and 4. As the method used
to collect informaƟon on income varies somewhat from wave to wave and previous re-
search has suggested ‘permanent’ income (rather than transitory income) has a much
larger eﬀect on young people’s educaƟonal outcomes (Jenkins and Schluter, 2002, p.2), I
construct an approximaƟon of the household’s ‘permanent’ income by averaging across
the four measures. I also equivalise my incomemeasure by dividing it by the square root
of household size, thus recognising the importance of family resources being stretched
further in larger households. As discussed in Chapter 2, household income is underes-
Ɵmated to some extent in the LSYPE, relaƟve to other social surveys where it is a major
focus.
Parental educaƟon seems likely to play a role in the formaƟon of young people’s edu-
caƟonal expectaƟons (Ganzach, 2000), not least because young people whose parents
went to university are more likely to see it as a natural next step in their educaƟon. In-
deed, Table 3.3 shows that, at least based on the iniƟal report of expectaƟons at age 14,
more of the young people who report that they are ‘likely to apply’ to university have
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at least one parent who themselves received higher educaƟon than young people who
report that they are ‘unlikely to apply’. Data on parental educaƟon is collected from both
parents (where available) at eachwave between 1 and 4 using the same quesƟons; where
both parents’ educaƟon level are recorded and these diﬀer I use the highest. Unsurpris-
ingly, there is very liƩle change over Ɵme, since most parents have already completed
the highest educaƟonal level they will achieve by this stage of their lives.
Parents’ occupaƟonal status is recorded in the LSYPE using the NaƟonal StaƟsƟcs Socio-
Economic ClassiﬁcaƟon (NS-SEC), which was designed to capture social class diﬀerences
between the diﬀerent occupaƟonal types (Rose and Pevalin, 2001). It is based on ques-
Ɵons about job Ɵtle, role and responsibiliƟes asked of both parents (where available) at
each wave between 1 and 4. As with parental educaƟon, where both parents’ occupa-
Ɵonal status are recorded I use the highest, and, also as with parental educaƟon, there
is liƩle change in this variable over the period of analysis. I collapse the classiﬁcaƟon
into four ordinal groups¹¹: managerial and professional occupaƟons; intermediate occu-
paƟons; rouƟne and manual occupaƟons; and long-term unemployed.¹² Social class is
seen by sociologists as a key element of an individual’s SES, as “the experience of indi-
viduals in terms of economic security, stability and prospects will typically diﬀer with the
class posiƟons that they hold” (Goldthorpe and McKnight, 2004). ParƟcularly relaƟng to
the purposes of this chapter, sociological theory suggests that “young people (and their
families) have, as their major educaƟonal goal, the acquisiƟon of a level of educaƟon
that will allow them to aƩain a class posiƟon at least as good as that of their family of
origin” (Breen and Yaish, 2006, p.232). This implies that individuals from diﬀerent class
backgrounds will have, on average, diﬀerent educaƟonal expectaƟons.
I combine the above measures of household equivalised ‘permanent’ income, highest
parental educaƟon, and highest parental occupaƟonal status into a single index of SES.¹³
This provides a broader measure of family circumstances that any one measure would
provide. I use principal components analysis with a polychoric correlaƟonmatrix (Olsson,
1979; Kolenikov and Angeles, 2009) to construct a single index, which explains roughly
¹¹Some sociologists are criƟcal of aƩempts to express social class in ordinal terms, most parƟcularly in
how self-employed individuals should ﬁt into such a hierarchy (Rose et al., 2005).
¹²Individuals experiencing short-term unemployment at the Ɵme of interview are allocated a group
based on their most recent job.
¹³All measures from age 14 (except income, which is averaged over available observaƟons between age
14-17), except where not available due to item non-response at age 14, when data from later in the survey
was used.
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three quarters of the variaƟon in the three individual measures.¹⁴ I divide individuals into
quinƟle groups on the basis of this SES index; Table 3.2 reports the family characterisƟcs
of the median individual in each quinƟle group, demonstraƟng increasing SES across all
three dimensions, as would be expected.
Table 3.2: Median family characterisƟcs by quinƟle group of socioeconomic status index
QuinƟle group Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Parental
EducaƟon
< A*-C GCSE A*-C GCSE A Level HE < Degree Degree
OccupaƟonal
Status
RouƟne
occupaƟons
RouƟne
occupaƟons
Intermediate
occupaƟons
Higher
occupaƟons
Higher
occupaƟons
Family Income
(£p.a.)
5,699 9,549 12,992 16,433 29,941
N 2,585 2,221 2,171 2,201 2,071
Notes: Adjusted using LSYPE-providedWave 2 survey design, aƩriƟon and non-responseweights. Standard
errors, clustered by school, in parentheses. Family income is equivalised by dividing by the square root of
household size. Sample: Wave 2 respondents with non-missing data on university expectaƟons (‘don’t
know’ treated as ‘not very likely’) and university applicaƟons.
3.3.4 Measurement of other factors
The dataset also includes a rich set of parƟcipant characterisƟcs and experiences. As
discussed in SecƟon 3.2, many of these factors are correlated with SES. However, they
may also have independent eﬀects of their own, with their exclusion resulƟng in omit-
ted variable bias. It follows that it is important to be able to control well for these other
factors to isolate the inﬂuence of SES. In this secƟon I discuss the measurement and im-
portance of academic ability, demographic characterisƟcs (age, gender and ethnicity),
school characterisƟcs, traumaƟc events, and local labour market condiƟons.
One of the advantages of duraƟon modelling is that it allows me to take into account dif-
ferent values of explanatory variables at diﬀerent Ɵmes. As such, in addiƟon to describ-
ing potenƟal explanatory factors in the dataset, I also assess their potenƟal use as valid
Ɵme-varying covariates. This requires that they are measured repeatedly and consis-
tently throughout the LSYPE, sincemeasurement in diﬀeringwaysmight result in changes
that are not due to any underlying change in circumstances. Box-Steﬀensmeier and Jones
¹⁴Despite the presence of non-conƟnuous variables, construcƟng my SES index using any of the fol-
lowing alternaƟve methods makes no substanƟve diﬀerence (correlaƟon coeﬃcients between the indices
r > 0:98) to my SES quinƟle groups: principal components analysis applied to a Pearson’s correlaƟon ma-
trix; factor analysis treaƟng the income, educaƟon and occupaƟonal status as conƟnuous and using full
informaƟon maximum likelihood (FIML) to deal with missing data; factor analysis treaƟng income as con-
Ɵnuous, and educaƟon and occupaƟonal status as ordinal, using FIML, but no weights. Given this, I am
conﬁdent that my SES index is robust.
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(2004, p.110-112) also highlight the importance of understanding the temporal ordering
of Ɵme-varying covariates and the events it is being claimed that they are causing. Since,
by their nature, Ɵme-varying covariates are not ﬁxed, it is parƟcularly important to assess
whether, in this case, such covariates are plausibly being aﬀected by changes in young
people’s expectaƟons of applying to university. This eventuality, referred to as reverse
causaƟon, would result in endogeneity bias to the esƟmates (Goodliﬀe, 2003).
Table 3.3: Summary staƟsƟcs of sample by whether young person reports being likely or
unlikely to apply to university at age 14
Variable Mean of Mean of Mean of Standard
Unlikely Likely Whole Sample DeviaƟon
SES Index (Z-Score) -0.40 0.20 0.00 1.00
( 0.02) ( 0.02) ( 0.02)
Equivalised Family Permanent Income 12464.07 18029.33 16199.21 12220.12
( 209.35) ( 256.24) ( 208.44)
At least one parent has Higher EducaƟon 0.06 0.25 0.19 0.39
( 0.00) ( 0.01) ( 0.01)
At least one parent has ‘Higher’ Occ. Status 0.26 0.49 0.41 0.49
( 0.01) ( 0.01) ( 0.01)
Lone Parent 0.28 0.20 0.22 0.42
( 0.01) ( 0.01) ( 0.00)
Gender: Male 0.55 0.48 0.51 0.50
( 0.01) ( 0.01) ( 0.01)
Ethnicity: Non-White 0.07 0.16 0.13 0.34
( 0.00) ( 0.01) ( 0.01)
Age 11 AƩainment Z-Score -0.48 0.23 -0.00 0.97
( 0.02) ( 0.02) ( 0.02)
Age 16 AƩainment Z-Score -0.60 0.29 -0.00 1.00
( 0.03) ( 0.02) ( 0.02)
AƩend Independent School 0.02 0.10 0.07 0.26
( 0.01) ( 0.01) ( 0.01)
AƩend Grammar School 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.19
( 0.00) ( 0.01) ( 0.01)
AƩend school with Sixth Form 0.52 0.56 0.55 0.50
( 0.02) ( 0.02) ( 0.02)
Local Unemployment Rate (%) at Age 14 4.61 4.80 4.74 2.14
( 0.07) ( 0.07) ( 0.06)
N 3686 7523 11209
Notes: Weighted using LSYPEWave 2 sample design and non-response weighted weights. Standard errors,
clustered by school, in parentheses. Household income is equivalised by dividing by the square room of
household size.
CorrelaƟon between academic ability and SES would lead to upward biased esƟmates
of the eﬀect of SES on young people’s expectaƟons of aƩending university, if it is not
included in the model. Academic aƩainment provides an imperfect proxy for the unmea-
surable individual trait of ability. A parƟcularly important imperfecƟon is that SES is likely
to have an eﬀect on the aƩainment measures available in the LSYPE. This suggests that
models including aƩainmentmay underesƟmate the inﬂuence of SES. The LSYPE provides
measures of academic aƩainment through linkage to selected elements of the NaƟonal
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Pupil Database (NPD). This provides informaƟon on the young people’s academic aƩain-
ment from Key Stage 2 (age 11), Key Stage 3 (age 14) and Key Stage 4 (age 16). Having
high-quality, seldom-missing data on prior aƩainment is a major advantage compared
to many surveys. Key Stage 5 data (from qualiﬁcaƟons taken at ages 17 and 18) are now
available as part of the LSYPE release. However, I do not use them as part of this analysis,
since the relevant examinaƟons are taken aŌer the period of this analysis.
Some of the academic aƩainment data from ages 11 and 14 aremissing where an individ-
ual was not in the state educaƟon sector and hence either did not take the relevant tests
(SATS) or, if they did, the school chose not to report them. Pupils at independent schools
are under no obligaƟon to do either, althoughmany do. Amissing variable dummy is em-
ployed for Key Stage 2 scores to prevent these individuals from being excluded from my
analyses. This is not an opƟon for Key Stage 3, since the missing variable dummy would
be almost perfectly collinear with an indicator of independent school aƩendance. Given
this problem, the fact that children are unlikely to change schools immediately aŌer tak-
ing their Key Stage 3 SATS and the low stakes nature of Key Stage 3 SATS I decide not to
include it in my analysis.¹⁵
For Key Stage 2 (KS2), I use the average raw point score across all three subjects (Maths,
English and Science¹⁶). KS2 SATS are relaƟvely low stakes examinaƟons for pupils, al-
though they are rather higher stakes for primary schools and there is some limited use
by secondary schools for tasks such as sorƟng pupils into ability groups. AŌer weight-
ing, there is a roughly normal distribuƟon of scores ranging between approximately 0
and 100. The mean score is 65.5 and the median individual obtains a score of 67.3. I
standardise this variable, creaƟng a ‘Z-score’ with a mean score of zero and a standard
deviaƟon of one.
For Key Stage 4 (KS4), I use the oﬃcial capped GCSE score. GCSEs (General CerƟﬁcates of
Secondary EducaƟon) are high stakes public examinaƟons, taken at the end of compul-
sory educaƟon. They potenƟally have a large bearing on the individual’s future educaƟon
and/or employment. AŌerweighƟng, the capped point score gives a range of scores from
0 to 483, with a mean of 306 and a median of 326. The capped point score is calculated
from an individual’s best 8 GCSEs or equivalent qualiﬁcaƟons. This is in contrast to the
uncapped score, which uses all GCSEs and equivalents taken and hence is more subject
¹⁵It is also worth noƟng that Key Stage 3 SATS were abolished in England in 2008 (BBC News).
¹⁶In the raw scores, Science is out of 80. I rescale it to be out of 100, ensuring it receives the sameweight
as Maths and English.
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to manipulaƟon by schools. Again, I standardise this so that the score has mean zero
and standard deviaƟon one. However, it should be noted that there is some potenƟal
for reverse causaƟon in the relaƟonship between KS4 performance and young people’s
educaƟonal expectaƟons, in that individuals’ beliefs about their likelihood of applying to
university may aﬀect the eﬀort they put into these examinaƟons.
The LSYPE collects data on young people’s demographic characterisƟcs, including their
gender, age and ethnicity. While neither gender nor age are likely to be correlated with
SES, they are both likely to be important in explaining changes in young people’s ex-
pectaƟons.¹⁷ However, individuals with diﬀerent ethniciƟes have, on average, diﬀer-
ent levels of SES (Strand, 2014). As such, failure to control for ethnicity may result in
eﬀects stemming from, for example, cultural diﬀerences between ethniciƟes, being in-
correctly idenƟﬁed as SES eﬀects. In the LSYPE, ethnicity is iniƟally collected according
to young people’s self-designaƟon, and classiﬁed into the groups White, Mixed, Indian,
Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Black Caribbean, Black African and Other before the data are re-
leased.
The input of schools and teachers is important in shaping young people’s educaƟonal
choices. For example, AlcoƩ (2013b) ﬁnds evidence that teacher encouragement makes
it more likely that young people remain in educaƟon past theminimum leaving age. Like-
wise, Sanders et al. (2013) report that within-school provision of informaƟon on univer-
sity increases stated likelihood of applicaƟon. The LSYPE includes data on the young per-
son’s school type at Ɵme of sampling. Of parƟcular interest, this allows me to idenƟfy
those who aƩend academically selecƟve ‘grammar’ schools (4% of the age 14 sample)
and those who aƩend fee-paying independent schools (5% of the age 14 sample). Table
3.3 shows that a signiﬁcantly larger proporƟon of those who think it likely that they will
apply to university at age 14 than those who think it is unlikely are in one of these types
of schools. It is also the case that individuals from higher SES backgrounds aremore likely
to be in such schools. It is not clear how much of the inﬂuence of schools is an ‘indepen-
dent’ eﬀect and how much reﬂects SES bias in the intake of diﬀerent types of school. As
such, in the sameway as was discussed above regarding inclusion of prior aƩainment in a
model, condiƟoning on school characterisƟcs may result in an underesƟmate of the total
inﬂuence of SES.
¹⁷Given the relaƟonship between age and the passage of Ɵme in this dataset, I discuss the inclusion of
age in the models further in SecƟon 3.4.
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TraumaƟc events within a family, such as job loss, separaƟon or bereavement, might also
be expected to have a negaƟve inﬂuence on young people’s educaƟonal expectaƟons.
Such events are to some extent random and, hence, eﬀects would be at least partly in-
dependent of those of SES. However, there is likely to be some correlaƟon.
The employment status of parents in the household are recorded at each wave. Drawing
on previous evidence that ﬁnds an associaƟon between even short periods of workless-
ness and lower educaƟonal expectaƟons (although these do not persist when addiƟonal
controls are added) (Schoon et al., 2012, p.38-39), I construct a cumulaƟve indicator
of whether the young person has experienced being in a workless household by the
Ɵme of each wave’s interview. As I do not have data before age 14, it is not possible
for this to include periods of worklessness before this point. Nevertheless, 22% of the
young people’s parents (aŌer weighƟng) reported neither parent being in work in at least
one wave. I judge that it is unlikely that young people’s educaƟonal expectaƟons aﬀect
changes in employment status in their household, and hence the risk of endogeneity bias
is low. However, sociologists emphasise that an important element of social class is the
increased economic security of those with higher SES (Goldthorpe and McKnight, 2004,
p.6). Once again this implies that, once this factor is controlled for, my esƟmates of the
inﬂuence of socio-economic status are likely to be understated.
I use informaƟon on the marital status of the ‘main parent’¹⁸ in a similar way as the em-
ployment indicators, construcƟng a cumulaƟve indicator of whether the young person
has experienced this parent going through some kind of separaƟon (including bereave-
ment) up to the point of each wave’s interview. Unlike with the indicator for workless
households, retrospecƟve quesƟons (asked at the ﬁrst wave of the survey) about relevant
events since the young person was born mean that this does cover the period before age
14. 28% of young people’s main parents report having experienced such an event by the
ﬁnal interview with them. I deﬁne a cumulaƟve measure on the grounds that negaƟve
consequences on a young person’s aƫtudes from such an event are unlikely to be limited
to one year. Again, I judge that there is unlikely to be problems of reverse causaƟon with
this Ɵme-varying covariate.
Local labourmarket condiƟons are important in predicƟng young people’s decision to ap-
ply to university: other things being equal, individuals who face circumstances in which
¹⁸Deﬁned as the parent most involved in the young person’s educaƟon. Where there is only one parent
in the household they are, by deﬁniƟon, the main parent.
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the labour market looks less promising are more likely to remain in educaƟon longer
(Reynolds and Pemberton, 2001; Fumagalli, 2012). However, on average, SES and worse
local labourmarket condiƟons are likely to be negaƟvely correlated. Unlike with the char-
acterisƟcs discussed above, this implies that not including this factor in the model may
understate the impact of SES. To include this inmymodels I make use of data on the Local
Authority (LA) area in which the young person’s home is located is also available from the
LSYPE. I use this LA idenƟﬁer to link this with data on unemployment in the local labour
market¹⁹ from the Annual PopulaƟon Survey (Oﬃce for NaƟonal StaƟsƟcs, 2004, for ex-
ample). I use the unemployment rate for those aged 16-64 in the individual’s LA area,
with separate ﬁgures for males and females. In a small number of LAs the ﬁgures are
suppressed, due to small numbers in the data. In such cases I use the Government Of-
ﬁce Region unemployment rate (or in extremis the naƟonal unemployment rate) to avoid
missing data.
3.4 DuraƟon modelling
DuraƟonmodelling, also known as survival analysis or event history analysis, is not a com-
mon technique in educaƟonal research (AlcoƩ, 2013a, p.50-51). However, it has several
key features that make it a useful tool to address the quesƟon of changes in young peo-
ple’s expectaƟons, speciﬁcally models of change i) from ‘likely to apply’ to ‘unlikely to
apply’ and ii) from ‘unlikely to apply’ to ‘likely to apply’. In this secƟon, I introduce its key
features, concepts and their importance for the applicaƟon in this chapter.
Central to duraƟon modelling is the concept of the ‘spell’. A spell is an uninterrupted
period of Ɵme during which a given individual remains in the same state; in this case,
consistently reporƟng that they are ‘likely to apply’ to university, or conversely, consis-
tently reporƟng that they are ‘unlikely to apply’. Figure 3.2 shows spells as uninterrupted
periods as solid lines (‘likely to apply’) or doƩed lines (‘unlikely to apply’). In some appli-
caƟons of duraƟon modelling the end of a spell is permanent (or eﬀecƟvely permanent),
such as in models of an individual’s death aŌer the onset of a disease. However, in this
¹⁹Since the aim is to capture the labourmarket condiƟons individuals face, it would be beƩer to use areas
designed to reﬂect this. Local AuthoriƟes do not necessarily reﬂect local labour markets well, especially
in larger, rural authoriƟes. A beƩer alternaƟve would be Travel To Work Areas (TTWAs). Unfortunately,
informaƟon that would allow me to idenƟfy in which TTWA an individual resides is not available in the
LSYPE general release.
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Table 3.4: ProporƟon of young people saying they are likely or very likely to apply to
university - always reported likely vs. current wave
Wave Always likely Current wave
1 0.676 0.676
2 0.552 0.626
3 0.484 0.608
4 0.429 0.570
5 0.399 0.566
6 0.384 0.582
Notes: Analysis weighted using LSYPE Wave 7 design and non-response weights. Sample: Wave 7 respon-
dents with non-missing data on university expectaƟons (‘don’t know’ treated as ‘not very likely’) and uni-
versity applicaƟons. Unweighted sample size = 8029. ‘Always likely’ column reports proporƟon of the
sample who have always reported being ‘very likely’ or ‘fairly likely’ to apply to university up to and includ-
ing the wave in quesƟon. ‘Current wave’ column reports the simple proporƟon of the sample who report
being ‘very likely’ or ‘fairly likely’ to apply at the wave in quesƟon.
applicaƟon individuals can report being ‘likely to apply’, then ‘unlikely to apply’, and then
‘likely to apply’ again.²⁰
Since parƟcipants canmove back and forth between being ‘likely’ and ‘unlikely’, the same
individuals may appear in both sets of models at diﬀerent Ɵme points. One can see that
this is indeed the case by calculaƟng the proporƟon of the sample that ever report being
‘likely to apply’ to university and the proporƟon that ever report being ‘unlikely to apply’.
First, considering the transiƟon from ‘likely to unlikely’, 79% of theWave 2weighted sam-
ple (represenƟng 9,247 out of 11,249 individuals before weighƟng) in the dataset report
being ‘likely to apply’ to university (and, hence, are ever in a posiƟon to make a transi-
Ɵon to being ‘unlikely to apply’) in at least one wave. In the other direcƟon, 52% of the
Wave 2 weighted sample (represenƟng 5,330 out of 11,249 individuals before weighƟng)
report they are ‘unlikely to apply’ (and, hence, are ever in a posiƟon to make a transiƟon
to being ‘likely to apply’) in at least one wave. In total, this sums to 131% of the sample,
demonstraƟng the signiﬁcant overlap. One can also see this is the case by looking at the
sequences of expectaƟons observed in the data in Figure 3.2: individuals of type 3 are
included in the model of ‘likely to unlikely’ at age 15, then in the model of ‘unlikely to
likely’ at ages 16 and 17.
To highlight the implicaƟons of using duraƟon modelling, relaƟve to a model of diﬀer-
ences between the start and the end of the Ɵme period under consideraƟon, in Table 3.4
I compare the proporƟon of individuals who at all points up to and including the relevant
²⁰It should be noted that one reason for such sequences of transiƟons could be measurement error.
This makes allowing for mulƟple spells parƟcularly important, since ignoring spells aŌer the ﬁrst would
compound the error.
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wave have reported that they think it ‘likely’ that they will apply to university (in the leŌ
hand column), with the proporƟon who think it is ‘likely’ that they will apply at that par-
Ɵcular point in Ɵme (in the right hand column). As also noted in Figure 3.1 earlier, the
proporƟon who think it is ‘likely’ that they will apply at a given point in Ɵme falls from
68% at Wave 1 to 57% by Wave 4. However, the reducƟon in those who have always
reported being likely to apply is much greater: from 68% at Wave 1 to 42% by Wave 4.
This diﬀerence is caused by individuals who start reporƟng being ‘likely to apply’ aŌer
Wave 1 (e.g. individuals of type 8) in Figure 3.2.
The larger reducƟons in the proporƟon who have always reported being ‘likely to apply’
demonstrates the addiƟonal informaƟon on transiƟons that is picked up by using this ap-
proach. This informaƟon would be ignored if I only modelled the diﬀerence between the
start and the end of the Ɵme period under consideraƟon. In fact, as I allow for mulƟple
transiƟons, the diﬀerences are even larger than suggested in this table, since the analysis
in this chapter recognises that individuals can, in principle, switch back and forth asmany
Ɵmes as there are observaƟon periods (e.g. individuals of type 9 in Figure 3.2). Each tran-
siƟon from being ‘likely to apply’ to being ‘unlikely to apply’, even mulƟple transiƟons by
the same individual, is captured as part of the modelling.
My mulƟple regression-based duraƟon models will allow for mulƟple spells in a state,
since this is preferable to concentraƟng only on the ﬁrst one. However, my modelling
strategy treats mulƟple spells as being independent from one another, making the as-
sumpƟon that there is no causal eﬀect of one spell on any later spells (either of the same
type i.e. ‘likely to unlikely’, or the converse transiƟon i.e. ‘unlikely to likely’).²¹
The passage of Ɵme is, as the name suggests, fundamental to duraƟonmodelling. Models
can include the length of Ɵme an individual has spent in a spell before making a transi-
Ɵon, not throwing away this considerable amount of informaƟon as would be done in
a tradiƟonal binary choice model (DesJardins, 2003; Box-Steﬀensmeier and Jones, 2004;
Jenkins, 2004). However, as individuals in the LSYPE are all (approximately) the same age
at the same point in Ɵme, where spells begin at the same point it is impossible to disƟn-
guish between age and duraƟon eﬀects. In the data, some spells do start at diﬀerent Ɵme
points, but there is not enough variaƟon to disentangle the eﬀects of age and duraƟon. At
²¹However, see discussion of clustering of standard errors in SecƟon 3.6. Furthermore, I aƩempt to
parƟally relax the assumpƟon of independence of mulƟple spells of the same type using random eﬀects
models, discussed in Appendix B. However, it maintains the assumpƟon of no eﬀect of an individual’s spell
of being ‘likely to apply’ on subsequent spells of being ‘unlikely to apply’.
74
this stage of life, I judge that age eﬀects are more important to educaƟonal expectaƟons
than duraƟon in the state, and concentrate on these. Other important characterisƟcs of
individuals may also change over Ɵme and duraƟonmodelling is able to incorporate such
Ɵme-varying covariates²²
As discussed in SecƟon 3.3, since I have discrete (as opposed to conƟnuous) Ɵme data, I
use discrete Ɵme duraƟonmodelling techniques, as the most appropriate. One potenƟal
problem with this is that, since young people are born in diﬀerent months and the LSYPE
interviews are staggered over several months, there will be some variaƟon in individuals’
age by month when they are give their responses. In order to reduce the possibility that
this could aﬀect results, I include individuals’ month of birth and month of interview in
all my regression models, aƩempƟng to standardise results as if individuals were all both
born and interviewed in August each year.
A key concept in duraƟon modelling is that of an individual being ‘at risk’ of making a
transiƟon, and therefore relevant to my modelling. When modelling a transiƟon it only
makes sense to consider those who are in a posiƟon to make that transiƟon. As a mini-
mum, this excludes those who already in the state of interest. For example, it does not
make sense to consider the probability that someone who already reports being ‘unlikely
to apply’ to university becomes ‘unlikely to apply’ to university. While it may be interest-
ing to consider the quesƟon of whether an individual remains ‘unlikely to apply’, that is
a diﬀerent quesƟon (and, in fact, just the inverse of my other model: whether an indi-
vidual currently reporƟng being ‘unlikely to apply’ becomes ‘likely to apply’). In some
applicaƟons individuals may become not at risk in other ways.
DuraƟonmodelling can also treat expectaƟons data that are missing as ‘censored’, rather
than dropping individuals for whom expectaƟons are not observed (even in only one
wave) from the sample. ‘Censoring’²³ is where the start and/or end points of a spell is
not observed in the data. It has the consequence that the true length of the spell is
unknown, only that it is at least as long as the period it is observed to last.
When the start of a spell is not observed this is referred to as ‘leŌ censoring’; this can
be parƟcularly problemaƟc, as it prevents modelling of duraƟon dependence, since one
does not know how long a spell has lasted at any given point (Iceland, 1997). However,
²²This was discussed further in SecƟon 3.3.4.
²³Censoring is someƟmes confused with ‘truncaƟon’. This is when the probability of inclusion of a spell
is aﬀected by its length or where spells are cut short for the same reason. I do not have to deal with
truncaƟon in my data.
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as discussed in SecƟon 3.3.1, I treat all spells as starƟng at age 14 and, hence, exclude
the possibility of leŌ censoring in this dataset by construcƟon.
Not observing the end of a spell is referred to as ‘right censoring’. Taking the example of
models for the ‘likely to unlikely’ transiƟon, this occurs where ‘likely to apply’ is observed
in the ﬁnal report for an individual, whether this is due to the end of the period under
analysis (at age 17 in this case), or earlier as a result of aƩriƟon. SƟll concentraƟng on the
‘likely to unlikely’ transiƟon, there is right censoring in the sequences of spells in Figure
3.2 for individuals of type 1, 8, and 9 (in the case of the ﬁnal observaƟon being sƟll ‘likely
to apply’); and types 5 and 7 (resulƟng from aƩriƟon).
TreaƟng individuals who aƩrit from the sample as right censored will only result in unbi-
ased esƟmates under the assumpƟon that this missing data censoring is ‘uninformaƟve’
(Clark et al., 2003, p.236), i.e. that individuals whose outcomes are missing are just as
likely to make a transiƟon between reporƟng being ‘likely to apply’ to university and be-
ing ‘unlikely to apply’ (or vice versa) as the individuals that are observed. It seems unlikely
that this assumpƟon is jusƟﬁed. However, van den Berg et al. (2006) suggests it is likely
that while informaƟve aƩriƟon will aﬀect the rate of transiƟons, it is less likely to bias
the eﬀect of covariates on those rates. As a robustness check, I also repeat my analysis
including only those sƟll parƟcipaƟng in the survey at Wave 4 (when the response rate
relaƟve to Wave 1 has fallen to 73% (Collingwood et al., 2010, p.52)), using the LSYPE-
provided aƩriƟon and non-response weights for Wave 4.²⁴
All of these features are important in ﬁƫng the most appropriate model to understand
changes to youngpeople’s expectaƟons during these criƟcal years for their educaƟon.
3.5 Nonparametric analysis of transiƟons
In this chapter I model the probability and Ɵming of young people’s transiƟons from re-
porƟng they are 1) ‘likely to apply’ to ‘unlikely to apply’ or, conversely, 2) ‘unlikely to ap-
ply’ to ‘likely to apply’. RestricƟng my aƩenƟon to those who are ‘at risk’ of making each
transiƟon, it follows that I am interested in the likelihood of the following events:
1. for the transiƟon from ‘likely to apply’ to ‘unlikely to apply’: whether individuals,
who at the previous wave said they were ‘likely to apply’ to university, switch to
²⁴I report the results of this analysis and discuss the diﬀerences in Appendix B.
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reporƟng that they are ‘unlikely to apply’; and
2. for the transiƟon from ‘unlikely to likely’: whether individuals, who at the previous
wave said they were ‘unlikely to apply’ to university, switch to reporƟng that they
are ‘likely to apply’.
To begin exploring these transiƟons, I conduct non-parametric analysis of the probability
and Ɵmings of transiƟons between being ‘likely’ and ‘unlikely’ to apply to university and
consider the associaƟon between the probability of making a transiƟon and young peo-
ple’s SES. In order to do this I make use of Kaplan-Meier esƟmates of the probability that
spells have not ended with a transiƟon by a given age. To obtain Kaplan-Meier esƟmates
one ﬁrst calculates, at each Ɵme point in the data, the number of individuals that do not
make a transiƟon divided by the number that are in a posiƟon to make a transiƟon. The
esƟmate for each Ɵme point is the product of all of the proporƟons just calculated from
the ﬁrst Ɵme point up to the Ɵme point in quesƟon. Kaplan-Meier esƟmates are able to
handle right-censoring in the data, since individuals who are censored are removed from
the denominator, since they are no longer ‘at risk’. These esƟmates of ‘survival’ will be
calculated both for the sample as a whole, and for sub-samples deﬁned by SES.
In order to perform this analysis, I restrict the spells under consideraƟon to those be-
ginning at age 14 (the start of the dataset). By deﬁniƟon, this also means concentraƟng
on an individual’s ﬁrst spell at risk, ignoring any later spells either as ‘likely’ or ‘unlikely’.
Below, I indicate the kinds of spells excluded as a result. Among the costs and beneﬁts of
the mulƟple regression-based analysis introduced in SecƟon 3.6, this restricƟon will be
relaxed.
It was not possible to perform non-parametric staƟsƟcal inference on the diﬀerence be-
tween esƟmated survival funcƟons as part of this analysis. The relevant staƟsƟcal test,
the log-rank test, is “not appropriate” with sampling weights (StataCorp, 2013, p.446).
Instead, I perform Cox regression-based tests, which make the proporƟonal hazards as-
sumpƟon. However, I checked the robustness of this approach by performing log-rank
tests of the equality of the survival curves esƟmated using unweighted data. In all cases
the two sets of results were in agreement.
I ﬁrst consider the transiƟon from ‘likely to unlikely’, before moving on to the transiƟon
from ‘unlikely to likely’.
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3.5.1 From likely to unlikely
I begin by analysing the age at which young people stop thinking they are likely to apply
to university. RelaƟng this to the sequences of expectaƟons shown in Figure 3.2, this
means including the ﬁrst (or only) spell of individuals of type 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 or 9 (amongst
others not shown in the diagram), but not the spell that type 8 spends reporƟng being
‘likely to apply’. Nevertheless, this includes over 70% of the individuals in the data, with
much of the remainder being individuals who never report being ‘likely to apply’ rather
than individuals who are excluded simply because of this restricƟon.
Figure 3.3: Probability that an individual who reports being ‘likely to apply’ at age 14
has not moved to reporƟng that they are ‘unlikely to apply’, by age
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Notes: Kaplan-Meier esƟmated survivor funcƟon. Excludes spells beginning aŌer age 14. Analysis
weighted using Wave 2 sample design and non-response weights. Unweighted number of subjects: 6,129;
weighted number of subjects: 6,009.
Figure 3.3 shows that 70% of periods of reporƟng being ‘likely to apply’ conƟnue unƟl
at least age 16, at which point young people will be in the process of taking their GCSEs.
Conversely, thismeans that 30% of such periods have endedwith the individual switching
to reporƟng they are ‘unlikely to apply’ by this age. Looking right to the end of the ages
under consideraƟon, roughly a third of the observed periods of being ‘likely to apply’ end
by age 17. There are evidently a signiﬁcant number of transiƟons during this stage of life.
However, this sheds no light on the reasons for these changes, other than young people’s
age increasing.
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Figure 3.4: Probability that an individual who reports being ‘likely to apply’ at age 14
has not moved to reporƟng that they are ‘unlikely to apply’, by age and household SES
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Notes: Kaplan-Meier esƟmated survivor funcƟon. Excludes spells beginning aŌer age 14. Analysis
weighted using Wave 2 sample design and non-response weights. ‘High SES’ denotes individuals in the
top two quinƟles of SES, while ‘low SES’ refers to all other individuals. Unweighted number of subjects:
6,129; weighted number of subjects: 6,009. Cox regression-based test for equality of survivor funcƟons
rejects the null hypothesis of no diﬀerence (p<0.01)
A simpleway of assessing the associaƟon between the probability of transiƟon and family
background is by esƟmaƟng the survivor funcƟon for diﬀerent groups of SES. For ease of
interpretaƟon I dichotomise SES into ‘high’ (comprising the top 40% of the distribuƟon
of my SES index) and ‘low’ (comprising the boƩom 60% of the distribuƟon). Figure 3.4
shows that individuals from lower SES households are more likely to make a transiƟon to
reporƟng ‘unlikely to apply’ than their richer counterparts throughout the period under
analysis: 40% of those from lower SES backgrounds havemade a transiƟon from ‘likely to
unlikely’ by age 16, whereas only 20% of those from high SES backgrounds have done so.
Making the assumpƟon of proporƟonal hazards allows me to carry out a Cox-regression
based test, which rejects the null hypothesis of no diﬀerence between the two esƟmated
survivor funcƟons (p=0.00).
3.5.2 From unlikely to likely
It is possible that the relaƟonship between SES and young people raising their expecta-
Ɵons is quite diﬀerent from that associated with movement in the opposite direcƟon.
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The analysis of this transiƟon from ‘unlikely to likely’ includes the ﬁrst (or only) spell from
individuals of types 2, 8 and 10 in Figure 3.2, but not the spell that types 3, 4, 6 and 9
spend reporƟng being ‘unlikely to apply’. This represents over 20% of the overall sample,
but much of the remainder again comprises individuals who never report being ‘unlikely
to apply’, rather than exclusions because of restricƟng to spells that start at age 14.
Figure 3.5: Probability that an individual who reports being ‘unlikely to apply’ at age 14
has not moved to reporƟng that they are ‘likely to apply’, by age
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Notes: Kaplan-Meier esƟmated survivor funcƟon. Excludes spells beginning aŌer age 14. Analysis
weighted using Wave 2 sample design and non-response weights. Unweighted number of subjects: 2,556;
weighted number of subjects: 2,946.
As with the opposite transiƟon, Figure 3.5 shows the proporƟon of periods of being ‘un-
likely to apply’ that do not end in transiƟon to being ‘likely to apply’ by a given age. Almost
25% of spells end by age 15 and around a third of spells have ended in transiƟon by the
last point of observaƟon at age 17. These are higher rates of transiƟon than those seen
for the same Ɵme points in my analysis of the transiƟon from ‘likely to unlikely’ above,
this despite a larger overall shiŌ in the opposite direcƟon. Although this iniƟally seems
counterintuiƟve, it is consistent because of the larger absolute numbers of young people
who start out saying they are ‘likely to apply’ (as shown in Figure 3.1). Furthermore, it
again highlights the large number of transiƟons between the two states.
In common with transiƟons from ‘likely to unlikely’, Figure 3.6 shows that there are clear
socio-economic diﬀerences in the expected proporƟon of transiƟons from being ‘unlikely
to apply’ to being ‘likely to apply’. However, in this case those from the less advantaged
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Figure 3.6: Probability that an individual who reports being ‘unlikely to apply’ at age 14
has not moved to reporƟng that they are ‘likely to apply’, by age and SES
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Notes: Kaplan-Meier esƟmated survivor funcƟon. Excludes spells beginning aŌer age 14. Analysis
weighted using Wave 2 sample design and non-response weights. ‘High SES’ denotes individuals in the
top two quinƟles of SES, while ‘low SES’ refers to all other individuals. Unweighted number of subjects:
2,556; weighted number of subjects: 2,946. Cox regression-based test for equality of survivor funcƟons
rejects the null hypothesis of no diﬀerence (p<0.01).
groups are less likely to make a transiƟon out of being ‘unlikely’ than their more advan-
taged peers. Again, a Cox regression-based test allows me to reject the null hypothesis
of no diﬀerence between the two survivor funcƟons (p=0.00).
Comparing Figure 3.6 with Figure 3.4 it is clear that the diﬀerences in rates of transiƟon
frombeing ‘unlikely’ to being ‘likely’ by SES aremarkedly smaller than for the transiƟon in
the opposite direcƟon: by age 16 68% of those from lower SES backgrounds havemade a
transiƟon from ‘unlikely to likely’, while 56%of those frommore advantaged backgrounds
had done so. This suggests thatmore of the inequality in expectaƟons builds from less ad-
vantaged individuals having a higher probability of switching to reporƟng being ‘unlikely’,
than from movements in the other direcƟon. Nevertheless, the inequality in probability
of transiƟon from ‘unlikely to likely’ compounds thewidening socio-economic and demo-
graphic inequality of expectaƟons generated by the larger proporƟon of less advantaged
individuals switching from being ‘likely to unlikely’ seen above.
However, the analysis so far has limitaƟons: it cannot accommodate spells that started
aŌer age 14 (or, hence, mulƟple spells from one individual); and it cannot control for ad-
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diƟonal covariates. In order to relax these limitaƟons, I now turn to mulƟple regression-
based duraƟon modelling techniques.
3.6 MulƟple regression models
I esƟmatemulƟple regression duraƟonmodels using the so-called ’easy esƟmaƟon’meth-
ods detailed by Jenkins (1995). These are implemented using a standard binary depen-
dent variable regression model applied to a dataset organised such that there is one ob-
servaƟon for each Ɵme point that each individual is ‘at risk’ of making the transiƟon of
interest. I show the derivaƟon of this method in Appendix C. The model exposiƟon con-
centrates on the transiƟon from ‘likely to apply’ to ‘unlikely to apply’ only to avoid un-
necessary duplicaƟon; it is easy to see how the model is modiﬁed for the transiƟon from
‘unlikely to apply’ to ‘likely to apply’.
The outcome of interest, as outlined in SecƟon 3.3, is a simple indicator of whether the
individual reports being unlikely to apply to university:
Yit = 1 if young person i is unlikely to apply to university at Ɵme t
= 0 if young person i is likely to apply to university at Ɵme t (3.2)
However, as noted above, it only makes sense to include in modelling individuals who
are ‘at risk’ of the transiƟon in quesƟon occurring. I deﬁne a variable dit, which indicates
whether an individual makes the transiƟon at a given Ɵme point, given that the individual
was at risk ofmaking the transiƟon (i.e. they reported being likely to apply in the previous
period). dit takes no value where individuals are not ‘at risk’ of making a transiƟon and so
these observaƟons are not included in models. The variable is formally deﬁned as:
dit = 1 if Yit = 1 \ Yit 1 = 0
= 0 if Yit = 0 \ Yit 1 = 0 (3.3)
A large component of changes in young people’s expectaƟons may simply be explained
by the age they have reached. If I ignore this inmodelling it may result in omiƩed variable
bias, with other covariates picking up the variaƟon that should have been explained by
age alone. I include a simple funcƟon of age in my models, denoted by . Imposing
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funcƟonal form restricƟons herewould increase the risk of not adequately accounƟng for
the underlying probability of transiƟon at each age, whichmay also aﬀect other esƟmates
through omiƩed variable bias. ParƟcularly because I have relaƟvely few Ɵme periods, I
use a piecewise constant age funcƟon, implemented through inclusion in the model of a
dummy variable for each age (except for the ﬁrst, making this the base category):
(Ait) = 0 + 16A16:it + 17A17:it (3.4)
In duraƟon models it is common to model the eﬀect of the length of Ɵme individuals
have spent in their current state on the probability of transiƟon. A relevant example of
this ‘duraƟon dependence’ could be that Ɵme spent believing that you are unlikely to
go to university aﬀects one’s aƫtudes towards and, hence, performance in school work.
Such lower performance then becomes self-reinforcing of the view that you are unlikely
to be in a posiƟon to apply to university. The eﬀect of the length of Ɵme spent in a
state is referred to as a ‘baseline hazard rate’. In some applicaƟons, parametric ‘baseline
hazard funcƟons’ are used to make statements about how the underlying probability of
transiƟon changes as the length of a spell increases. However, introducing a baseline
hazard funcƟon to the models in this chapter has not been possible because such a large
proporƟon of spells in the data start at the same point in Ɵme (age 14). As a result, the
variables for age and Ɵme in state are highly collinear.
Since my outcome variable (dit) is dichotomous, I opt to use complementary log-log re-
gression models.²⁵ Using these variables and x, which is a vector of Ɵme-invariant and
Ɵme-varying control variables (discussed further below), I esƟmate regression models of
the form:
log(  log(1  dit)) = (Ait) + xit + "it (3.5)
This method of esƟmaƟng duraƟonmodels involvesmulƟple observaƟons per individual.
As a consequence, ignoring the survey design, I would esƟmate standard errors clustered
at the individual level. However, given that young people in the Longitudinal Study of
Young People in England are clustered within schools, the esƟmated standard errors are
calculated more conservaƟvely, taking into account this higher level clustering.
²⁵The othermajor alternaƟve used in duraƟonmodelling of this type are logisƟcmodels. As a robustness
check, I also esƟmate my models using this method. Doing so makes liƩle diﬀerence to the results.
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I begin with a baseline model (M0), only including my age funcƟon.²⁶ This performs a
number of roles. First, it places the survivor funcƟons fromSecƟon 3.5 into this regression
framework, this Ɵme allowing for mulƟple spells from one individual and also for spells
that begin later than age 14. Second, it allows me to inspect the raw coeﬃcients on
age, providing insights on when adjustment of expectaƟons most oŌen occurs. Third, it
provides a baseline against which I can assess the following models, in which I include
addiƟonal explanatory variables.
My ﬁrst model of substanƟve interest (M1) aƩempts to capture the ‘total’ associaƟon
between SES and the probability that individuals make a transiƟon between being ‘likely’
and ‘unlikely’ to apply. In addiƟon to the age dummy variables, I include dummy variables
indicaƟng which quinƟle group of socio-economic status (SES), measured using the index
described in SecƟon 3.3.3, an individual is in. I leave out a variable for the third (middle)
quinƟle group, making it the baseline category.
My second model (M2) aƩempts to idenƟfy the ‘condiƟonal’ associaƟon between SES
and the probability of making a transiƟon, controlling for demographic characterisƟcs,
school characterisƟcs, traumaƟc experiences and local labour market condiƟons. For
demographic characterisƟcs, the model includes gender, ethnic group, number of sib-
lings, number of older siblings, and region of residence. For school characterisƟcs, I in-
clude indicators for fee-paying independent schools, selecƟve ‘grammar’ schools, and for
whether the school has a post-16 ‘sixth form’.²⁷ To capture the eﬀect of traumaƟc expe-
riences, I include Ɵme varying measures derived from experience of being in a workless
household or having experienced a family separaƟon. Finally, I include data proxying local
labour market condiƟons faced by young people, speciﬁcally the local youth unemploy-
ment rate within an individual’s Local Authority of residence. Since many of these vari-
ables are socially graded, I expect them to reduce the condiƟonal associaƟon between
coming from an advantaged family and the probability of transiƟon, allowing us to assess
the remaining ‘eﬀect’ aƩributable to SES. However, as discussed in SecƟon 3.3.4, the ef-
fect of SES on these variables may mean I start to underesƟmate the inﬂuence of SES on
changes in expectaƟons.
²⁶M0 does also include the month of birth and month of interview variables to try and control for the
diﬀerences in age of the panel members when interviewed.
²⁷I also esƟmate linear probability models including school ﬁxed eﬀects as a robustness check. As might
be anƟcipated, the inﬂuence of SES is somewhat reduced in these models, but they do not alter the overall
narraƟve.
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My third model (M3) contains the same variables as M2, and adds covariates to con-
trol for an individual’s observable prior academic aƩainment. I include a standardised
score of young people’s performance at age 11 (Key Stage 2). Undoubtedly, young peo-
ple’s academic performance aﬀects whether they stand a realisƟc chance of making a
successful applicaƟon to university and, hence, aﬀects whether young people maintain
their current expectaƟons. As with some of the variables above, young people’s aƩain-
ment at age 11 is already likely to be aﬀected by SES, meaning that results including prior
aƩainment only show SES eﬀects condiƟonal on these results. This model is my preferred
speciﬁcaƟon for idenƟfying the ‘condiƟonal’ eﬀect of SES on changes in young people’s
expectaƟons of applying to university.
My ﬁnal two models speciﬁcally address whether young people’s expectaƟons are af-
fected by the new informaƟon on their academic aƩainment provided by performance
in examinaƟons at age 16. The ﬁrst of these (M4) adds a variable for an individual’s per-
formance in end of secondary school examinaƟons at age 16 (Key Stage 4), standardised
with mean zero and standard deviaƟon one, and interacted with the age variable indi-
caƟng that they will have received their results (age 17). As such, it will provide an es-
Ɵmate of the associaƟon between a one standard deviaƟon increase in young people’s
performance at age 16 and the risk of transiƟon from ‘likely’ to ‘unlikely’ or vice versa,
condiƟonal on family background and aƩainment at age 11. However, in interpreƟng
this ﬁnding, it is important to note that individuals’ performance in examinaƟons at 16 is
likely to be endogenous: young people’s expectaƟons of applying to university are likely
to aﬀect their eﬀort at school and hence performance in the these examinaƟons. As
such, parƟcular cauƟon should be taken in the interpretaƟon of this model. The results
should only be used as indicaƟve for the quesƟon of responsiveness to new informaƟon
on academic aƩainment; results from M3 are likely to be a more reliable guide to the
overall associaƟon between SES and changes in young people’s expectaƟons.
The ﬁnal model (M5) builds on M4, but relaxes the implicit assumpƟon that this new in-
formaƟon on academic performance aﬀects all young people in the sameway. I introduce
an interacƟon between KS4 performance and SES, which allows me to explore whether
individuals are more or less likely to adjust their expectaƟons in response to their results
depending on their SES background. The same caveats apply in terms of the potenƟal
endogeneity in performance at age 16, but this sƟll provides suggesƟve evidence on a
potenƟally important driver of inequality in expectaƟons of applying to university.
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Given the complexity of interpreƟng interacƟon eﬀects, and in the interests of parsimony,
I also esƟmate variants of models M4 and M5, in which the dummy variables for each
quinƟle group of SES have been replaced by a single variable of my underlying SES index,
standardised so that it has mean zero and standard deviaƟon one. This simpliﬁcaƟon
comes at the cost of assuming a linear relaƟonship between my SES index and the risk
of transiƟon. However, robustness checks²⁸ suggest that this does not seem to aﬀect the
overall narraƟve of my analysis. As such, in my discussion of the results, I focus these
variants, referred to as M4C and M5C.
3.7 Results
The results tables focus on the inﬂuence of SES on changes in expectaƟons during this
period.²⁹ Once again, I explore the transiƟon from ‘likely to unlikely and the transiƟon
from ‘unlikely to likely’ separately.
I report the results of themodels using hazard raƟos (exponenƟated coeﬃcients from the
underlying complementary log-log regression model). These are mulƟplicaƟve, rather
than addiƟve; they express no diﬀerence from the baseline group when they are equal
to 1 (rather than 0, as would be the case if I were discussing coeﬃcients). As such, when
I refer to a hazard raƟo being staƟsƟcally signiﬁcant, this means that it is staƟsƟcally sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent from 1, rather than from 0.
In models focusing on the inﬂuence of SES on transiƟons (M1-M3), I concentrate on the
hazard raƟos for each quinƟle group of SES, relaƟve to a baseline category of the middle
(third) quinƟle group. These may be interpreted as the probability that an individual in
the relevant SES quinƟle group makes a transiƟon, condiƟonal on being in the state at
that point, divided by the probability that an individual in the middle SES quinƟle group
makes a transiƟon (condiƟonal in the sameway). In order to examine the overall paƩerns
of young people’s transiƟons as they age, I also report hazard raƟos from each model
associated with each age, relaƟve to a baseline of the period between the interview at
age 14 and age 15.
In models focusing on the responsiveness of young people to new informaƟon on their
²⁸The full results of M4, M4C, M5 and M5C are reported in Appendix B for comparison.
²⁹Regression tables reporƟng the full set of hazard raƟos are reported in Appendix B, along with their
counterparts for several variaƟons on the models (as discussed elsewhere in the chapter).
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academic aƩainment (M4C and M5C), I concentrate on the hazard raƟo associated with
change in SES and the hazard raƟo associated with change in both SES and KS4 perfor-
mance. The formermay be interpreted as the probability that an individual makes a tran-
siƟon, divided by the probability than an individual with one standard deviaƟon lower SES
makes a transiƟon (condiƟoned as above). The laƩer may be interpreted as the probabil-
ity that an individual makes a transiƟon divided by the probability than an individual with
one standard deviaƟon lower SES and one standard deviaƟon lower KS4 performance
makes a transiƟon.
It is also natural to want to test whether each model adds explanatory power, relaƟve
to the one before. In many circumstances this would be done with likelihood raƟo tests.
However, as a result of accounƟng for the complex survey design of the data, these are
not valid. Instead, I conduct F tests of the joint signiﬁcance of all addiƟonal coeﬃcients,
relaƟve to the previous model. As the results simply show that each model does pro-
vide addiƟonal explanatory power relaƟve to the one before, they are only reported in
Appendix B.
3.7.1 From likely to unlikely
The results for the transiƟon from ‘likely to unlikely’ are reported in Table 3.5. I begin
by discussing the results from the baseline model (M0), to examine the point in Ɵme at
which individuals currently reporƟng being ‘likely to apply’ are most likely to change to
reporƟng being ‘unlikely to apply’. The hazard raƟos reported for ages 16 and 17 are
staƟsƟcally signiﬁcantly less than one. This suggests the individuals are most likely to
make a transiƟon between their reports at age 14 and 15, with the rate of transiƟons
slowing aŌer this point. This reﬂects the Kaplan-Meier survivor funcƟon ploƩed in Figure
3.3, where the largest step was the ﬁrst. However, it has commonly been observed in
duraƟon modelling that one reason for such an observaƟon is that individuals who are
most likely to make a transiƟon have already done so before later Ɵme points (Jenkins,
2004, p.81), hence the sample at risk are systemaƟcally less likely to change their report
just for this reason. Controlling for factors associated with this composiƟonal change
may, therefore, reduce the apparent eﬀect of age.
In the ﬁrst model including SES (M1), I ﬁnd that the esƟmated hazard raƟos are staƟs-
Ɵcally signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one for each of the quinƟle groups of SES, with young
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Table 3.5: EsƟmated hazard raƟos of transiƟon from reporƟng being likely to apply to
reporƟng being unlikely to apply by quinƟles of socioeconomic status
M0 M1 M2 M3 M4
Age 16 0.89 0.90 0.91 0.95 0.94
( -2.41)** ( -2.33)** ( -2.07)** ( -1.08) ( -1.22)
Age 17 0.74 0.77 0.85 0.92 0.92
( -6.60)*** ( -5.82)*** ( -3.48)*** ( -1.83)* ( -1.76)*
SES Q1 (Low) 1.46 1.54 1.13 1.10
( 6.33)*** ( 6.59)*** ( 1.80)* ( 1.42)
SES Q2 1.40 1.31 1.17 1.16
( 5.61)*** ( 4.49)*** ( 2.53)** ( 2.42)**
SES Q4 0.75 0.80 0.80 0.80
( -4.76)*** ( -3.69)*** ( -3.67)*** ( -3.71)***
SES Q5 (High) 0.33 0.39 0.47 0.47
( -13.45)*** ( -11.89)*** ( -9.66)*** ( -9.59)***
Signiﬁcance of SES (P > jF j) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 9,247 9,247 9,247 9,247 9,247
Variables M0 M1 M2 M3 M4
Age p p p p p
SES QuinƟle Dummies p p p p
Demographics & School p p p
Prior AƩainment p p
Age 16 AƩainment p
Notes: ReporƟng hazard raƟos. P > jF j shows p-value from joint signiﬁcance test of the hypothesis
that exponenƟated coeﬃcients on all SES group dummies in the underlying condiƟonal log-log regression
model are equal to 1. Adjusted using LSYPE-provided Wave 2 survey design and non-response weights.
T-staƟsƟcs of the null hypothesis that the hazard raƟo is equal to one, based on standard errors clustered
by individual’s school, are reported in parentheses. EsƟmated risks are relaƟve to base categories of Age
15 and SES quinƟle group 3.
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people from less advantaged backgrounds being signiﬁcantly more likely to switch from
reporƟng being ‘likely’ to reporƟng being ‘unlikely’. To take the extremes, those in the
least advantaged quinƟle group have more than four Ɵmes the hazard of making a tran-
siƟon than those in the most advantaged SES group. In addiƟon, the size of the change
in hazard between each quinƟle group tends to increase further up the SES distribuƟon:
the smallest gap in hazard is between Q1 and Q2 (only equivalent to a 5 percent reduc-
Ɵon in the probability of transiƟon), while the largest is between Q4 and Q5 (equivalent
to more than a 50% reducƟon in the hazard of transiƟon). Also worthy of note is that
inclusion of SES in the model has made very liƩle diﬀerence to the correlaƟon between
age and hazard of transiƟon.
Given previous evidence on the young people’s expectaƟons of applying to university by
SES the strong relaƟonship is unsurprising. However, the aim in the following models is
to assess what, if anything, explains these gaps, and whether the SES gradient persists
once other factors have been controlled for.
Moving to the second model including SES (M2), I add various demographic and school
characterisƟcs. Several of these (notably including gender, ethnicity, and school char-
acterisƟcs) have large hazard raƟos that are staƟsƟcally signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one
(reported in Table B.1 of Appendix B.1). There is some reducƟon in the socio-economic
inequaliƟes observed in earlier models: the hazard of an individual from the least advan-
taged SES quinƟle group making a transiƟon from ‘likely to unlikely’ is now esƟmated to
be just under 4 Ɵmes greater than the hazard of an individual from the most advantaged
group doing so. The esƟmated hazard of transiƟon for individuals in the highest SES quin-
Ɵle group remains dramaƟcally diﬀerent from the esƟmated hazard for individuals in any
other quinƟle group: individuals have less than half the hazard of making a transiƟon as
individuals in the second most advantaged ﬁŌh of the distribuƟon.
As anƟcipated, inclusion of prior academic aƩainment from age 11 (inM3)makes amuch
bigger diﬀerence to the esƟmated inﬂuence of SES on young people’s expectaƟons. A
noƟceable feature of the esƟmated inﬂuence of SES quinƟle groups is that there is now
no diﬀerence in the hazard of transiƟon between the lowest two quinƟle groups; condi-
Ɵonal on other characterisƟcs, young people in the boƩom 40% of the SES distribuƟon
have approximately 15% higher hazard ofmaking a transiƟon from ‘likely to unlikely’ than
individuals in the middle. By contrast, the inﬂuence of being in a higher SES group con-
Ɵnues to be large reducƟons in the hazard of transiƟon from ‘likely to unlikely’: young
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people in the top SES quinƟle group sƟll have approximately 50% of the hazard of making
a transiƟon as individuals in the middle.
Furthermore, introducing prior aƩainment reduces esƟmated diﬀerences in the hazard of
transiƟon by age, which become only staƟsƟcally signiﬁcant at a 0.1 level. This suggests
that, in the case of the transiƟon from ‘likely to unlikely’, much of the apparent eﬀects
of age were driven by the reduced presence in the sample of individuals with lower prior
aƩainment by later Ɵme points.
In summary, there conƟnues to be a strong relaƟonship between young people’s socio-
economic background and their hazard of conƟnuing to report being ‘likely to apply’ to
university. Individuals from the least advantaged ﬁŌh of the SES distribuƟon sƟll have
almost 2.5 Ɵmes the hazard of making a transiƟon as individuals in the most advantaged
quinƟle group.
Table 3.6: EsƟmated odds raƟos of transiƟon from reporƟng being likely to apply to
reporƟng being unlikely to apply by interacƟon of socio-economic status and new
informaƟon on aƩainment at age 16
M4C M5C
Age 16 0.92 0.92
( -1.45) ( -1.45)
Age 17 1.00 1.05
( -0.03) ( 0.84)
SES Z-Score 0.68 0.69
( -11.00) ( -10.41)
KS4 Z-Score (AŌer results) 0.51 0.46
( -9.51) ( -9.98)
SES * KS4 0.79
( -3.11)
N 9,247 9,247
Variables M4C M5C
Age p p
SES Index Z-Score p p
Demographics & School p p
Prior AƩainment p p
Age 16 AƩainment p p
Age 16 AƩainment and SES InteracƟon p
Notes: ReporƟng hazard raƟos. Adjusted using LSYPE-provided Wave 2 survey design and non-response
weights. T-staƟsƟcs of the null hypothesis that the hazard raƟo is equal to one, based on standard errors
clustered by individual’s school, are reported in parentheses. EsƟmated risks are relaƟve to base category
of Age 15.
What explains the reducƟon in the size of the SES gap once prior aƩainment has been
included? Two possibiliƟes are that young people from less advantaged backgrounds are
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less likely to have achieved strong results at age 16, for whatever reason. AlternaƟvely, it
could be that their expectaƟons are more sensiƟve to the results that they receive. My
ﬁnal models aim to shed light on this quesƟon.
I ﬁrst examine whether KS4 results do have an associaƟon with changes in young peo-
ple’s expectaƟons of applying to university. I report the results from M4 in Table 3.5 in
order to check for unexpected changes in the main eﬀects. Given the likely endogeneity
of performance at age 16, esƟmates from M3 are likely to be a beƩer guide to the ‘con-
diƟonal’ associaƟon between SES and the hazard of transiƟon, although there are only
slight changes in pracƟce. For parsimony and ease of interpretaƟon, at this point I switch
to use of models in which SES is measured using the index variable deﬁned in SecƟon
3.3.3. Comparing the results of M4 (ﬁnal column of Table 3.5) and M4C (ﬁrst column of
Table 3.6) suggests that this simpliﬁcaƟon does not seem to have much of an eﬀect on
other variables in the model. However, the main coeﬃcient here is on the KS4 perfor-
mance variable, which unsurprisingly shows that a one standard deviaƟon improvement
in results at age 16 are associated with a having approximately a 20% reducƟon in the
hazard of moving from reporƟng ‘likely to apply’ to reporƟng ‘unlikely to apply’.
Results from M5C, in the second column of Table 3.6, then provides evidence on the
quesƟon of diﬀering responsiveness of young people to age 16 exam results. The esƟ-
mate reported in the interacƟon row of Table 3.6 should be interpreted as the addiƟonal
expected change in the hazard raƟo associated with a one standard deviaƟon increase in
KS4 scores when the individual in quesƟon is one standard deviaƟon further up the SES
distribuƟon. As I do ﬁnd a staƟsƟcally signiﬁcant esƟmate for this interacƟon term, this
suggests that young people’s SES background does aﬀect how likely they are to adjust
their expectaƟons downwards when faced with a similar set of KS4 results. Speciﬁcally,
the hazard raƟo of 0.79 shows that, in general, young people from more advantaged
backgrounds are less likely to respond to poorer results by lowering their expectaƟons of
applying to university.³⁰
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Table 3.7: EsƟmated hazard raƟos of transiƟon from reporƟng being unlikely to apply to
reporƟng being likely to apply by quinƟles of socioeconomic status
M0 M1 M2 M3 M4
Age 16 0.88 0.88 0.90 0.91 0.90
( -2.28)** ( -2.30)** ( -1.80)* ( -1.72)* ( -1.86)*
Age 17 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.76
( -7.90)*** ( -8.13)*** ( -7.90)*** ( -7.61)*** ( -4.48)***
SES Q1 (Low) 0.76 0.70 0.79 0.81
( -3.80)*** ( -4.28)*** ( -2.78)*** ( -2.57)**
SES Q2 0.89 0.88 0.91 0.91
( -1.75)* ( -1.83)* ( -1.43) ( -1.38)
SES Q4 1.29 1.25 1.16 1.15
( 3.42)*** ( 3.05)*** ( 2.00)** ( 1.87)*
SES Q5 (High) 1.94 1.92 1.71 1.67
( 7.76)*** ( 7.68)*** ( 6.25)*** ( 5.99)***
Signiﬁcance of SES (P > jF j) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 5,330 5,330 5,330 5,330 5,330
Variables M0 M1 M2 M3 M4
Age p p p p p
SES QuinƟle Dummies p p p p
Demographics & School p p p
Prior AƩainment p p
Age 16 AƩainment p
Notes: ReporƟng hazard raƟos. P > jF j shows p-value from joint signiﬁcance test of the hypothesis
that exponenƟated coeﬃcients on all SES group dummies in the underlying condiƟonal log-log regression
model are equal to 1. Adjusted using LSYPE-provided Wave 2 survey design and non-response weights.
T-staƟsƟcs of the null hypothesis that the hazard raƟo is equal to one, based on standard errors clustered
by individual’s school, are reported in parentheses. EsƟmated risks are relaƟve to base categories of Age
15 and SES quinƟle group 3.
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3.7.2 From unlikely to likely
I now turn to the transiƟon back from being ‘unlikely to apply’ to being ‘likely to apply’. I
report the results in Table 3.7, concentraƟng again just on the associaƟon between young
people’s SES quinƟle group and the hazard of young people raising their expectaƟons. As
remarked above, it may well be the case that the relaƟonship explaining the likelihood of
transiƟon from ‘unlikely to likely’ is quite diﬀerent from that explaining ‘likely to unlikely’;
this could be in terms of diﬀerent signiﬁcant factors, diﬀerent direcƟons of eﬀects and
diﬀerent strengths of relaƟonships. However, this is not the case for the uncondiƟonal
relaƟonship between young people’s age and the hazard that theymake a transiƟon from
‘unlikely to likely’ (in M0): as with the opposite transiƟon, as individuals get older they
appear to become less likely to switch, albeit more dramaƟcally by age 17.
Turning to SES (in M1), once again there is a large gradient in young people’s chances of
making a transiƟon depending on their relaƟve advantage. In this case, young people
from more advantaged backgrounds have a greater hazard of making a transiƟon from
reporƟng ‘unlikely’ to reporƟng ‘likely’. Individuals from the most advantaged quinƟle
group of the SES index have more than 2.5 Ɵmes the hazard of making a transiƟon as
their counterparts in the least advantaged ﬁŌh of the distribuƟon. This is a large dif-
ference, although not as large as the diﬀerence between these groups in the hazard of
moving from ‘likely to unlikely’, where the uncondiƟonal hazard raƟo was greater than
four. However, as with the inverse transiƟon, will this apparent inﬂuence of SES be re-
duced when I add further covariates?
The addiƟonal covariates inM2donothing to reduce the associaƟonbetween SES and the
hazard of making a transiƟon from ‘unlikely to likely’. The hazard raƟos barely change for
any of the quinƟle groups of SES. Coeﬃcients on some of the variables added at this point
(reported in Table B.2 of Appendix B.1) suggest large and signiﬁcant relaƟonshipswith the
hazard of transiƟon: in parƟcular young people who from ethnic minoriƟes and young
women are much more likely to switch to being ‘likely to apply’. However, the results
suggest that these are largely independent of SES and/or cancel one another out.
On the other hand, controlling for prior aƩainment doesmore to explain the SES inﬂuence
on young people’s chances of changing their minds from ‘unlikely to likely’, parƟcularly
³⁰I do also esƟmate separate versions of this model using dummy variables for quinƟles of SES. While
the results from this model suggest that a linear relaƟonship is unlikely to provide the best ﬁt, a joint test of
the interacƟon terms sƟll suggests that the overall form of the relaƟonship reported in Table 3.6 is robust.
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at the more advantaged end of the SES distribuƟon. Nevertheless, a large SES gradient
remains, with individuals in the top quinƟle group of the SES index having more than
twice the hazard of moving from ‘unlikely’ to ‘likely’ as peers in the boƩom group. The
most advantaged ﬁŌh of the sample remain outliers from the rest of the distribuƟon:
their hazard of transiƟon is almost ﬁŌy percent higher than in the quinƟle group just
below them.
In contrast to the results for ‘likely to unlikely’, the coeﬃcients on whether an individual
aƩends an independent school, a grammar school, or a school with a sixth form (reported
inAppendix B) are not staƟsƟcally signiﬁcant. However, itwould appear that in the former
two cases this is due to there only being a very small number of such individuals in the
sample on which models of the transiƟon from ‘unlikely to likely’ are esƟmated: there
are very few individuals from independent or grammar schools who ever report being
‘unlikely to apply’ to university during this period.
Another noƟceable diﬀerence between the two direcƟons of transiƟon is that, in contrast
to themodel of ‘likely to unlikely’, even inclusion of young people’s prior aƩainment in the
model of ‘unlikely to likely’ does not fully explain the role of age: the coeﬃcient on age 16
becomes only signiﬁcant at the 10% level, while the coeﬃcient on age 17 remains highly
signiﬁcant. One explanaƟon for this is that, while it’s never too late to decide against
making an applicaƟon to university, it can get too late for individuals to start thinking
that they will. If they have not been planning to apply to university, young people will
not have taken key acƟons necessary in order to be in a posiƟon to make a compeƟƟve
applicaƟon. Arguably this is closer to a duraƟon eﬀect than an age eﬀect, being picked
up by the age variables due to the absence of duraƟon parameters: it is less likely to
be present for young people who only spend a single period reporƟng being ‘unlikely to
apply’, for example.
In summary, as with the transiƟon from ‘likely to unlikely’, there remains a large, staƟsƟ-
cally signiﬁcant relaƟonship between young people’s socio-economic advantage and the
likelihood that they move into thinking they are ‘likely to apply’.
Again, the quesƟon arises of whether young people from less advantaged backgrounds
are responding diﬀerently to new informaƟon on their academic aƩainment. Speciﬁcally,
in this case, the hypothesis that may parƟally explain the growing inequality in expecta-
Ɵons is that individuals from lower SES backgrounds are less responsive to just as promis-
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Table 3.8: EsƟmated odds raƟos of transiƟon from reporƟng being unlikely to apply to
reporƟng being likely to apply by interacƟon of socio-economic status and new
informaƟon on aƩainment at age 16
M4C M5C
Age 16 0.88 0.88
( -1.92) ( -1.94)
Age 17 0.75 0.73
( -4.02) ( -4.29)
SES Z-Score 1.34 1.35
( 7.20) ( 7.34)
KS4 Z-Score (AŌer results) 1.84 2.06
( 8.32) ( 8.05)
SES * KS4 1.22
( 2.32)
N 5,330 5,330
Variables M4C M5C
Age p p
SES Index Z-Score p p
Demographics & School p p
Prior AƩainment p p
Age 16 AƩainment p p
Age 16 AƩainment and SES InteracƟon p
Notes: ReporƟng hazard raƟos. Adjusted using LSYPE-provided Wave 2 survey design and non-response
weights. T-staƟsƟcs of the null hypothesis that the hazard raƟo is equal to one, based on standard errors
clustered by individual’s school, are reported in parentheses. EsƟmated risks are relaƟve to base category
of Age 15.
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ing new informaƟon at age 16 as peers with similar prior academic aƩainment frommore
advantaged homes. As with the transiƟon from ‘likely to unlikely’, I switch at this point to
use of a conƟnuous measure of SES. As such, in Table 3.8, the esƟmate reported in the
interacƟon row (SES * KS4) reports the addiƟonal expected change in the risk of transi-
Ɵon associated with a one standard deviaƟon increase in KS4 scores when the individual
in quesƟon is one standard deviaƟon further up the SES distribuƟon.
Indeed, the results do suggest diﬀerenƟal sensiƟvity to new informaƟon on academic
performancemaybe important in explaining the observed changes in expectaƟons. There
is a staƟsƟcally signiﬁcant hazard raƟo of 1.29 associatedwith the interacƟon term,³¹ sug-
gesƟng that individuals with the same age 16 performance but with more advantaged
parents are more likely to revise their expectaƟons in light of beƩer academic results at
age 16.
3.8 Conclusions
In this chapter I have invesƟgated how young people’s expectaƟons of applying to univer-
sity change between age 14 and age 17, just before individuals start making applicaƟons.
My ﬁndings conﬁrm that this is a period when many young people do change their ex-
pectaƟons of applying to university. They also highlight that this change is not just from
being ‘likely to apply’ to being ‘unlikely to apply’, but rather runs in both direcƟons.
While young people across the socio-economic status distribuƟon start their adolescence
with high educaƟonal expectaƟons, those from less advantaged backgrounds are much
more likely to revise their expectaƟons downwards and much less likely to raise their
expectaƟons during this period. This relaƟonship persists even once I control for many
other factors correlated with SES and, perhaps most notably, young people’s prior aca-
demic aƩainment. The least advantaged ﬁŌh of young people have more than twice the
chances of switching from reporƟng being ‘likely to apply’ to reporƟng being ‘unlikely
to apply’ as the most advantaged ﬁŌh, condiƟonal on prior aƩainment. Conversely, the
most advantaged ﬁŌh of young people have more than twice the chances of changing
from reporƟng being ‘unlikely to apply’ to reporƟng being ‘likely to apply’ as the most
³¹Aswith themodel from ‘likely to unlikely’, the results from a separatemodelmodel where I use dummy
variables for quinƟle groups of SES suggest that a linear relaƟonship is unlikely to provide the best ﬁt.
Nevertheless, in a model in which dummy variables are used, a joint test of the interacƟon terms suggests
this ﬁnding is robust.
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advantaged ﬁŌh, again condiƟonal on prior aƩainment.
In Chapter 2 I found that much of the socio-economic gradient in access to university
opened at or before the point of applicaƟon. This chapter builds on this, ﬁnding that a
substanƟal porƟon of this socio-economic gap in university applicaƟons opens between
ages 14 and 17. A posiƟve implicaƟon of this is that it is not too late to target policies,
both to maintain and to raise educaƟonal expectaƟons, at bright individuals from less
advantaged backgrounds during this period of their lives. However, of the two, raising
expectaƟons of applying to universitymay be less eﬀecƟve thanmaintaining expectaƟons
and becomes increasingly diﬃcult as individuals get older.
I also ﬁnd some evidence that young people from diﬀering SES backgrounds react dif-
ferently to new informaƟon on their academic aƩainment at age 16. This diﬀerenƟal is
also asymmetric, helping to explain the growth in inequality of expectaƟons: more ad-
vantaged young people are less responsive to results in lowering their expectaƟons, but
more responsive to results in raising them. AŌer these exam results is a diﬃcult point
in Ɵme to reach young people, as many move between educaƟonal insƟtuƟons or leave
full Ɵme educaƟon altogether. However, it may be the case that providing fresh guid-
ance in the light of the results is very important in ensuring young people’s educaƟonal
expectaƟons are appropriate.
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Chapter 4
The impact on socio-economic and
gender inequaliƟes of using an apƟtude
test as part of the admissions process at
an elite university
4.1 IntroducƟon
Having considered the emergence of socio-economic inequaliƟes in the years running up
to making an applicaƟon in Chapter 3, this chapter now turns to take an in depth look at
one aspect of the admissions process itself, speciﬁcally those at a highly selecƟve Russell
Group university. As we saw in Chapter 2, university applicants from the boƩom income
quinƟle group are almost 20 percentage points less likely to aƩend a Russell Group insƟ-
tuƟon than those from the top income quinƟle group.
In parƟcular, this chapter considers the increasing use of apƟtude tests as part of the
admissions processes at elite universiƟes in England, which potenƟally has signiﬁcant
implicaƟons for fair access to these insƟtuƟons. While the intenƟon is to improve the
eﬃciency of the process, making it easier to select individuals with a beƩer ‘apƟtude’ ¹
for their university course, is this eﬃciency gain traded oﬀ against other aims of the ad-
missions process? In parƟcular, previous research suggests there are reasons to think ap-
¹‘ApƟtude’ is taken broadly as a measure of potenƟal aƩainment, as against prior aƩainment such as
measured by A Levels or GCSEs, or innate ability.
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Ɵtude tesƟng may have side eﬀects on the proporƟon of applicants from diﬀerent socio-
economic backgrounds (Rothstein, 2002) and diﬀerent genders (Tannenbaum, 2012)who
get a place.
To explain this concern, let us take the example of fair access by socioeconomic status.
There are at least two potenƟal reasons that the introducƟon of an apƟtude test could
result in a smaller intake of those from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. First, the
outcomes of the test could reﬂect skills acquired in previous educaƟon, hence skewing
the distribuƟon of those oﬀered a place towards those who received certain kinds of
schooling, or training to the test, both of which might be of concern (Stringer, 2008).
AlternaƟvely, it could reﬂect genuine diﬀerences in apƟtude for the university’s degree
programme across the socioeconomic spectrum. However, there are also reasons to see
the possibility of the opposite eﬀect as a result of the introducƟon of an apƟtude test,
with more oﬀers of places made to those from less advantaged backgrounds. If more
weight is given to apƟtude test results over and above school examinaƟon results then
this could help overcome bias in those indicators caused by schooling rather than un-
derlying ability. This chapter aims to idenƟfy which, if either, of these eﬀects seems to
dominate and hence understand the wider impact of using apƟtude tests as a selecƟon
tool.
In 2007-2008, the University of Oxford, an elite BriƟsh university, introduced an apƟtude
test as part of the admissions process for Economics-related subjects. The test, named
the Thinking Skills Assessment, was intended to assess criƟcal thinking and problem solv-
ing skills, seen as useful for predicƟng apƟtude for these courses at the university.² I use
administraƟve data from the University’s admissions system, covering all undergraduate
applicaƟons, to esƟmate the diﬀerenƟal impact of the introducƟon of this test on ap-
plicants by their socioeconomic backgrounds and their gender. I employ a diﬀerence
in diﬀerences framework: this aƩempts to control for any general trends in the pro-
porƟon oﬀered an interview and the proporƟon admiƩed using those seen in subjects
where the apƟtude test was not introduced, hence isolaƟng the impact due to the policy
change.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In SecƟon 4.2, I survey the literature on access to elite
universiƟes, idenƟfy important details about the use of apƟtude tests in university admis-
²In Appendix D I give further details of the Thinking Skills Assessment and reproduce a number of ques-
Ɵons from the specimen paper.
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sions, and lay out the research quesƟons for this chapter. I then detail the admissions
process at the University of Oxford in SecƟon 4.3 and describe the data used in this work
in SecƟon 4.4. SecƟon 4.5 describes the changes in admissions during the period anal-
ysed and idenƟﬁes the parƟcular features of the change in policy. It then lays out the
empirical strategy for idenƟfying the changes in outcomes that seem to be associated
with its introducƟon and presents simple esƟmates of impact. I extend this using regres-
sion analysis, describing my models in SecƟon 4.6 and presenƟng the results in SecƟon
4.7. I consider an alternaƟve way of looking at the results in SecƟon 4.8 and conduct
various robustness checks in SecƟon 4.9, before concluding in SecƟon 4.10.
4.2 Previous research and research quesƟons
Why take an interest in the admissions processes of elite universiƟes, and the introduc-
Ɵon of an apƟtude test in parƟcular? I consider these quesƟons in turn.
Given the higher wage premiums graduates from elite universiƟes seem to command
(Chevalier andConlon, 2003), fair access to these insƟtuƟons is important to future equal-
ity of opportunity. Furthermore, one cannot necessarily rely on insights about fair access
to all universiƟes to understand inequaliƟes at elite universiƟes; Pallais argues that “it is
enƟrely plausible that barriers to enrollment at the most selecƟve insƟtuƟons are some-
what diﬀerent than at the margin of enrollment” (Pallais and Turner, 2008, p.132) and as
such the correct policy response may well be diﬀerent.
The current UK government’s belief is that “progress over the last few years in securing
fair access to the most selecƟve universiƟes has been inadequate, and that much more
determined acƟon now needs to be taken” (WilleƩs, 2011). Previous research from both
the UK and the US has highlighted concern about the equality of opportunity in access
to elite Higher EducaƟon insƟtuƟons. In Chapter 2 I showed that, among young English
peoplewhodo aƩenduniversity, those from the boƩom incomequinƟle group are almost
20 percentage points less likely to aƩend a Russell Group insƟtuƟon (a group of elite
UK universiƟes) than those from the top income quinƟle group. Similarly, analysis by
Boliver (2013) highlighted that Russell Group applicants from state schools are less likely
to receive oﬀers of admission from Russell Group universiƟes in comparison with their
equivalently qualiﬁedpeers fromprivate schools. Such concerns also exist in theUS: “Less
100
than 11 percent of ﬁrst–year students matriculaƟng at 20 highly selecƟve insƟtuƟons
were from the boƩom income quarƟle of the income distribuƟon” (Pallais and Turner,
2006, p.357).
Speciﬁcally regarding the University of Oxford, BhaƩacharya et al. (2012) use administra-
Ɵve data from one undergraduate programme to esƟmate the expected performance of
the marginal admiƩed candidate by sex and school type, arguing that in an academically
fair process this threshold for admission would be equal between such groups. However,
they esƟmate that the expected performance of the marginal candidate from an inde-
pendent school is approximately 0.3 standard deviaƟons higher than their state school
counterpart. Similarly, the expected performance of the marginally admiƩed male can-
didate is about 0.6 standard deviaƟons higher than their female counterpart. Contrary to
much evidence this suggests that, at the margin, increasing the number of male entrants
and those from independent schools would increase expected degree performance of
the intake.
ApƟtude tesƟng has become a much more important issue in recent years. As more stu-
dents have begun to reach the upper bound of performance in A Levels (examinaƟons
taken by most English students aiming for entry to Higher EducaƟon, usually at age 18) it
has become harder for universiƟes to diﬀerenƟate between potenƟal students at the top
end of the ability distribuƟon.³ This has led to an increasing use of apƟtude tests among
elite insƟtuƟons, including the BioMedical ApƟtude Test and United Kingdom Clinical Ap-
Ɵtude Test for admission to medical courses at many universiƟes; the Physics ApƟtude
Test, at the University of Oxford; and, the focus of this chapter, the Thinking Skills As-
sessment at the University of Oxford, the University of Cambridge and University College
London (Admissions TesƟng Service, 2013b);. However, an important quesƟon iswhether
this response is a sensible course of acƟon, especially in the light of the inequaliƟes dis-
cussed above.
Taking apƟtude as ameasure of potenƟal ability in a givenﬁeld, then apƟtude tests should
be eﬀecƟve at predicƟng the performance of candidates once they reach university and
should do so without being biased by candidates’ other characterisƟcs. Unfortunately,
McDonald et al. (2001b) ﬁnd liƩle evidence that the ScholasƟc ApƟtude Test (SAT) pre-
dicts aƩainment once at college in the US any beƩer than high school record alone. These
³This analysis covers the period before the introducƟon of the new A* grade for A-Levels, which has
ameliorated this problem to some extent.
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ﬁndings were replicated in a pilot study in Britain (McDonald et al., 2001a), which does
have a very diﬀerent insƟtuƟonal seƫng, most notably naƟonally comparable end of
school examinaƟons. A more recent Department of Business, InnovaƟon and Skills (BIS)
report comes to similar conclusions, arguing that the SAT does not provide signiﬁcantly
more informaƟon on applicants’ likely performance at undergraduate level, relaƟve to a
baseline of GCSE (English school examinaƟons taken at the end of compulsory educaƟon)
aƩainment scores (Kirkup et al., 2010, p.20).
On the quesƟon of bias in apƟtude test scores, the fact that “low-income students not
only are less likely to take college placement tests but also tend to have lower scores on
these exams” (Pallais and Turner, 2008, p.135) suggests, on the face of it, that apƟtude
tesƟng could causemore harm than good. In addiƟon, Pallais and Turner (2008) note that
the “gap [in apƟtude tests between low and high income students] is parƟcularly marked
at the top of the distribuƟon from which elite colleges and universiƟes are likely to draw
students”, which means that, even if apƟtude tesƟng becomes commonplace among HE
insƟtuƟons of all kinds, its eﬀects remain parƟcularly perƟnent to elite universiƟes.
There have long been concerns about gender diﬀerences on performance in apƟtude
tesƟng in the US (Linn and Hyde, 1989) and, while ﬁnding diﬀerences in scores by socio-
economic status or gender does not necessarily imply bias (Zwick, 2007, p.20), McDonald
et al. (2001b) do idenƟfy speciﬁc evidence of biases in the SAT, in the US, with “consis-
tent evidence that [it] under-predicts female aƩainment” once they get to university and
more mixed evidence on bias by ethnic groups. Similarly, Wikström andWikström (2014)
present evidence from Sweden that, on average, females perform worse than males in
the SweSAT (a naƟonal university admissions test), while the opposite is true inmeasures
based on their performance at school. Tannenbaum (2012) argues that one reason for
these ﬁndings is diﬀering gender styles in test taking, analysing in parƟcular the SAT and
diﬀering aƫtudes to risk.
Although these analyses cannot necessarily be extrapolated to the Thinking Skills Assess-
ment, no analysis that I am aware of evaluates whether its predicƟve power is signiﬁ-
cantly higher than a baseline of school examinaƟon results, norwhether there is evidence
of bias in its assessments. The research that has been done speciﬁcally into the Think-
ing Skills Assessment has been restricted to simple analysis of predicƟve validity with no
baseline. Research by Cambridge Assessment (the developers and administrators of the
test) sought to examine the extent to which the TSA could predict future academic per-
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formance (Emery, 2006; Emery et al., 2006). This was conducted using data from the Uni-
versity of Cambridge courses in Computer Science, Economics, Engineering and Natural
Science for students who took the TSA in 2003. As is standard pracƟce in evaluaƟng the
predicƟve validity of selecƟon tests, this involved calculaƟng correlaƟons between TSA
score and subsequent academic outcomes. In parƟcular, the research ﬁnds a correlaƟon
between higher marks in the TSA and higher marks in ﬁrst year university examinaƟons;
strong similariƟes in the candidates that would be rejected by a low TSA cut oﬀ score and
those rejected under the present selecƟon system; and higher mean TSA scores among
those gaining higher degree classiﬁcaƟon marks in the same examinaƟons.
The authors also state that the correlaƟons, some (but not all) of which are staƟsƟcally
signiﬁcant, are likely to be an underesƟmate of the true predicƟve power since they do
not include those who were unsuccessful in geƫng a place at the university. However,
there are potenƟal problems in some of the analysis done because of the data they were
able to work with. Rather than having any data where the TSA was administered but
not used for selecƟon, the TSA was already in use in the selecƟon process (Emery et al.,
2006, p.13). This means that care should be taken in interpretaƟon, especially of the
distribuƟons suggesƟng similarity between those who would be rejected by a TSA cut oﬀ
and those rejected by the original selecƟon methods.
With rather limited evidence on predicƟve validity, one should also consider the wider
consequences of introducing an apƟtude test. McDonald et al. (2001b, p.53) highlight
the importance of this, and draw on the concept of ‘consequenƟal validity’ (Messick,
1989, p.8). This refers to the wider consequences of introducing the test on other as-
pects of the admissions process. In this context, one might expect to see a reduced focus
on the other informaƟon about a candidate that an admissions tutor has: use of apƟtude
tesƟng may reduce focus on a candidate’s examinaƟons results. This might have posiƟve
consequences, given known socioeconomic gradients in aƩainment in such exams. How-
ever, that is only the case if the alternaƟve provides a fairer assessment of candidates’
ability.
‘ConsequenƟal validity’ also refers to responses to the use of apƟtude tesƟng outside
the admissions process itself. For example, Wilmouth (1991) argues that students might
spend increased Ɵme preparing for apƟtude tests and less on their academic studies
(cited in McDonald et al., 2001b, p.54). This could have a negaƟve knock-on eﬀect on
individuals’ academic aƩainment, both in the short term and on their aƩainment at uni-
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versity. Similarly, Geiser (2008) argues that the educaƟon system should reward individ-
uals who work hard throughout their school careers, aƩaining highly as a result; apƟtude
tesƟng may incenƟvise bright individuals to work less hard at achieving high levels of
aƩainment, if they believe they can be successful in gaining access to higher educaƟon
simply by doing well on a test supposedly designed to assess innate skills.
This chapter contributes to the literature by providing evidence on the consequences of
apƟtude tesƟng for applicants to an elite BriƟsh university. Given concerns about bias
in scores on apƟtude tests (Zwick, 2007, p.20) I pay parƟcular aƩenƟon to these issues,
with the chapter’s research quesƟons as follows:
1. Does use of the TSA have an eﬀect on the proporƟon of applicants called to inter-
view, the proporƟon of applicants oﬀered a place, or the proporƟon of intervie-
wees oﬀered a place?
2. Do these impacts diﬀer for high and low socioeconomic status applicants?
3. Do these impacts diﬀer for female and male applicants?
4.3 The admissions process
Unlike at some BriƟsh universiƟes, the admissions process at the University of Oxford
consists of more than one stage, with a shortlist of candidates invited to interview before
ﬁnal admissions decisions are taken. I show the basic form of the admissions process
graphically in Figure 4.1, highlighƟng three key decision points that make up the pro-
cess. First, individuals choosewhether to apply toOxford; second, the University chooses
which applicants to call to interview⁴; and third, the University chooses whether to oﬀer
interviewees a place. Since I am using administraƟve data from the University (which I
will describe further in SecƟon 4.4), I can analyse the laƩer two decision points, but not
the ﬁrst.
Referring back to the idea of ‘consequenƟal validity’ of using an apƟtude test, and the
potenƟal for wider societal eﬀects of its introducƟon, an important part of the story is
the impact of the introducƟon of the TSA on who applies to Economics courses at the
⁴StarƟng in 2009, the University introduced use of contextual data in selecƟon to interview across all
subjects. Qualiﬁed applicants with various combinaƟons of ‘ﬂags’ (indicaƟng more challenging circum-
stances based on prior educaƟon and area-based measures) are strongly recommend for interview (Uni-
versity of Oxford, 2014).
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Figure 4.1: Simpliﬁed model of the admissions process
Interviewees
Not Interviewed
Offer
No Offer
2: Call to Interview 3: Offer a Place
Applicants
1: Make an Application
Eligible
Don't Apply
University of Oxford. Unfortunately, the data available do not allow for the proporƟon
of young people who choose to apply to be modelled since potenƟal applicants are not
observed by the university. In any case, the denominator is rather poorly deﬁned. Do
we really want to consider the proporƟon of all young people of this age who apply, or
restrict aƩenƟon to a subset of ‘eligible’ applicants? If the laƩer, whom should we regard
as an eligible applicant? However, without addressing this maƩer we might be ignoring
signiﬁcant eﬀects of the policy change. I return to this issue in SecƟon 4.8.
Thus far, I have described the decision to call candidates to interview, and whether ulƟ-
mately to oﬀer them a place, as being made by ‘the University’. However, to understand
who actually makes the decisions it is important to understand the unusual way admis-
sions are organised at the University of Oxford. The University is made up of more than
30 diﬀerent, fairly autonomous, ‘colleges’. Much undergraduate teaching occurs within
these colleges, rather than at university level, although students at all colleges, on the
same course, study towards the same degree examinaƟons. It is usually one or more of
the members of staﬀ who undertake this undergraduate teaching within a college who
decide which applicants to invite to interview and, subsequently, which to oﬀer places
to. For this purpose, they are referred to as ‘admissions tutors’.
A college’s admissions tutors’ decision over whether to admit an individual is ﬁnal: Uni-
versity departments cannot overrule college decisions. Most applicaƟons for undergrad-
uate courses aremade to colleges. However, some individuals domake open applicaƟons
(which are not to any parƟcular college); these are allocated to a college with a lower ap-
plicaƟons to places raƟo and then proceed on the same basis.
It is worth noƟng that applicants receiving an oﬀer do not necessarily receive that of-
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fer from the college they applied to. The aim of the reallocaƟon process is to ensure
that the number of applicants considered by a college is proporƟonal to the number of
places available there. Those who are reallocated to other colleges are usually more
marginal applicants (since colleges have ﬁrst refusal on those applicants who apply to
them). Under 25% of successful applicants are reallocated, with it being somewhat less
likely among Economics applicants. The college an individual applies to (or is allocated
to if they make an open applicaƟon) and the college an individual receives an oﬀer from
are both recorded in the dataset.⁵
All colleges that admit undergraduates admit Economics students.⁶ However, the pro-
porƟon of applicants for Economics and the proporƟon of oﬀers going to Economics ap-
plicants at each college vary greatly (and do not necessarily track one another directly).
For example, at the top end, one college received 6.1% of applicaƟons to Economics and
hosted 8.1% of the university’s Economics undergraduates. At the other extreme, one
college received just under 1.5% of Economics applicaƟons, and went on to host 1% of
the university’s undergraduate economists.
4.4 Data
I use administraƟve data from the University of Oxford covering undergraduate admis-
sions made in the years 2005 to 2010. The dataset includes informaƟon on all appli-
caƟons to undergraduate courses. This includes applicaƟons to Philosophy, PoliƟcs and
Economics (PPE) and Economics and Management (E&M), the University of Oxford’s two
main undergraduate degrees in Economics and the subjects for which the apƟtude test
was introduced; applicaƟons to these two courses make up 11% of total applicaƟons to
Oxford during this period (see Table 4.1). Throughout the chapter I refer to these two
courses as Economics, for convenience (although I do explore potenƟally important dif-
ferences at various points during the chapter).
The progress of applicants through the admissions process is recorded comprehensively
⁵I test the robustness ofmy results to thesemoremarginally accepted candidates by treaƟng these indi-
viduals as not having received an oﬀer. In relevant models this does reduce the absolute size of diﬀerences
and hence staƟsƟcal signiﬁcance, but does not materially alter the ﬁndings.
⁶I exclude the very small Permanent Private Halls (PPHs), some of which do not oﬀer Economics, and
a college that only accepts mature students (mature students do not have a school aﬃliaƟon, so we are
missing our limited measure of SES). Without exclusion these colleges would produce a missing value in
proporƟons of applicants in certain circumstances, resulƟng in inconsistent sample sizes.
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in the dataset, tracking the individuals who apply, whether they are called to interview,
and ulƟmately whether they are oﬀered a place at the University. Other than details on
an applicant’s successes or failures (discussed in SecƟon 4.3), the available data from the
process is relaƟvely sparse: it includes their gender, school type (i.e. independent or
state), school postcode (which may be linked to data on area level deprivaƟon), and their
qualiﬁcaƟons, with which to aƩempt to understand the addiƟonal eﬀects aƩributable to
the TSA. Coming from administraƟve data collected as part of the admissions exercise,
the dataset does not include informaƟon on the performance of successful individuals
once they have been admiƩed.
Likewise, as its purpose is to summarise all undergraduate admissions, the dataset does
not include informaƟon on aspects of the process which are course-speciﬁc. Notably, for
the purposes of this chapter, this means there is no data on individuals’ performance in
the TSA itself. In any case, this would not, of course, be available for Economics applicants
in years prior to its introducƟon, or for non-Economics applicants in any year. Hence, test
scores would not be of use as part of a diﬀerence in diﬀerences approach to esƟmaƟng
the impact of the introducƟon of the TSA.While diﬀerences in TSA performance between
diﬀerent groups may be part of the explanaƟon for the results, this is beyond the scope
of this chapter.
To answer my research quesƟons, I need a proxy for socioeconomic status. Unfortu-
nately, the dataset includes no informaƟon on individuals’ family backgrounds.⁷ I use
the variable indicaƟng whether an individual applicant aƩended an independent school,
a state school or neither of these at Ɵme of applicaƟon. I use school type as a proxy
for socioeconomic status in this way because of the correlaƟon between the two: in
the UK independent schools are primarily fee-paying schools, catering for those from
aﬄuent backgrounds. The remainder of the populaƟon aƩends state schools, where
funding is provided by the government either through Local AuthoriƟes (someƟmes re-
ferred to as maintained schools) or, increasingly, direct to the schools (which are known
as academies). While only about 18% of those in educaƟon between the ages of 16 and
18 aƩend an independent school (Department for EducaƟon, 2010), 38% of applicants
observed in the dataset are from independent schools.
⁷ApplicaƟons to UK universiƟes are made through the UniversiƟes and Colleges Admissions Service
(UCAS). As part of this process, individuals are asked to provide informaƟon on their ethnic origin, parental
educaƟon and occupaƟonal background. However, these quesƟons are not compulsory. In any event, any
responses are not provided to the insƟtuƟons to which the individual has applied (except in aggregate, and
at a later date). As such, they do not form part of this dataset.
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Figure 4.2: Kernel density esƟmate of the distribuƟon of household equivalised income
among young people who apply to university, by whether the young person aƩends
independent school
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Notes: CalculaƟons based on data from the Longitudinal Study of Young People in England. Independent
school status measured at age 14. Equivalised household income measure constructed as per Chapter 2,
speciﬁcally equivalised by dividing by square root of household size.
AƩending an independent school does correlate with individuals’ socioeconomic status.
Using data from the Longitudinal Study of Young People in England (LSYPE), speciﬁcally
the same income measure constructed in Chapter 2, I esƟmate that median household
equivalised income for university applicants from state schools is about £14,800, while
for those aƩending an independent school it is just over £31,000.⁸
However, there are drawbacks compared to other measures. First, it is a very blunt in-
strument, providing us with only a binary indicator of status. Second, it proxies socio-
economic status with error: as can be seen from Figure 4.2 there is large overlap in the
distribuƟons of household income in households where a teenager is at independent or
state school. There will be many reasons for this; for example, in more aﬄuent areas or
where schools are selecƟve,more young people from richer backgroundswill aƩend state
schools. Furthermore, in the other direcƟon, individuals from poor backgrounds may at-
tend independent schools, for example supported by bursaries. On the other hand, use
⁸The LSYPE’s measurement of school type is based on a combinaƟon of administraƟve and survey data
from approximately age 14. It would be beƩer to measure at age 17 or 18, since a greater proporƟon of
the school populaƟon are in independent schools for the two post-compulsory educaƟon years leading up
to university (about 17.5% vs. 7%). Unfortunately, this is not available: it would make the diﬀerence in
average income less stark, but would be extremely unlikely to eliminate it.
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of independent school status does have an intuiƟve appeal. It is both an instantly inter-
pretable disƟncƟon and is oŌen the basis for targets regarding fair access that universiƟes
negoƟate with the UK Government’s Oﬃce for Fair Access.
The data also include the post codes of the schools that individuals are currently aƩend-
ing (or aƩended the previous year in the case of applicantswho apply shortly aŌer leaving
school). By linking with the Income DeprivaƟon AﬀecƟng Children Index (IDACI) I aƩempt
to achieve a more nuanced picture of the individual’s SES from their school’s neighbour-
hood. IDACI “is expressed as the proporƟon of all children aged 0-15 living in income
deprived families” (McLennan et al., 2011, p.22-23). This too will proxy socioeconomic
statuswith error: for example, some schools in deprived neighbourhoodsmay sƟll aƩract
children from aﬄuent families. However, using another dataset, I show that school IDACI
is weakly correlated with an individual’s socioeconomic status (see Appendix E.1).
For the purposes of this analysis I exclude all overseas applicants; those who apply with-
out school aﬃliaƟon (primarily mature students); and those aﬃliated to schools where
the school type is unavailable for some other reason (about 2% of UK applicants). 63,986
UKapplicants forwhomdetails about school type are observed remain in thedataset.
Academic aƩainment of applicants will clearly be an important factor in admissions to
any university. In England, the majority of universiƟes use applicants’ performance in ‘AS
Levels’, which are exams taken at around the age of 17, one year into post-compulsory
educaƟon. In addiƟon, most oﬀers of places will be condiƟonal on applicants achieving
a parƟcular set of results in ‘A Levels’ (these build on AS Levels and are taken two years
into post-compulsory educaƟon): at the University of Oxford this is typically achieving 3
A-Levels at grade A (the maximum). However, among applicants for courses at Oxford
there is very liƩle variability among results in either of these qualiﬁcaƟons, with most
applicants achieving top grades.
As a result, applicants’ performance in General CerƟﬁcates of Secondary EducaƟon (GC-
SEs) is taken into consideraƟon. In England, these are the predominant examinaƟons
taken at the end of compulsory educaƟon, usually while individuals are aged 16. In the
dataset, I observe the number of GCSEs that applicants have passed and the number of
GCSE A*s (themaximumpossible grade) that they achieved. As would be expected, GCSE
performance diﬀers signiﬁcantly between applicants, interviewees and those oﬀered a
place: the number of GCSE A*s an applicant holds is a good predictor of selecƟon to
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interview and for an oﬀer.⁹
Table 4.1: Summary staƟsƟcs of applicants by their school type
Variable Overall Independent State
ProporƟon geƫng an Interview 0.72 0.79 0.68
ProporƟon geƫng an Oﬀer 0.26 0.30 0.23
ProporƟon of Interviewees geƫng an Oﬀer 0.36 0.38 0.34
ProporƟon applying to Economics 0.11 0.12 0.10
Mean No. of GCSEs passed 10.28 9.99 10.46
Mean No. of GCSE A*s 6.15 7.01 5.63
N 63986 24470 39516
Notes: Individuals for whom school type is unknown are excluded. Standard errors suppressed as all  0.
Table 4.2: Summary staƟsƟcs of applicants by their gender
Variable Overall Female Male
ProporƟon geƫng an Interview 0.72 0.72 0.72
ProporƟon geƫng an Oﬀer 0.26 0.24 0.27
ProporƟon of Interviewees geƫng an Oﬀer 0.36 0.34 0.37
ProporƟon applying to Economics 0.11 0.07 0.14
Mean No. of GCSEs passed 10.28 10.29 10.28
Mean No. of GCSE A*s 6.15 6.48 5.85
N 63986 30985 33001
Notes: Individuals for whom school type is unknown are excluded. Standard errors suppressed as all  0.
Applicants from independent schools have diﬀerent observable characterisƟcs, on av-
erage. For example, Table 4.1 shows that they receive on average fewer GCSEs. While
this may seem counter-intuiƟve, independent schools may encourage their pupils to take
slightly fewer GCSEs to maximise performance on those they do take. Indeed, applicants
from independent schools have more GCSEs awarded A*s (the highest grade). In addi-
Ɵon, a larger proporƟon of independent school applicants apply to Economics than do
state school applicants. Likewise, there are observable diﬀerences, on average, between
male and female applicants (Table 4.2). Female applicants are just as likely to get an in-
terview, but less likely to receive an oﬀer. This is despite having a staƟsƟcally signiﬁcantly
higher mean number of GCSEs awarded A*s than their male counterparts. They are also
half as likely to apply to Economics as male applicants.
Less obviously, admissions staƟsƟcs and average aƩainment of applicants also diﬀer sig-
niﬁcantly by course choice. Table 4.3 shows summary staƟsƟcs for the two groups, Eco-
nomics and all other subjects. It shows us that Economics applicants are already less likely
⁹Using a simple linear probability model containing only the number of GCSE A*s held by a candidate
as a conƟnuous regressor, I esƟmate that each addiƟonal GCSE A* increases a candidate’s probability of
being oﬀered a place by approximately 4.6 percentage points. The t-staƟsƟc on this coeﬃcient is 83.3 and
the overall model has an R2 of 0.10. I get very similar results with a linear probability model of selecƟon
to interview.
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Table 4.3: Summary staƟsƟcs of applicants by subject group applied to
Variable Overall Economics Others
ProporƟon geƫng an Interview 0.72 0.69 0.72
( 0.00) ( 0.01) ( 0.00)
ProporƟon geƫng an Oﬀer 0.26 0.22 0.26
( 0.00) ( 0.00) ( 0.00)
ProporƟon of Interviewees geƫng an Oﬀer 0.36 0.31 0.36
( 0.00) ( 0.01) ( 0.00)
ProporƟon from Independent school 0.38 0.44 0.38
( 0.00) ( 0.01) ( 0.00)
ProporƟon who are female 0.48 0.33 0.50
( 0.00) ( 0.01) ( 0.00)
Mean No. of GCSEs passed 10.28 10.26 10.29
( 0.01) ( 0.02) ( 0.01)
Mean No. of GCSE A*s 6.15 6.33 6.13
( 0.01) ( 0.04) ( 0.01)
N 63986 6904 57082
Notes: Individuals for whom school type is unknown are excluded. Standard errors in parentheses.
to get an interview than other subjects, and are less likely ulƟmately to receive an oﬀer
(these diﬀerences are staƟsƟcally signiﬁcant). The supply of places is eﬀecƟvely ﬁxed: as
the proporƟon geƫng an oﬀer is driven by diﬀerences in demand there is no parƟcular
reason to expect the proporƟons to be the same across courses. In addiƟon, there is
a larger proporƟon of applicants from independent schools for Economics. Importantly
for this work, applicants for Economics have, on average, staƟsƟcally signiﬁcantly fewer
GCSEs but more A* grades achieved than applicants for other subjects, again on average.
This suggests GCSE performancemay be a parƟcularly important predictor for Economics,
relaƟve to other subjects: I aƩempt to miƟgate this potenƟal problem for my esƟmaƟon
strategy by controlling for GCSE performance using least squares regression as part of my
analysis.
Given their importance in the admissions process, it is also important to consider the
diﬀerences between colleges. Within the University of Oxford, colleges have diﬀering
academic reputaƟons. It seems plausible that this may aﬀect the quality of applicants to,
and selecƟvity of, individual colleges. The University-produced ‘Norrington score’ may
capture some of this. According to the University website it “provides away ofmeasuring
the performance of students at each college in the end of university exams” (University
of Oxford, 2013). The Norrington score is based on the classiﬁcaƟons of undergraduate
degrees awarded, aƩaching a score of 5 to a ﬁrst class degree, 3 to an upper second class
degree, 2 to a lower second class degree, 1 to a third class degree and 0 to a pass. It is
calculated by dividing the total college score by the total possible score the college could
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aƩain and mulƟplying by 100 to yield a percentage. I assign each college’s Norrington
score to the group of applicants in the autumn following the examinaƟons on which the
score is based. This means that it will be the most recent piece of informaƟon on college
quality that applicants and interviewers will have.
4.5 Trends in admissions and introducƟon of the TSA
The University of Oxford has experienced a large increase in applicaƟons for all courses
since the year 2000, as can be seen in Figure 4.3. AŌer roughly 10 years of receiving
approximately 8,000 applicaƟons from UK students each year, this grew rapidly by about
50% to a peak of around 12,000 in 2009, although it fell back somewhat in 2010. This
has been driven parƟcularly by a large increase in the number of applicaƟons from state
school pupils during this period (see Figure 4.4), rising from under 4,500 to about 7,500.
However, there has been no corresponding increase in the number of oﬀers made to
UK students, which have conƟnued at around 3,000 and, if anything, declined slightly as
more oﬀers have gone to overseas applicants. It follows that geƫng a place has become
considerably more compeƟƟve.
Figure 4.3: Number of applicaƟons from and oﬀers given to UK students, by year
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Notes: Source: Oxford University Admissions StaƟsƟcs, across all subjects. Individuals for whom school
type is unknown are excluded.
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Figure 4.4: Number of applicaƟons from UK students, by year and school type
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type is unknown are excluded.
Figure 4.5: Number of applicaƟons to, interviews for and oﬀers for Economics from UK
students, by year
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cates the year 2007, when test was administered but not used to inform decisions. In years before the line
the test was not used; and in years aŌer the test was used as part of the admissions process.
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Over the shorter period for which I can observe subject-speciﬁc ﬁgures,¹⁰ Economics is
no excepƟon to the paƩern of increasing applicaƟons. Figure 4.5 shows that the number
of applicaƟons has risen from 972 in 2005 to a peak of 1,318 in 2009 (with a similar slight
reducƟon in 2010 as that seen in the overall ﬁgures, but sƟll above that seen between
2005-2007). Again, the number of places to study Economics awarded to UK students
has not risen alongside this.
Faced with this large increase in the number of applicaƟons, and the labour-intensive
nature of the interview stage of the admissions process, the decision was taken to in-
troduce a guideline for the number of interviews a college should conduct per place it
had available. Figure 4.5 shows this fall in the number of interviews, from 836 in 2007 to
682 in 2010. This is a sizeable diﬀerence; with potenƟal knock-on eﬀects. The TSA was
introduced at the same Ɵme in order to support this policy, providing admissions tutors
with addiƟonal informaƟon with which to select applicants to call to interview. As such,
the test was a requirement for all individuals applying to these subjects; this is unlike
some insƟtuƟons’ use of the TSA, where it is administered only to interviewees (Admis-
sions TesƟng Service, 2013a). Candidates sit the TSA at their school¹¹ on a date in early
November, just under a month aŌer the deadline for applicaƟons. Results are available
to admissions tutors shortly aŌerwards, but are not released to the candidates unƟl early
the following year, importantly this is aŌer interviews have been conducted and oﬀers
made.
The TSAwas introduced in a phased approach. Applicants to Philosophy, PoliƟcs and Eco-
nomics (PPE) at the University ﬁrst sat the TSA in 2007. A complicaƟon in 2007 is that the
test was administered to PPE applicants, but the results were not released to admissions
tutors unƟl aŌer they had selected which applicants to call for interview. As such, it was
not used to make decisions on who to call to interview, but was available to make deci-
sions on which applicants to oﬀer places to. This means one might expect to see some
of the eﬀects of the policy (for example due to changing behaviour by applicants), but
not others (due to changing behaviour by admissions tutors in selecƟng candidates for
interview). Applicants to Economics and Management (E&M) ﬁrst sat the test in 2008.
Unlike in PPE, the results of the TSA were available to admissions tutors when deciding
¹⁰It should be noted that this covers only about half the period of the large rise in applicaƟons to the
University in general.
¹¹If the school is not willing to administer the test then candidatesmay take it at an approved test centre,
usually another school or college nearby.
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which applicants to call for interview from that ﬁrst year. However, in a diﬀerent compli-
caƟon the guideline for the number of interviews per place was not introduced for TSA
unƟl 2009. These diﬀerences in implementaƟon have the potenƟal to distort the anal-
ysis. Since the impact of the test is our fundamental interest, I elect to exclude 2007
from the analysis. Since applicants do sit the test in 2008 and the results are available
throughout the process to admissions tutors, I do not exclude it. However, the later im-
plementaƟon of the target number of interviews per place in E&M means there was a
relaƟvely larger number of E&M than PPE interviews in 2008: as such E&M interviews
will weigh parƟcularly heavily in that year. I am careful to discuss explore and discuss
potenƟal implicaƟons for the results in 2008.¹²
In my analysis, I exploit the fact that in the data there are two years where the apƟtude
test was not administered (2005 and 2006); and three years where it was administered to
all Economics applicants (2008, 2009 and 2010). The policy has then conƟnued in more
recent years, but I do not have access to the data from this period. This natural experi-
ment presents an opportunity to evaluate the eﬀects stemming from this policy change,
with no other major confounding policy changes aﬀecƟng admissions having been un-
dertaken at this Ɵme, to my knowledge.¹³
As noted above, since 2000 there have been large increases in the number of applicaƟons
to the University, but no increase in the number of oﬀers made. EsƟmaƟng the impact
of the TSA just by looking at characterisƟcs before the change in policy and comparing
them to the same characterisƟcs aŌerwards would likely be biased downwards by the
general downward trend in the proporƟon of applicants receiving an oﬀer. Instead, I
esƟmate the impact using a diﬀerence in diﬀerences (DiD) framework. This aƩempts to
control for any general trends using the trends seen in subjects where the TSA was not
introduced, hence aƩempƟng to isolate the changes in our outcomemeasures of interest
that are due to the introducƟon of the TSA. The idenƟfying assumpƟon is that changes
in the outcome variables for Economics applicants, over and above those seen among
applicants to other subjects, are due to the introducƟon of the TSA: this requires that the
trends in the treatment and control groups are the same, the so-called ‘common trends’
¹²Although not reported in this chapter, I do also run models including 2007 to check for unexpected
eﬀects, and run models that esƟmate the eﬀect for PPE and E&M applicaƟon processes separately. These
do not alter the main thrust of the ﬁndings.
¹³Undergraduate tuiƟon fees rose from £1000 to amaximumof £3000 in the academic year 2006/7. The
majority of applicaƟons for that year’s entry would be made in 2005, at the very beginning of this dataset.
As such, any changes in applicaƟon behaviour associated with this policy change should not confound the
analysis in this chapter, although they could aﬀect pre-treatment trends.
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assumpƟon. Formost ofmy analysis, the ‘treatment’ group is Economics and the ‘control’
group are all other subjects. The policy of interest, the introducƟon of the TSA, is ‘oﬀ’ in
2005 and 2006, and ‘on’ in 2008, 2009 and 2010.
Common trends are more likely if the ‘control’ group (other subjects) has similar observ-
able characterisƟcs to the Economics ‘treatment’ group. In SecƟon 4.4, I discussed some
of the diﬀerences between the proﬁle of the average Economics applicant and the aver-
age applicant to other subjects, noƟng in parƟcular diﬀerences in the average academic
aƩainment between the two groups. However, the subject groups are not so diﬀerent
that it casts doubt on the validity of other subjects as a ‘control’ group. I also use a
more restricted control group as a robustness check, which I discuss further in SecƟon
4.9.
Table 4.4: ProporƟon of applicants who receive an oﬀer, proporƟon of applicants who
receive an interview, and proporƟon of interviewees who receive an oﬀer, by year and
subject group: diﬀerence in diﬀerences esƟmates
Apply! Oﬀer Policy Oﬀ Policy On Diﬀerence
Economics 0.250 0.193 -0.057
( 0.013) ( 0.010) ( 0.012)***
Others 0.284 0.241 -0.043
( 0.006) ( 0.006) ( 0.005)***
Diﬀerence -0.034 -0.048 -0.014
( 0.014)*** ( 0.011)*** ( 0.013)
Apply! Interview Policy Oﬀ Policy On Diﬀerence
Economics 0.828 0.578 -0.250
( 0.015) ( 0.016) ( 0.023)***
Others 0.788 0.677 -0.111
( 0.007) ( 0.007) ( 0.006)***
Diﬀerence 0.040 -0.099 -0.139
( 0.016)*** ( 0.017)*** ( 0.024)***
Interview! Oﬀer Policy Oﬀ Policy On Diﬀerence
Economics 0.302 0.334 0.032
( 0.016) ( 0.012) ( 0.017)*
Others 0.361 0.356 -0.004
( 0.006) ( 0.006) ( 0.005)
Diﬀerence -0.059 -0.023 0.036
( 0.017)*** ( 0.013)* ( 0.018)**
Notes: Analysis excludes individuals for whom school type is unknown. Policy Oﬀ in 2005, 2006 and 2007;
Policy On in 2008, 2009 and 2010. Standard errors, clustered by college-subject group combinaƟon, in
parentheses. Stars indicate staƟsƟcal signiﬁcance:  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01. Sample sizes:
Apply! Oﬀer: 63986 Apply! Interview: 63986 Interview! Oﬀer: 46106
Table 4.4 shows the change in the proporƟon of applicants geƫng interviews and places
from before to aŌer the policy change, for Economics and other subjects. While there is
a signiﬁcant reducƟon in the proporƟon of Economics applicants receiving oﬀers, this is
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matched by a similar fall in the proporƟon geƫng an oﬀer in other subjects.
By contrast, the reducƟon in proporƟon of Economics applicants geƫng an interview
is signiﬁcantly larger than that seen in other subjects, driven by the introducƟon of a
guideline number of interviews per available place. Table 4.4 shows a simple esƟmate
of the eﬀect of the policy’s introducƟon on the proporƟon of applicants who receive an
interview: a 11.5 percentage point reducƟon. When coupledwith no eﬀect on the overall
proporƟon receiving an oﬀer, this implies that the policymust have resulted in an increase
in the proporƟon of interviewees geƫng an oﬀer. This is indeed borne out, with the
proporƟon of Economics interviewees receiving an oﬀer increasing, even as this staƟsƟc
falls for other subjects. A simple esƟmate of the impact of the policy changes is a 5.4
percentage point increase in the proporƟon of interviewees who receive an oﬀer.
A reducƟon in the proporƟon of applicants who are called to interview would appear to
be an increase in eﬃciency of the admissions process. However, it could be that this is a
trade-oﬀ against other aims: selecƟng the highest quality applicants for the course and
doing so without bias from applicants’ other characterisƟcs. TesƟng the ﬁrst of these
might be possible, but would require data on candidates’ performance in their ﬁnal ex-
aminaƟons, which is not available in the dataset. However, I now shed some light on the
second aim.
The large reducƟon in the proporƟon of applicants called for interviews clearly allows for
the possibility of relaƟve changes in the proporƟon of applicants from diﬀerent genders
or school types. Neither do the ﬁndings so far rule out the possibility of the policy having
an eﬀect on the proporƟon of applicants receiving an oﬀer and coming from a parƟcular
group, since countervailing eﬀects could oﬀset one another.
To consider these maƩers, I present versions of Table 4.4 that separate out the overall
eﬀect of the policy into separate eﬀects by our groups of interest. For the exposiƟon of
this analysis, I concentrate on eﬀects by school type. However, it is easy to see how this
is translated to analyse diﬀerences by gender.
For these purposes, instead of using the overall proporƟon of applicants who get a place,
I analyse two sets of proporƟons: onewhere the numerator consists of only those geƫng
an oﬀer (or an interview) and coming from an independent school; and the other where
the numerator consists of only those geƫng an oﬀer (or an interview) and coming from
a state school (on the right side of the table). In both cases, the denominator remains,
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as for Table 4.4, all applicants (or interviewees, in the case of Oﬀer | Interview).
To make this clearer, I deﬁne the following notaƟon:
AI = Number of applicants from independent schools
AS = Number of applicants from state schools
II = Number of interviewees from independent schools
IS = Number of interviewees from state schools
OI = Number of oﬀers to individuals from independent schools
OS = Number of oﬀers to individuals from state schools
The proporƟons reported in the table are as follows:
ProporƟon of applicants receiving an oﬀer : Independent: OI
AI+AS
State: OS
AI+AS
ProporƟon of applicants receiving an interview : Independent: II
AI+AS
State: IS
AI+AS
ProporƟon of interviewees receiving an oﬀer : Independent: II
II+IS
State: OS
II+IS
This DiD analysis is presented in Table 4.5. How do these proporƟons relate to the pre-
vious analysis and to one another? The proporƟons reported in Table 4.4 were of the
form II+IS
AI+AS
(this parƟcular example is the proporƟon of applicants called to interview).
The proporƟons separated by school type are a simple decomposiƟon of this overall pro-
porƟon, since II
AI+AS
+ IS
AI+AS
= II+IS
AI+AS
. Ensuring that the outcome variables for the
independent and state school analyses have the same denominator allows easy compar-
ison of the DiD esƟmates from each to see whether there are diﬀerenƟal eﬀects of the
policy on applicants from the two school types.
In the case of the overall proporƟon receiving an oﬀer, the story does not immediately
seemmore complex than suggested by Table 4.4. In the top panel, there is no staƟsƟcally
signiﬁcant change in the proporƟon of all applicants who are successful and come from
either school type as a result of the policy change.
However, looking at the middle panel, at ﬁrst look there would appear to be a diﬀer-
ence between the eﬀects on the proporƟon of all applicants called to interview by school
type. The diﬀerence in diﬀerence esƟmate of the eﬀect on the proporƟon relaƟng to
state school interviewees is a reducƟon of 5.4 percentage points, while the relevant ef-
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Table 4.5: ProporƟon of all applicants who receive an oﬀer, proporƟon of all applicants
who receive an interview, and proporƟon of all interviewees who receive an oﬀer, by
school type, year and subject group: diﬀerence in diﬀerences esƟmates
Independent State
Apply! Oﬀer Policy Oﬀ Policy On Diﬀerence Policy Oﬀ Policy On Diﬀerence
Economics 0.123 0.091 -0.032 0.127 0.102 -0.025
( 0.010) ( 0.006) ( 0.009)*** ( 0.010) ( 0.008) ( 0.008)***
Others 0.128 0.106 -0.022 0.156 0.135 -0.020
( 0.006) ( 0.004) ( 0.004)*** ( 0.006) ( 0.004) ( 0.004)***
Diﬀerence -0.005 -0.015 -0.009 -0.029 -0.034 -0.005
( 0.012) ( 0.007)** ( 0.010) ( 0.012)*** ( 0.009)*** ( 0.009)
Independent State
Apply! Interview Policy Oﬀ Policy On Diﬀerence Policy Oﬀ Policy On Diﬀerence
Economics 0.392 0.268 -0.124 0.436 0.310 -0.126
( 0.022) ( 0.015) ( 0.014)*** ( 0.020) ( 0.020) ( 0.017)***
Others 0.321 0.283 -0.038 0.466 0.394 -0.072
( 0.014) ( 0.010) ( 0.008)*** ( 0.014) ( 0.010) ( 0.009)***
Diﬀerence 0.071 -0.015 -0.085 -0.030 -0.084 -0.054
( 0.026)*** ( 0.017) ( 0.016)*** ( 0.024) ( 0.022)*** ( 0.019)***
Independent State
Interview! Oﬀer Policy Oﬀ Policy On Diﬀerence Policy Oﬀ Policy On Diﬀerence
Economics 0.148 0.158 0.010 0.153 0.176 0.023
( 0.012) ( 0.010) ( 0.013) ( 0.013) ( 0.011) ( 0.010)*
Others 0.163 0.156 -0.007 0.198 0.200 0.002
( 0.007) ( 0.006) ( 0.005) ( 0.007) ( 0.006) ( 0.005)
Diﬀerence -0.015 0.002 0.016 -0.044 -0.024 0.020
( 0.014) ( 0.011) ( 0.014) ( 0.015)*** ( 0.012)** ( 0.011)*
Notes: Outcome variables reported are (Apply! Oﬀer) proporƟon of all applicants who receive an oﬀer
and come from given school type, (Apply! Interview) proporƟon of all applicants who receive an inter-
view and come from given school type, and (Interview!Oﬀer) proporƟon of all interviewees who receive
an oﬀer and come from given school type. Analysis excludes individuals for whom school type is unknown.
Policy Oﬀ in 2005, 2006 and 2007; Policy On in 2008, 2009 and 2010. Standard errors, clustered by college-
subject group combinaƟon, in parentheses. Stars indicate staƟsƟcal signiﬁcance:  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01. Sample sizes: Apply! Oﬀer: 63986; Apply! Interview: 63986; Interview! Oﬀer: 46106.
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fect relaƟng to those from independent schools is a reducƟon of 8.5 percentage points.
There are reducƟons in both these proporƟons, but the eﬀect on the proporƟon of all in-
terviewees being called to interview and coming from independent school is larger; the
esƟmated eﬀect is roughly 3 percentage points greater in magnitude. Nevertheless, we
cannot reject the null hypothesis of no diﬀerence between these two esƟmates at the
convenƟonal 5% level (although we can at the 10% level).
Finally, turning to the boƩom panel of Table 4.5 the proporƟon of interviewees who re-
ceive oﬀers and come from state schools is esƟmated to increase slightly more than the
proporƟon of all interviewees who are successful and come from independent schools
(2.0 percentage points, compared with 1.6 percentage points). However, a simple t-test
conﬁrms that the esƟmated eﬀects are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent fromone another.
Table 4.6: ProporƟon of all applicants who receive an oﬀer, proporƟon of all applicants
who receive an interview, and proporƟon of all interviewees who receive an oﬀer, by
gender, year and subject group: diﬀerence in diﬀerences esƟmates
Female Male
Apply! Oﬀer Policy Oﬀ Policy On Diﬀerence Policy Oﬀ Policy On Diﬀerence
Economics 0.089 0.057 -0.032 0.161 0.136 -0.025
( 0.006) ( 0.005) ( 0.007)*** ( 0.010) ( 0.008) ( 0.011)***
Others 0.135 0.115 -0.020 0.149 0.126 -0.023
( 0.003) ( 0.003) ( 0.003)*** ( 0.005) ( 0.005) ( 0.005)***
Diﬀerence -0.047 -0.059 -0.012 0.012 0.010 -0.002
( 0.007)*** ( 0.006)*** ( 0.007) ( 0.011) ( 0.009) ( 0.012)
Female Male
Apply! Interview Policy Oﬀ Policy On Diﬀerence Policy Oﬀ Policy On Diﬀerence
Economics 0.269 0.167 -0.102 0.558 0.411 -0.147
( 0.012) ( 0.008) ( 0.013)*** ( 0.016) ( 0.012) ( 0.022)***
Others 0.391 0.342 -0.049 0.396 0.335 -0.062
( 0.008) ( 0.007) ( 0.008)*** ( 0.010) ( 0.007) ( 0.009)***
Diﬀerence -0.122 -0.175 -0.053 0.162 0.076 -0.086
( 0.014)*** ( 0.011)*** ( 0.015)*** ( 0.019)*** ( 0.014)*** ( 0.024)***
Female Male
Interview! Oﬀer Policy Oﬀ Policy On Diﬀerence Policy Oﬀ Policy On Diﬀerence
Economics 0.107 0.098 -0.009 0.195 0.236 0.041
( 0.008) ( 0.007) ( 0.010) ( 0.012) ( 0.010) ( 0.015)***
Others 0.172 0.170 -0.001 0.189 0.186 -0.003
( 0.004) ( 0.004) ( 0.004) ( 0.006) ( 0.006) ( 0.006)
Diﬀerence -0.065 -0.072 -0.008 0.006 0.050 0.044
( 0.009)*** ( 0.008)*** ( 0.011) ( 0.013) ( 0.012)*** ( 0.016)***
Notes: Outcome variables reported are (Apply! Oﬀer) proporƟon of all applicants who receive an oﬀer
and come from given school type, (Apply! Interview) proporƟon of all applicants who receive an inter-
view and come from given school type, and (Interview!Oﬀer) proporƟon of all interviewees who receive
an oﬀer and come from given school type. Analysis excludes individuals for whom school type is unknown.
Policy Oﬀ in 2005, 2006 and 2007; Policy On in 2008, 2009 and 2010. Standard errors, clustered by college-
subject group combinaƟon, in parentheses. Stars indicate staƟsƟcal signiﬁcance:  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01. Sample sizes: Apply! Interview: 63986; Apply! Oﬀer: 63986; Interview! Oﬀer: 46106.
In Table 4.6 I report the same analysis split by gender, rather than school type. I do not
ﬁnd staƟsƟcally signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the overall eﬀect of introducing the TSA on the
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proporƟon of applicants geƫng an oﬀer by gender, although if there is any diﬀerence
it is to the detriment of female applicants. However, again there are diﬀerences in the
results by gender when considering the two separate stages of the admissions process. I
ﬁrst consider the proporƟon of applicants oﬀered an interview: the proporƟon of all ap-
plicants oﬀered an interview and who are female has declined by 5.5 percentage points,
compared to a larger decline of 8.6 percentage points in the proporƟon of all applicants
oﬀered an interview and who are male. However, we cannot reject the null hypothesis
of no diﬀerence between these two esƟmates at the convenƟonal 5% level (although we
can at the 10% level).
In any case, the diﬀerence appears to be oﬀset at the laƩer stage of the admissions pro-
cess. We saw above that the proporƟon of interviewees geƫng an oﬀer increased in
response to the introducƟon of the TSA (oﬀseƫng the falling numbers geƫng an inter-
view): the results by gender suggest that this is enƟrely driven by the proporƟon of all
interviewees receiving an oﬀer and who are men (4.4 percentage point increase, com-
pared to a very small decrease for females). This diﬀerence does appear to be staƟsƟcally
signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Given that the apƟtude test is primarily used to select can-
didates for interview, ﬁnding an eﬀect at the laƩer stage of the admissions process may
seem unexpected. However, an indirect eﬀect of this type is possible. One explanaƟon
is that the TSA is ﬁltering out the kind of female interviewees who previously went on
to perform well at interview and hence receive an oﬀer. I invesƟgate such explanaƟons
further while discussing the results from the regression models in SecƟon 4.7.
So far, these results answermy research quesƟons in the followingways: they do not sug-
gest an impact on the proporƟon of applicants oﬀered a place, but do reﬂect the negaƟve
impact on the proporƟon of applicants called to interview caused by the introducƟon of
a target number of interviews per place. As such, there is an oﬀseƫng increase in the
proporƟon of interviewees oﬀered a place. I ﬁnd some limited evidence of diﬀerences
in these impacts by the socioeconomic status of applicants, with the proporƟon of appli-
cants geƫng an interview and coming from an independent school declining more than
for its state school counterpart. In addiƟon, there is evidence of diﬀerenƟal eﬀects on the
proporƟon of applicants geƫng an interview and the proporƟon of interviewees geƫng
an oﬀer by gender. Nevertheless, these results should not overshadow the ﬁnding that
in neither of these cases (diﬀerences by school type or gender) is there a staƟsƟcally sig-
niﬁcant overall diﬀerence in the proporƟon of all applicants who receive an oﬀer.
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However, this simple analysis has limitaƟons, which I aim to check and/or relax, as ap-
propriate, using regression analysis below.
4.6 Regression analysis
DiD esƟmates may be conveniently recovered using least squares regression. In addiƟon,
regression analysis allows increased model ﬂexibility compared to those I have used thus
far. I use this ﬂexibility to check for diﬀerent eﬀects by year and to control for college-,
course- and Ɵme-varying covariates that could aﬀect the validity of the common trends
assumpƟon.
As discussed in SecƟon 4.3, decisions about who to admit are made by admissions tutors
at each college. Given their importance, I perform regression analysis using colleges as
the unit of analysis. I collapse individual applicant records into college-level averages,
also maintaining separate observaƟons by year and course group. AŌer exclusions, the
data include 29 colleges, six years and two course groups (Economics and Others). This
gives 348 college, year, course group combinaƟons forming available observaƟons for the
regression analysis. In all speciﬁcaƟons, year variables are grouped in someway, reducing
the number of observaƟons to those shown in later results tables.
I weight the observaƟons to take account of the average number of applicants a college
receives per year across thewhole period from2005 to 2010. Colleges vary signiﬁcantly in
size so, as the underlying research quesƟons are about the eﬀects on applicants, weight-
ing to be representaƟve of the numbers of applicants is appropriate. Failure to do this
would implicitly give each college an equal weighƟng, exaggeraƟng the inﬂuence of small
colleges on the overall results. The weighƟng strategy takes into account the fact that
the observaƟons are means, made up of observaƟons of individuals’ characterisƟcs and
progress through the admissions process.¹⁴
I begin by replicaƟng the analysis in SecƟon 4.5 above in a regression framework, using
an equaƟon of the form shown in EquaƟon 4.1. As a result of the weighƟng strategy, one
would not expect the point esƟmates to be idenƟcal to those in earlier analysis, but they
¹⁴This echoes the approach by Card (1992), who esƟmates the impact of minimum wages using obser-
vaƟons from 51 states, weighƟng these by the average size of the sample for relevant workers in each
state.
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should be very close.
Yjt =  + pTreatedj
+ Policy Ont
+ Treatedj  Policy Ont + "jt (4.1)
where Yjt is the outcome of interest at college j in year t; Treated are dummy variables
indicaƟng the two treatment groups (both PPE and E&M); Policy On is a dummy variable
set to 0 in years 2005 and 2006, and 1 in 2008, 2009 and 2010; and " is an error term
(which I discuss further below).
The coeﬃcients on Treated () control for pre-exisƟng diﬀerences between applicants
to these and other subjects; the coeﬃcient on Policy On () controls for general trends
in the variables relaƟve to the base years of 2005 and 2006; and the coeﬃcient on the
interacƟon term between the Treated and Policy On variables () allows us to recover the
impact of the TSA, under the idenƟfying assumpƟon of common trends.
However, regression analysis makes it easy to introduce more ﬂexibility than I have al-
lowed for so far; I take advantage of this in various ways. First, I allow for diﬀerent eﬀects
each year by replacing the Policy On dummy variables with a set of year dummies. Equa-
Ɵon 4.2 shows the form of equaƟon used.
Yjt =  + Treatedj
+ 82008t + 92009t + 102010t
+ 8Treatedj  2008t + 9Treatedj  2009t + 10Treatedj  2010t + "jt (4.2)
where 2008, 2009 and 2010 are dummy variables indicaƟng cohorts where the policy is
on.
The interpretaƟon for EquaƟon 4.2 is very similar to that for EquaƟon 4.1. The coeﬃcient
on Treated () sƟll controls for pre-exisƟng diﬀerences between applicants to Economics
and other subjects; the coeﬃcients on 2008, 2009 and 2010 () control for general trends
in the variables relaƟve to the base years of 2005 and 2006; and the coeﬃcients on the
interacƟon terms between the Treated and year variables (8, 9 and 10) allow us to
recover the esƟmated impact of the TSA for each of these treatment years.
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I also use regression to include addiƟonal college-, course-, and Ɵme-varying covariates.
Including these covariates aims to help control for omiƩed college- and course-speciﬁc
trends in the outcome variables that could otherwise undermine the common trends as-
sumpƟon. Firstly, I include measures of the average academic performance of applicants
from our groups of interest (applicants from independent and state schools for school
type analysis; male and female applicants for analysis by gender) to each course group
at each college (using the number of GCSEs and the number of GCSE A*s held by the
mean applicant from each school type). These aim to control for changes in the suc-
cess of candidates from each school type that are due to observable diﬀerences in their
prior academic aƩainment. Secondly, I include an annual measure of the performance
of the college’s undergraduates at the end of their degrees (using the Norrington score,
discussed in SecƟon 4.4). This aims to control for the possibility that the quality of ap-
plicants to a college is aﬀected by its academic reputaƟon. I use a regression equaƟon
very similar to that in EquaƟon 4.2, except for the addiƟon of this vector of college-level
controls.
As is common in DiD analysis, various aspects of the data are problemaƟc for classical
staƟsƟcal inference (Bertrand et al., 2004). However, there is a growing literature on in-
ference in such circumstances (Brewer et al., 2013a). In parƟcular, I adapt advice from
Angrist and Pischke (2009, ch. 8) in my approach to obtaining appropriate standard er-
rors. First, while admissions tutors are college- and subject-speciﬁc, some courses have
more than one subject area. It follows that there may be cases where the same admis-
sions tutor makes decisions in diﬀerent courses. As such, I allow for clustering between
courses, other than between the treatment and control groups (i.e. Economics-related
subjects and others). Given that most courses do have diﬀerent admissions tutors, this is
a very conservaƟve approach¹⁵. Second, repeated observaƟons across several years, of-
ten likely with the same admissions tutor with persistent preferences over Ɵme, makes
autocorrelaƟon/serial correlaƟon likely (Kennedy, 2008, p.118).
As the observaƟons are in the form of college, year, course group combinaƟons, this
¹⁵Nevertheless, one might wish to allow clustering even between Economics and other subjects. How-
ever, in doing so the number of clusters is reduced to equal the number of colleges (aŌer the exclusions
described above): this is only 29 clusters. This is short of the minimum of 42 recommended for standard
clustering techniques by Angrist and Pischke (2009). The ‘wild bootstrap t-procedure’ (Cameron et al.,
2008) is more eﬀecƟve at avoiding type II errors with such a small number of clusters. Performing infer-
ence even on this extremely conservaƟve basis does not materially alter the staƟsƟcal signiﬁcance of my
results. I implement this using the command by Bansi Malde, available from http://www.ifs.org.uk/
publications/6231
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already allows for clustering within college and course group combinaƟons. However, it
assumes independence by year. As such, I use Stata’s cluster opƟon to deﬁne clusters as
the 58 college and course group combinaƟons, allowing for serial correlaƟon.
4.7 Results
Given this chapter’s parƟcular focus on the potenƟal for diﬀerenƟal eﬀects on applicants
by their socioeconomic background or gender, I take as given the picture of the reducƟon
in proporƟon of applicants who are called for interview and oﬀseƫng increase in the
proporƟon of interviewees who are oﬀered a place.¹⁶ I proceed immediately to analyse
whether evidence exists of diﬀerenƟal eﬀects for applicants, beginning with school type
before turning to gender.
Results are presented in tables for each stage of the admissions process, with regression
models in numbered columns. In each column, the DiD esƟmates of policy impact are
shown either by rows giving the interacƟon between Economics and policy on () or by
rows giving the interacƟon between Economics and treatment years (8, 9 and 10) de-
pending on the model. I then report the diﬀerences between the DiD esƟmated eﬀects
for each pair of models, with the staƟsƟcal signiﬁcance of the diﬀerences indicated us-
ing stars,¹⁷ to allow us to assess whether there are diﬀerenƟal eﬀects. I will not discuss
the “Simple” models (columns 1 and 2) in each case, since they are very similar (but for
weighƟng) to the analysis from Tables 4.5 and 4.6 in SecƟon 4.5.
4.7.1 School type
In the case of the proporƟon of applicants geƫng an oﬀer, Table 4.7 shows no unex-
pected results when separaƟng the successful proporƟon into those from independent
and state schools. The only small deviaƟon from this is that in 2008 the esƟmate for
the proporƟon from independent schools is noƟceably more negaƟve than that for state
¹⁶I do esƟmate these regression models to check the robustness of the analysis in Table 4.4, but do not
report the results in this chapter as they do not diﬀer in their ﬁndings.
¹⁷I conduct cross-model hypothesis tesƟng using a seemingly-unrelated regression technique, speciﬁ-
cally the Stata suest command, as this allows weights and clustering to be taken into account. Since the
models being compared contain the same regressors this has no impact on the esƟmated standard er-
rors (Zellner, 1962, p.351). Stars indicate staƟsƟcal signiﬁcance as follows: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, ***
p < 0:01
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Table 4.7: ProporƟon of all applicants geƫng an oﬀer, comparing proporƟons who are
successful and come from either independent or state schools: diﬀerence in diﬀerences
esƟmates
Variable nModel Simple Years Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ind. State Ind. State Ind. State
Constant () 0.129 0.155 0.129 0.155 0.135 -0.149
( 0.006)*** ( 0.006)*** ( 0.006)*** ( 0.006)*** ( 0.156) ( 0.147)
Treated () -0.006 -0.028 -0.006 -0.028 -0.012 -0.026
( 0.012) ( 0.012)** ( 0.012) ( 0.012)** ( 0.011) ( 0.009)***
Policy On () -0.023 -0.020
( 0.004)*** ( 0.004)***
2008 (8) -0.005 -0.012 -0.006 -0.025
( 0.004) ( 0.004)*** ( 0.010) ( 0.009)***
2009 (9) -0.028 -0.028 -0.042 -0.039
( 0.004)*** ( 0.005)*** ( 0.006)*** ( 0.006)***
2010 (10) -0.032 -0.019 -0.049 -0.029
( 0.006)*** ( 0.005)*** ( 0.008)*** ( 0.006)***
Treated*Policy On () -0.008 -0.005
( 0.010) ( 0.009)
Treated*2008 (8) -0.026 -0.004 -0.020 -0.005
( 0.011)** ( 0.012) ( 0.012)* ( 0.011)
Treated*2009 (9) -0.005 -0.013 -0.005 -0.012
( 0.011) ( 0.010) ( 0.012) ( 0.010)
Treated*2010 (10) 0.005 -0.001 -0.007 0.003
( 0.013) ( 0.012) ( 0.013) ( 0.011)
Mean No. of GCSEs (State) -0.021 0.010
( 0.013) ( 0.013)
Mean No. of GCSEs (Ind.) -0.000 -0.026
( 0.010) ( 0.010)**
Mean No. of A*s (State) 0.003 0.015
( 0.005) ( 0.005)***
Mean No. of A*s (Ind.) 0.025 -0.007
( 0.005)*** ( 0.004)*
Norrington Score / 10 0.477 6.254
( 1.022) ( 0.925)***
Diﬀerences in esƟmated eﬀects by school type
Treated*Policy On () -0.003
Treated*2008 (8) -0.022 -0.015
Treated*2009 (9) 0.007 0.007
Treated*2010 (10) 0.006 -0.010
N 116 232 232
Notes: Analysis excludes individuals for whom school type is unknown. For Simple model (columns 1 and
2), Policy Oﬀ in 2005 and 2006; Policy On in 2008, 2009 and 2010. For other models (columns 3, 4, 5 and
6), base category for years is pooling of observaƟons for 2005 and 2006. ‘Ind.’ is a contracƟon of Indepen-
dent. Cross-model hypothesis tesƟng conducted using seemingly-unrelated regressions. Standard errors,
clustered by college-subject group combinaƟon, in parentheses. Stars indicate staƟsƟcal signiﬁcance: *
p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
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Table 4.8: ProporƟon of all applicants geƫng an interview, comparing proporƟons who
are successful and come from either independent or state schools: diﬀerence in
diﬀerences esƟmates
Variable nModel Simple Years Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ind. State Ind. State Ind. State
Constant () 0.323 0.464 0.323 0.464 0.722 -0.210
( 0.015)*** ( 0.015)*** ( 0.015)*** ( 0.015)*** ( 0.331)** ( 0.255)
Treated () 0.065 -0.024 0.065 -0.024 0.053 -0.018
( 0.025)*** ( 0.023)** ( 0.025)*** ( 0.023)** ( 0.024)** ( 0.021)***
Policy On () -0.040 -0.071
( 0.009)*** ( 0.009)***
2008 (8) -0.015 -0.060 -0.023 -0.084
( 0.008)** ( 0.007)*** ( 0.018) ( 0.019)***
2009 (9) -0.041 -0.078 -0.063 -0.090
( 0.009)*** ( 0.010)*** ( 0.012)*** ( 0.014)***
2010 (10) -0.060 -0.073 -0.092 -0.084
( 0.013)*** ( 0.012)*** ( 0.017)*** ( 0.016)***
Treated*Policy On () -0.085 -0.059
( 0.016)*** ( 0.018)***
Treated*2008 (8) -0.080 -0.015 -0.068 -0.020
( 0.017)*** ( 0.017) ( 0.020)*** ( 0.020)
Treated*2009 (9) -0.101 -0.103 -0.098 -0.102
( 0.021)*** ( 0.023)*** ( 0.024)*** ( 0.023)***
Treated*2010 (10) -0.076 -0.065 -0.100 -0.051
( 0.021)*** ( 0.025)*** ( 0.020)*** ( 0.027)*
Mean No. of GCSEs (State) -0.019 0.030
( 0.026) ( 0.025)
Mean No. of GCSEs (Ind.) -0.010 -0.042
( 0.025) ( 0.018)**
Mean No. of A*s (State) 0.001 0.021
( 0.010) ( 0.010)**
Mean No. of A*s (Ind.) 0.054 -0.024
( 0.010)*** ( 0.010)**
Norrington Score / 10 -6.827 12.140
( 2.072)*** ( 1.983)***
Diﬀerences in esƟmated eﬀects by school type
Treated*Policy On () -0.026
Treated*2008 (8) -0.066** -0.048
Treated*2009 (9) 0.003 0.004
Treated*2010 (10) -0.012 -0.048
N 116 232 232
Notes: Analysis excludes individuals for whom school type is unknown. For Simple model (columns 1 and
2), Policy Oﬀ in 2005 and 2006; Policy On in 2008, 2009 and 2010. For other models (columns 3, 4, 5 and
6), base category for years is pooling of observaƟons for 2005 and 2006. ‘Ind.’ is a contracƟon of Indepen-
dent. Cross-model hypothesis tesƟng conducted using seemingly-unrelated regressions. Standard errors,
clustered by college-subject group combinaƟon, in parentheses. Stars indicate staƟsƟcal signiﬁcance: *
p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
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Table 4.9: ProporƟon of all interviewees geƫng an oﬀer, comparing proporƟons who
are successful and come from either independent or state schools: diﬀerence in
diﬀerences esƟmates
Variable nModel Simple Years Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ind. State Ind. State Ind. State
Constant () 0.163 0.197 0.163 0.197 0.266 -0.169
( 0.007)*** ( 0.007)*** ( 0.007)*** ( 0.007)*** ( 0.196)** ( 0.242)
Treated () -0.016 -0.043 -0.016 -0.043 -0.027 -0.041
( 0.014)*** ( 0.014)*** ( 0.014)*** ( 0.014)*** ( 0.013)** ( 0.012)***
Policy On () -0.007 0.002
( 0.005)*** ( 0.005)***
2008 (8) 0.009 0.004 -0.001 -0.004
( 0.005)* ( 0.005)*** ( 0.012) ( 0.011)***
2009 (9) -0.014 -0.007 -0.037 -0.021
( 0.005)** ( 0.006)*** ( 0.008)*** ( 0.008)**
2010 (10) -0.015 0.011 -0.046 -0.003
( 0.007)** ( 0.007)*** ( 0.010)*** ( 0.009)***
Treated*Policy On () 0.016 0.018
( 0.013)*** ( 0.011)*
Treated*2008 (8) -0.018 0.009 -0.017 0.006
( 0.014)*** ( 0.016) ( 0.014)*** ( 0.015)
Treated*2009 (9) 0.036 0.025 0.037 0.027
( 0.018)* ( 0.017)*** ( 0.017)** ( 0.018)***
Treated*2010 (10) 0.040 0.023 0.013 0.021
( 0.019)** ( 0.017)*** ( 0.019)*** ( 0.016)*
Mean No. of GCSEs (State) -0.017 -0.005
( 0.016) ( 0.017)
Mean No. of GCSEs (Ind.) -0.010 -0.012
( 0.015) ( 0.021)**
Mean No. of A*s (State) 0.009 0.014
( 0.007) ( 0.009)**
Mean No. of A*s (Ind.) 0.031 -0.006
( 0.006)*** ( 0.007)**
Norrington Score / 10 -1.354 7.320
( 1.106)*** ( 1.505)***
Diﬀerences in esƟmated eﬀects by school type
Treated*Policy On () -0.002
Treated*2008 (8) -0.027 -0.024
Treated*2009 (9) 0.010 0.011
Treated*2010 (10) 0.017 -0.007
N 116 232 231
Notes: Analysis excludes individuals for whom school type is unknown. For Simple model (columns 1 and
2), Policy Oﬀ in 2005and 2006; Policy On in 2008, 2009 and 2010. For other models (columns 3, 4, 5 and
6), base category for years is pooling of observaƟons for 2005 and 2006. ‘Ind.’ is a contracƟon of Indepen-
dent. Cross-model hypothesis tesƟng conducted using seemingly-unrelated regressions. Standard errors,
clustered by college-subject group combinaƟon, in parentheses. Stars indicate staƟsƟcal signiﬁcance: *
p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
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schools (although sƟll not staƟsƟcally signiﬁcant).¹⁸ However, this is not maintained in
subsequent years and is reduced in the model with addiƟonal controls. This suggests
that the introducƟon of the TSA has not had a diﬀerenƟal overall impact on the propor-
Ɵon of all applicants who are ulƟmately oﬀered a place and come from each school type.
However, this does not mean the same will be true at the intermediate stages of the
process.
The addiƟonal controls in models 5 and 6 also behave as might be expected. There is a
correlaƟon between the mean number of GCSE A*s held by applicants of a given school
type and the proporƟonof applicantswho are successful and come from that same school
type. We might also expect to see a negaƟve relaƟonship between average GCSE per-
formance among one school type and the successful proporƟon from the other: to ad-
missions tutors, applicants from diﬀerent school types are subsƟtutes and a rise in the
performance of one of these groups might be expected to reduce demand for applicants
from the other, other things being equal. However, if this eﬀect exists it is too weak to
be idenƟﬁed. The coeﬃcients on the Norrington Score imply that a greater proporƟon of
all applicants to colleges with higher performing exisƟng undergraduates will be oﬀered
a place and come from state schools; there is no staƟsƟcally signiﬁcant eﬀect on the pro-
porƟon of all applicants who get an oﬀer and come from an independent school. While
the implicaƟons are rather diﬃcult to interpret, its inclusion in the model aims to help
to control for the possibility that individuals aƩempt to choose colleges strategically to
improve their chances of admissions.
Table 4.8 gives a more complex picture of the proporƟon of applicants who are called to
interview: the simple DiD esƟmate was that the eﬀect of the introducƟon of the apƟtude
test was more negaƟve on the proporƟon of all applicants who were called to interview
and came from independent schools than it was on the state school proporƟon, but that
this diﬀerence was not staƟsƟcally signiﬁcant. However, from more ﬂexible regression
analysis we see that the esƟmated impact varies signiﬁcantly year by year. Much of the
diﬀerence in the simple esƟmates appears to be driven by a staƟsƟcally signiﬁcantly dif-
ference between the impacts by school type in 2008 (8).¹⁹ However, as with the pro-
¹⁸Examining the results separately by PPE and E&Mdoes not suggest this is driven by the relaƟvely larger
number of E&M interviews in that year.
¹⁹Examining these results separately for PPE and E&M (not reported here) suggests one of the reasons
for this is that the policy seƫng a target number of interviews per place for E&M was not yet acƟve. As
such, the number of interviews for E&Mweigh relaƟvely larger than in other years. Focussing only on PPE,
the esƟmate is for the same direcƟon of diﬀerence in eﬀects, but not staƟsƟcally signiﬁcant.
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porƟon geƫng an oﬀer, this diﬀerence between esƟmates becomes staƟsƟcally insignif-
icantly diﬀerent from one another when controls are added to the model. Furthermore,
by the following year this diﬀerenƟal has vanished: in 2009 and 2010 the diﬀerences be-
tween the two esƟmates are in each case much smaller and not staƟsƟcally signiﬁcant.
Considering the other controls in the model, there is also some evidence of a trade-oﬀ
between candidates of diﬀerent school types, with a posiƟve eﬀect of average GCSE per-
formance of independent school applicants on the proporƟon of all applicants who get
an oﬀer and come from independent schools, but a negaƟve eﬀect of the same variable
on the proporƟon from state schools. In summary, it would appear that any diﬀerence in
eﬀects may be driven by observable background characterisƟcs, likely prior aƩainment,
and is, at most, only short lived.
Finally, Table 4.9²⁰ also conﬁrms the simple DiD esƟmates by failing to ﬁnd strong evi-
dence of a diﬀerence by school type in the proporƟon of interviewees who receive an
oﬀer. While there is (as with the proporƟon of applicants oﬀered an interview) a noƟce-
ably larger diﬀerence by school type in 2008, it is not staƟsƟcally signiﬁcant. The inclusion
of addiƟonal covariates makes a much smaller diﬀerence to the esƟmated eﬀects (and
the gap between them) than in modelling the proporƟon of applicants oﬀered an inter-
view: this seems likely to be down to the smaller variaƟon in observable characterisƟcs
between those interviewed.
The results from the regression analysis add conﬁdence to ﬁndings from SecƟon 4.5 in
twoways. The esƟmates show a reasonably consistent story over Ɵme (parƟcularly given
the unusual circumstances in 2008); namely, that there is no evidence of diﬀerent eﬀects
on the two proporƟons by school type. Second, they give some conﬁdence that the re-
sults are not driven by changes in other observable characterisƟcs, notably the average
performance of applicants from each school type, or diﬀerences in college choice.
4.7.2 Gender
I now explore the results by gender in the same way. In the case of the proporƟon of ap-
plicants geƫng an oﬀer, Table 4.10 conﬁrms our earlier results. In no years are the diﬀer-
ences by gender between the esƟmated eﬀects staƟsƟcally signiﬁcant. As with analysis
²⁰The reducƟon in sample size in columns 5 and 6 in Table 4.9 is due to the fact that at one college in
one year none of the state school applicants were invited to an interview.
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Table 4.10: ProporƟon of all applicants geƫng an oﬀer, comparing proporƟons who are
successful and are either male or female: diﬀerence in diﬀerences esƟmates
Variable nModel Simple Years Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female Male Female Male Female Male
Constant () 0.135 0.149 0.135 0.149 0.087 -0.076
( 0.003)*** ( 0.005)*** ( 0.003)*** ( 0.005)*** ( 0.098) ( 0.165)
Treated () -0.046 0.012 -0.046 0.012 -0.053 0.008
( 0.008)*** ( 0.012) ( 0.008)*** ( 0.012) ( 0.007)*** ( 0.009)
Policy On () -0.020 -0.022
( 0.003)*** ( 0.005)***
2008 (8) -0.007 -0.010 -0.010 -0.016
( 0.004) ( 0.005)** ( 0.006)* ( 0.008)*
2009 (9) -0.031 -0.025 -0.039 -0.039
( 0.004)*** ( 0.006)*** ( 0.004)*** ( 0.006)***
2010 (10) -0.021 -0.029 -0.029 -0.046
( 0.005)*** ( 0.005)*** ( 0.005)*** ( 0.007)***
Treated*Policy On () -0.013 -0.000
( 0.008)* ( 0.012)
Treated*2008 (8) -0.029 -0.000 -0.024 -0.002
( 0.011)*** ( 0.015) ( 0.009)*** ( 0.014)
Treated*2009 (9) -0.013 -0.006 -0.007 -0.012
( 0.008) ( 0.012) ( 0.008) ( 0.011)
Treated*2010 (10) -0.003 0.007 -0.004 0.003
( 0.009) ( 0.015) ( 0.009) ( 0.014)
Mean No. of GCSEs (Male) -0.008 -0.033
( 0.009) ( 0.013)**
Mean No. of GCSEs (Female) -0.007 0.006
( 0.006) ( 0.008)
Mean No. of A*s (Male) -0.003 0.019
( 0.004) ( 0.005)***
Mean No. of A*s (Female) 0.020 -0.002
( 0.004)*** ( 0.004)
Norrington Score / 10 1.334 5.987
( 0.553)** ( 1.237)***
Diﬀerences in esƟmated eﬀects by gender
Treated*Policy On () -0.013
Treated*2008 (8) -0.028 -0.021
Treated*2009 (9) -0.007 0.004
Treated*2010 (10) -0.009 -0.007
N 116 232 230
Notes: Analysis excludes individuals for whom school type is unknown. For Simple model (columns 1 and
2), Policy Oﬀ in 2005 and 2006; Policy On in 2008, 2009 and 2010. For other models (columns 3, 4, 5
and 6), base category for years is pooling of observaƟons for 2005 and 2006. Cross-model hypothesis
tesƟng conducted using seemingly-unrelated regressions. Standard errors, clustered by college-subject
group combinaƟon, in parentheses. Stars indicate staƟsƟcal signiﬁcance: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, ***
p < 0:01.
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Table 4.11: ProporƟon of all applicants geƫng an interview, comparing proporƟons who
are successful and are either male or female: diﬀerence in diﬀerences esƟmates
Variable nModel Simple Years Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female Male Female Male Female Male
Constant () 0.392 0.396 0.392 0.396 0.149 0.353
( 0.009)*** ( 0.011)*** ( 0.009)*** ( 0.011)*** ( 0.214) ( 0.261)
Treated () -0.119 0.160 -0.119 0.160 -0.131 0.156
( 0.018)*** ( 0.022)*** ( 0.018)*** ( 0.022)*** ( 0.012)*** ( 0.019)***
Policy On () -0.050 -0.060
( 0.008)*** ( 0.009)***
2008 (8) -0.029 -0.046 -0.040 -0.051
( 0.008)*** ( 0.009)*** ( 0.012)*** ( 0.015)***
2009 (9) -0.061 -0.058 -0.070 -0.078
( 0.009)*** ( 0.011)*** ( 0.008)*** ( 0.011)***
2010 (10) -0.059 -0.075 -0.070 -0.096
( 0.010)*** ( 0.010)*** ( 0.009)*** ( 0.013)***
Treated*Policy On () -0.057 -0.087
( 0.018)*** ( 0.027)***
Treated*2008 (8) -0.048 -0.047 -0.036 -0.051
( 0.019)** ( 0.028)* ( 0.014)** ( 0.024)**
Treated*2009 (9) -0.082 -0.122 -0.070 -0.131
( 0.021)*** ( 0.031)*** ( 0.017)*** ( 0.030)***
Treated*2010 (10) -0.049 -0.092 -0.046 -0.100
( 0.021)** ( 0.028)*** ( 0.015)*** ( 0.027)***
Mean No. of GCSEs (Male) 0.028 -0.048
( 0.017)* ( 0.025)*
Mean No. of GCSEs (Female) -0.020 -0.001
( 0.012)* ( 0.016)
Mean No. of A*s (Male) -0.001 0.023
( 0.008) ( 0.008)***
Mean No. of A*s (Female) 0.025 0.003
( 0.006)*** ( 0.010)
Norrington Score / 10 0.183 5.830
( 1.028)** ( 1.899)***
Diﬀerences in esƟmated eﬀects by gender
Treated*Policy On () 0.030
Treated*2008 (8) -0.001 0.015
Treated*2009 (9) 0.041 0.061
Treated*2010 (10) 0.043 0.054
N 116 232 230
Notes: Analysis excludes individuals for whom school type is unknown. For Simple model (columns 1 and
2), Policy Oﬀ in 2005 and 2006; Policy On in 2008, 2009 and 2010. For other models (columns 3, 4, 5
and 6), base category for years is pooling of observaƟons for 2005 and 2006. Cross-model hypothesis
tesƟng conducted using seemingly-unrelated regressions. Standard errors, clustered by college-subject
group combinaƟon, in parentheses. Stars indicate staƟsƟcal signiﬁcance: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, ***
p < 0:01.
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Table 4.12: ProporƟon of all interviewees geƫng an oﬀer, comparing proporƟons who
are successful and are either male or female: diﬀerence in diﬀerences esƟmates
Variable nModel Simple Years Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female Male Female Male Female Male
Constant () 0.172 0.188 0.172 0.188 -0.047 0.010
( 0.004)*** ( 0.007)*** ( 0.004)*** ( 0.007)*** ( 0.133) ( 0.206)
Treated () -0.064 0.006 -0.064 0.006 -0.068 -0.002
( 0.010)*** ( 0.014)*** ( 0.010)*** ( 0.014)*** ( 0.010)*** ( 0.011)***
Policy On () -0.002 -0.002
( 0.005)*** ( 0.007)***
2008 (8) 0.008 0.006 -0.001 -0.003
( 0.006)*** ( 0.007)*** ( 0.008)*** ( 0.010)***
2009 (9) -0.017 -0.004 -0.028 -0.026
( 0.005)*** ( 0.008)*** ( 0.007)*** ( 0.009)***
2010 (10) 0.002 -0.007 -0.011 -0.030
( 0.006)*** ( 0.007)*** ( 0.008)*** ( 0.009)***
Treated*Policy On () -0.012 0.046
( 0.011)*** ( 0.016)***
Treated*2008 (8) -0.035 0.026 -0.037 0.026
( 0.015)** ( 0.020)* ( 0.013)*** ( 0.018)**
Treated*2009 (9) -0.006 0.067 -0.016 0.064
( 0.013)*** ( 0.019)*** ( 0.015)*** ( 0.018)***
Treated*2010 (10) 0.003 0.060 -0.011 0.051
( 0.014)** ( 0.023)*** ( 0.015)*** ( 0.023)**
Mean No. of GCSEs (Male) 0.015 -0.032
( 0.012)* ( 0.016)**
Mean No. of GCSEs (Female) -0.013 -0.004
( 0.009)* ( 0.019)
Mean No. of A*s (Male) -0.001 0.022
( 0.006) ( 0.007)***
Mean No. of A*s (Female) 0.015 -0.000
( 0.005)*** ( 0.007)
Norrington Score / 10 1.522 5.999
( 0.915)* ( 1.454)***
Diﬀerences in esƟmated eﬀects by gender
Treated*Policy On () -0.058***
Treated*2008 (8) -0.061** -0.063***
Treated*2009 (9) -0.074*** -0.080***
Treated*2010 (10) -0.057* -0.062**
N 116 232 230
Notes: Analysis excludes individuals for whom school type is unknown. For Simple model (columns 1 and
2), Policy Oﬀ in 2005 and 2006; Policy On in 2008, 2009 and 2010. For other models (columns 3, 4, 5
and 6), base category for years is pooling of observaƟons for 2005 and 2006. Cross-model hypothesis
tesƟng conducted using seemingly-unrelated regressions. Standard errors, clustered by college-subject
group combinaƟon, in parentheses. Stars indicate staƟsƟcal signiﬁcance: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, ***
p < 0:01.
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by school type, the addiƟonal controls in models 5 and 6 also behave as expected. There
are posiƟve correlaƟons between the mean number of GCSE A*s held by applicants of
a parƟcular gender and the proporƟon of applicants who are successful and are of that
gender. Likewise, any negaƟve eﬀects of increased performance by one gender on ad-
missions chances of the other are either non-existent or too weak to be idenƟﬁed. The
coeﬃcients on the Norrington Score imply that a greater proporƟon of all applicants to
collegeswith higher performing exisƟng undergraduateswill be oﬀered a place; this asso-
ciaƟon is noƟceably stronger for the success of male than female applicants, supporƟng
its inclusion in the model.
Turning to the proporƟon of applicants called to interview, Table 4.11 shows a broadly
consistent story of a larger decline in the proporƟon of applicants being called to inter-
viewwho aremale than the same proporƟon for females. However, the diﬀerences in es-
Ɵmated eﬀects are not staƟsƟcally signiﬁcant. Examining these results separately for PPE
and E&M (not reported here) suggests that the diﬀerences are driven more by changes
in E&M. This seems likely to be because E&M received more applicants per place and, as
such, the target number of interviews per place resulted in larger overall changes in the
proporƟon of applicants called to interview.²¹ Nevertheless, the results for PPE are not
contradictory, but rather weaker.
Finally, Table 4.12 conﬁrms the simple DiD esƟmate of a diﬀerence by gender in the pro-
porƟon of all interviewees who receive an oﬀer. The models provide consistently staƟsƟ-
cally signiﬁcant evidence that the increase in the proporƟon of all interviewees receiving
an oﬀer is more posiƟve for males than females. Generally this is explained by the in-
crease in the proporƟon of all interviewees geƫng an oﬀer being concentrated among
males. Once again, the addiƟon of covariates produces coeﬃcients that conform to the
paƩern seen in earlier models. As with the results by school type, the inclusion of co-
variates in this model makes less diﬀerence than that seen for the earlier stage of the
admissions process; however, if anything, their inclusion strengthens the staƟsƟcal sig-
niﬁcance of the diﬀerences between the esƟmates for males and females.
I noted in SecƟon 4.5 that an eﬀect at the point of interview like this, given that the test
is primarily used to screen applicants for interview, appears odd at ﬁrst glance. However,
a plausible explanaƟon is that the TSA is more likely to screen out female applicants who
²¹This is also hinted at by the smaller esƟmated eﬀects in 2008, when this part of the policy had not yet
been introduced for E&M.
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would in the past have been oﬀered a place once they were interviewed. Further inves-
ƟgaƟon, considering combinaƟons of gender and school type, suggests that this may be
partly be due to a larger reducƟon in the proporƟon of all applicants invited to interview
who were female and from an independent school. This is larger than the reducƟon in
the proporƟon for the combinaƟon of female and state school. By contrast, the diﬀer-
ence in eﬀects between males and females from state schools in the proporƟon of all
applicants geƫng an interview is much smaller. However, this only provides a potenƟal
pointer towards possible causes.
As with school type, the results from this regression analysis add conﬁdence to ﬁndings
from SecƟon 4.5. When it comes to the proporƟon of interviewees who receive an of-
fer, the regression esƟmates show a consistent and staƟsƟcally signiﬁcant set of esƟ-
mates over Ɵme, with the overall increases driven by the proporƟon who receive an of-
fer and are male. Furthermore, the regression models with addiƟonal controls suggest
that the results are not driven by changes in other observable characterisƟcs within the
groups.
4.8 AlternaƟve outcome measures
ProporƟons of applicantswho are successful and come froma parƟcular gender or school
type is not the only way to think about the admissions process. In this secƟon, I take an
alternaƟve approach, looking at each stage of the admissions process and analysing the
share of the individuals that come from each of our groups of interest. Since all appli-
cants in the dataset are classiﬁed as coming from either independent or state schools,
the shares of each sum to 1. The same is the case for males and females. As such, we can
restrict interest to just one of the shares in each case: I choose the share who come from
a state school and the share who are female. Returning to the graphical representaƟon
of the admissions process in Figure 4.1, instead of considering the decision points them-
selves, I analyse the share of applicants, interviewees, and those who receive an oﬀer
who come from state schools and, separately, the share of each of these groups who are
female.
ConcentraƟng on outcomemeasures of this type, generally with respect to school type, is
popular in the press (for example Vasagar, 2011), perhaps because a single ﬁgure is more
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readily comprehensible. Furthermore, while the main analysis produced esƟmated ef-
fects that are comparable in absolute terms, this alternaƟve approach implicitly takes
into account the size of the eﬀects relaƟve to the baseline proporƟon of successful ap-
plicants of each type. The importance of this will become apparent in the discussion of
the results by gender below.
This alternaƟve approach also allows us to consider an important addiƟonal aspect, which
the main analysis was not able to address. As discussed in SecƟon 4.3, the proporƟon of
young people who choose to apply cannot be analysed, since potenƟal applicants are
not observed by the University. However, a related, though not idenƟcal, quesƟon is
whether there is an impact on the make up of the pool of applicants i.e. the share of
applicants who are female, or the share from state schools. An increase in the proporƟon
of applicants from independent schools who do in fact apply will decrease this ﬁgure
(holding state school applicaƟons constant) and vice versa. Rather than taking as a given
the pool of applicants or interviewees, as the main analysis does, this approach focuses
on the cumulaƟve eﬀect of the policy change (including changes in applicaƟon behaviour)
up to a given point in the admissions process. One drawback of these outcome variables
is that they do not tell us about any overall changes in the number of interviews and
oﬀers.
Turning to school type ﬁrst, I apply the same DiDmethod as for the analysis in SecƟon 4.5
to idenƟfy the impact of the introducƟon of the TSA on the relaƟve numbers of applicants
from independent and state schools by comparing the change in share of applicants, in-
terviewees and those receiving an oﬀer between Economics and other subjects.²² Adopt-
ing the same notaƟon as that introduced in SecƟon 4.5 the outcome variables are as
follows:
Share of applicants from state schools: AS
AI + AS
Share of interviewees from state schools: IS
II + IS
Share of those oﬀered a place from state schools: OS
OI +OS
Howdo these relate to the outcome variables formymain analysis? While those took the
form IS
AI+AS
(in the case of the proporƟon of all applicants called to interview and coming
²²I do subject these ﬁgures to the same regression analysis as used above, but do not report the results
as they are not substanƟvely diﬀerent as those reported.
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from a state school), these alternaƟve outcome variables concentrate on proporƟons
within a parƟcular stage of the admissions process. They have the same denominators
as the main analysis’s outcomes, but quite diﬀerent numerators.
Table 4.13: Share of applicants from State schools, share of interviewees from State
schools, and share of those who receive an oﬀer from State schools, by year and subject
group: simple diﬀerence in diﬀerences esƟmates
Applicants Policy Oﬀ Policy On Diﬀerence
Economics 0.551 0.575 0.024
( 0.023) ( 0.023) ( 0.014)*
Others 0.617 0.632 0.015
( 0.016) ( 0.013) ( 0.008)*
Diﬀerence -0.066 -0.057 0.009
( 0.028)*** ( 0.026)** ( 0.016)
Interviewees Policy Oﬀ Policy On Diﬀerence
Economics 0.527 0.536 0.009
( 0.023) ( 0.026) ( 0.013)
Others 0.592 0.582 -0.010
( 0.018) ( 0.014) ( 0.009)
Diﬀerence -0.066 -0.046 0.020
( 0.029)** ( 0.029) ( 0.016)
Oﬀered Policy Oﬀ Policy On Diﬀerence
Economics 0.508 0.527 0.019
( 0.032) ( 0.025) ( 0.026)
Others 0.548 0.561 0.013
( 0.017) ( 0.014) ( 0.011)
Diﬀerence -0.040 -0.034 0.006
( 0.036) ( 0.029) ( 0.028)
Notes: Analysis excludes individuals for whom school type is unknown. Policy Oﬀ in 2005, 2006 and 2007;
Policy On in 2008, 2009 and 2010. Standard errors, clustered by college-subject group combinaƟon, in
parentheses. Stars indicate staƟsƟcal signiﬁcance:  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01. Sample sizes:
Applicants: 63986 Interviewees: 46106 AƩendees: 16412
Reading across the rows in the top panel of Table 4.13 reveals that the share of applicants
from state schools has been rising in all subjects, Economics included. Figure 4.4 shows
a large increase in the number of applicaƟons from state schools, suggesƟng this is the
cause, rather than any decline in the number of applicaƟons from independent schools.
Furthermore, the diﬀerence between Economics and other subjects (seen by reading
down each column) shows that Economics applicants are more likely to be from inde-
pendent schools than those to other subjects. However, the DiD esƟmate, in the boƩom
right hand cell, highlights that the increase was not staƟsƟcally signiﬁcantly larger in Eco-
nomics when the TSA was introduced: there is no strong evidence that the introducƟon
of the TSA aﬀected the makeup of applicants in this way. It should be remembered that
this analysis only covers the three years following the introducƟon of the policy; changes
in behaviour by applicants are likely to take some Ɵme.
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Unlike among applicants, there is only a very small rise in the proporƟon of Economics
interviewees who come from state schools. In fact, among non-Economics subjects the
proporƟon declines a small amount, however this is far from staƟsƟcal signiﬁcance. With
no signiﬁcant changes in the proporƟon of interviewees from state school among either
the treatment or control groups it comes as liƩle surprise that the DiD esƟmate provides
no evidence of a staƟsƟcally signiﬁcant eﬀect of the policy on the proporƟon of intervie-
wees who come from a state school.
Finally, considering the proporƟon of those oﬀered a place that come from state schools
(the staƟsƟc that receives most popular aƩenƟon), the story is very similar to that for
interviewees. In each case, these results echo the ﬁndings from SecƟon 4.5, suggesƟng
that the policy does not have a large impact on the kinds of young people who make it
through the admissions process.
SubjecƟng the analysis in this secƟon to the same regression modelling as in SecƟon 4.6
does not materially alter the interpretaƟon of these ﬁndings. I also take the approach
further in analysing diﬀerences by socioeconomic status in Appendix E.1, using the ap-
plicants’ schools’ IDACI (Income DeprivaƟon AﬀecƟng Children and Infants Index) ﬁgure
as the outcome of interest. The analysis does not seem inconsistent with the ﬁndings
reported above.
Turning now to the same analysis by gender, the story seems iniƟally similar. The DiD
esƟmate of the eﬀect on the share of applicants who are female is zero. However, there is
change in the composiƟon of interviewees. The share of interviewees for Economics who
are female falls by 3.6 percentage points, at a Ɵme when this ﬁgure is rising (marginally)
among other subjects. This results in an esƟmated impact of the TSA of a 4.5 percentage
point reducƟon in the share of interviewees who are female. Furthermore, regression
analysis (allowing for diﬀerent eﬀects by year and including the same covariates as in the
main analysis) casts liƩle doubt on this ﬁnding.
Why do these results seemingly diﬀer from our ﬁndings for gender in the main analy-
sis, where the proporƟon of applicants oﬀered an interview and who are male declines
more than the proporƟon of all applicants oﬀered an interview and who are female? It
is because the proporƟon for males starts at a higher baseline than for females; as such,
the larger absolute decline for the male proporƟon has a relaƟvely smaller eﬀect on the
gender makeup of interviewees.
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Table 4.14: Share of applicants who are female, share of interviewees who are female,
and share of those who receive an oﬀer who are female, by year and subject group:
simple diﬀerence in diﬀerences esƟmates
Applicants Policy Oﬀ Policy On Diﬀerence
Economics 0.325 0.323 -0.002
( 0.013) ( 0.008) ( 0.014)
Others 0.505 0.502 -0.003
( 0.013) ( 0.009) ( 0.012)
Diﬀerence -0.180 -0.179 0.000
( 0.018)*** ( 0.011)*** ( 0.018)
Interviewees Policy Oﬀ Policy On Diﬀerence
Economics 0.326 0.289 -0.036
( 0.014) ( 0.011) ( 0.016)*
Others 0.497 0.505 0.009
( 0.011) ( 0.009) ( 0.010)
Diﬀerence -0.171 -0.216 -0.045
( 0.018)*** ( 0.014)*** ( 0.019)***
Oﬀered Policy Oﬀ Policy On Diﬀerence
Economics 0.355 0.293 -0.061
( 0.019) ( 0.018) ( 0.027)*
Others 0.476 0.478 0.002
( 0.012) ( 0.011) ( 0.013)
Diﬀerence -0.122 -0.184 -0.063
( 0.022)*** ( 0.021)*** ( 0.029)**
Notes: Analysis excludes individuals for whom school type is unknown. Policy Oﬀ in 2005, 2006 and 2007;
Policy On in 2008, 2009 and 2010. Standard errors, clustered by college-subject group combinaƟon, in
parentheses. Stars indicate staƟsƟcal signiﬁcance:  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01. Sample sizes:
Applicants: 63986 Interviewees: 46106 AƩendees: 16412
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Considering those oﬀered a place the ﬁgures are similar: there is a fall in the female share
of those oﬀered a place to study Economics, despite the opposite trend among other
subjects. This leads to an esƟmated negaƟve eﬀect of the TSA of 6.3 percentage points.
However, unlike in the case of interviewees, these esƟmates are reduced to staƟsƟcal
insigniﬁcance by the inclusion of addiƟonal controls in regression analysis.
These results do not suggest that the introducƟon of the TSA has had a detrimental eﬀect
on the proporƟon of female applicants to Economics courses at the University of Oxford.
However, a gap would appear to open in the share of interviewees who are female, and
hence on into the share of those oﬀered a place. The esƟmated eﬀects are larger than
those recovered above for changes in shares from state schools. However, in this case,
regression analysis reduces rather than adds to our conﬁdence: the staƟsƟcal evidence
only remains strong in the case of the share of interviewees who are female.
4.9 Robustness
The extent to which one can trust the ﬁndings from DiD analysis rests on the validity of
the common trends assumpƟon that underlies it. This cannot be tested directly, since the
trend one would wish to look at is an unobserved counterfactual. However, robustness
checks can provide some evidence that the assumpƟon seems likely to hold.
The ﬁrst of these I employ is a ‘placebo’ test. This involves esƟmaƟng the ‘eﬀect’ across
a period when the policy was not introduced, in this case between 2005 and 2006. The
treatment and control groups remain as speciﬁed for the main analysis (Economics as
treatment, all other subjects as controls). Finding an eﬀect during this period, when
there was no policy to produce one, would suggest a failure of the common trends as-
sumpƟon was inducing the apparent impact. The results from the placebo treatment on
the proporƟon of all applicantswho get a place, all applicantswho get an interview and all
interviewees who get a place are shown in Table 4.15, using the same output from linear
regression employed in SecƟon 4.7. No signiﬁcant eﬀect is idenƟﬁed at any stage of the
admissions process, which is reassuring. This conƟnues to hold true when the propor-
Ɵons of applicants are analysed separately by school type or gender (not shown).
Second, I alter my control group to one which should even more closely resemble the
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Table 4.15: ProporƟon of all applicants geƫng an oﬀer, all applicants geƫng an
interview, and all interviewees geƫng an oﬀer - placebo test: diﬀerence in diﬀerences
esƟmates
(1) (2) (3)
Oﬀer Interview Inter.!Oﬀer
Constant () 0.292 0.805 0.362
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Treated () -0.040 0.050 -0.066
(0.016) (0.016) (0.019)
Policy Placebo () -0.014 -0.033 -0.003
(0.006) (0.004) (0.007)
Treated*Policy Placebo () 0.013 -0.012 0.017
(0.016) (0.021) (0.018)
N 116 116 116
R2 0.064 0.157 0.128
Notes: Analysis excludes individuals forwhomschool type is unknown. PolicyOﬀ in 2005; PolicyOn in 2006.
Standard errors, clustered by college, in parentheses. Stars indicate staisƟcal signiﬁcance: * p < 0:10, **
p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
Table 4.16: ProporƟon of applicants geƫng an oﬀer, applicants geƫng an interview, and
interviewees geƫng an oﬀer - restricted control group: diﬀerence in diﬀerences
esƟmates
(1) (2) (3)
Oﬀer Interview Inter.!Oﬀer
Constant () 0.245 0.667 0.368
(0.007) (0.014) (0.010)
Treated () 0.005 0.162 -0.066
(0.016) (0.019) (0.020)
Policy On () -0.031 -0.050 -0.016
(0.007) (0.012) (0.011)
Treated*Policy On () -0.025 -0.204 0.046
(0.014) (0.025) (0.021)
N 116 116 116
R2 0.148 0.597 0.108
Notes: Analysis excludes individuals for whom school type is unknown. Policy Oﬀ in 2005, 2006 and 2007;
Policy On in 2008, 2009 and 2010. Standard errors, clustered by college, in parentheses. Stars indicate
staisƟcal signiﬁcance: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
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Table 4.17: ProporƟon of all applicants geƫng an oﬀer, an interview, and interviewees
geƫng an oﬀer - comparing applicants from schools in high and low SES areas:
diﬀerence in diﬀerences esƟmates
Variable n Outcome Oﬀer Interview Interview!Oﬀer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High Low High Low High Low
Constant () 0.140 0.150 0.363 0.429 0.177 0.190
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Treated () -0.015 -0.020 0.055 -0.013 -0.027 -0.034
(0.011) (0.011) (0.018) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013)
Policy On () -0.020 -0.023 -0.040 -0.068 -0.002 -0.004
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Treated*Policy On () -0.004 -0.010 -0.094 -0.050 0.023 0.013
(0.011) (0.010) (0.018) (0.019) (0.014) (0.014)
N 116 116 116 116 116 116
R2 0.137 0.218 0.440 0.456 0.058 0.092
Notes: Analysis excludes individuals for whom school type is unknown. Policy Oﬀ in 2005, 2006 and 2007;
Policy On in 2008, 2009 and 2010. Standard errors, clustered by college, in parentheses. Stars indicate
staisƟcal signiﬁcance: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
treatment group: applicants to Social Science courses.²³ Table 4.16 shows the results,
with the interacƟon between Economics and Policy On () being the key coeﬃcient of
interest in each model. It shows the esƟmated impact on the proporƟon of applicants
geƫng an interview as being a reducƟon of 22.9 percentage points, while for the propor-
Ɵon of interviewees geƫng a place the esƟmate is an increase of 6.0 percentage points.
These are rather larger than the esƟmates in the main analysis of 14.4 percentage points
and 6.4 percentage points, respecƟvely, but tell a similar story. The impact on the pro-
porƟon of applicants who get a place is esƟmated at close to zero and staƟsƟcally in-
signiﬁcant. Once again, there is liƩle divergence from this picture when the proporƟons
of applicants are analysed separately by school type or gender (not shown).
Finally, I employ an alternaƟve proxy of socioeconomic status. Instead of aƩendance
at an independent school, I deﬁne a binary variable set to zero when applicants aƩend
schools in the three most deprived ﬁŌhs of postcodes, according to the Index of Depri-
vaƟon AﬀecƟng Children and Infants (IDACI),²⁴ and set to one when they aƩend schools
in the least two deprived ﬁŌhs of postcodes. This roughly replicates the proporƟons of
independent school applicants. The polychoric correlaƟon between an individual aƩend-
²³I deﬁne Social Science courses as follows: Experimental Psychology; Geography; History and Economics
(although an Economics subject this did not introduce the TSA); History and PoliƟcs; Law; Law with Law
Studies in Europe; and Psychology, Philosophy and Physiology (PPP).
²⁴I take an alternaƟve approach to analysis using IDACI in Appendix E.1. This does not involve converƟng
it to a dichotomous variable in this way, which does reduce the informaƟve content of the variable. I also
include more detail on the construcƟon of the IDACI.
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ing an independent school and aƩending a school in a ‘high SES area’ is 0.37. Looked at
another way, 52% of individuals in the dataset who aƩend a school in a ‘high SES area’
are aƩending an independent school. By contrast, only 29% of those aƩending a school
in a ‘low SES area’ are aƩending an independent school. I re-esƟmate my DiD model,
with successful proporƟons split by this variable.
The results are shown in Table 4.17 and produce similar esƟmates to those from themain
analysis. For example, the proporƟon of all applicants who are called to interview and
come froma school in a high SES area is reduced by 7.9 percentage points, comparedwith
8.5 percentage points for independent schools. Similarly, the proporƟon of all applicants
who are called to interview and come from a school in a low SES area is reduced by 5.0
percentage points, compared with 5.9 percentage points for state schools.
The results from these robustness checks are very encouraging, producing no signiﬁcant
eﬀect from a placebo test and substanƟvely similar results to my main analysis for the
two other tests.
4.10 Conclusions
This chapter has esƟmated the eﬀects of introducing an apƟtude test to an elite uni-
versity’s admissions process using diﬀerence in diﬀerences methods and data from the
University of Oxford. No evidence is found of an overall impact on the proporƟon of ap-
plicants who receive an oﬀer of a place to study at the University. The policy was coupled
with a policy seƫng a target number of interviews per place, reducing the proporƟon of
applicants invited to interview (by 14 percentage points). Oﬀseƫng this, the proporƟon
of interviewees receiving an interview increased (by 3.6 percentage points), driven by
the reducƟon in the number of interviewees rather than an increase in the number of
oﬀers.
There is no clear evidence of diﬀerenƟal eﬀects on the proporƟon of all applicants oﬀered
a place by the school type individuals come from. Spliƫng the admissions process into
its consƟtuent parts: at ﬁrst glance, there appeared to be evidence that the reducƟon
in the proporƟon of applicants called to interview had a larger (negaƟve) eﬀect on the
proporƟon of all applicants geƫng an interviewwho come independent school, although
when examined more closely this was driven by peculiariƟes relaƟng to the ﬁrst year of
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introducƟon. Furthermore, there is liƩle convincing evidence of heterogeneity by school
type in the proporƟon of interviewees oﬀered a place.
In the case of diﬀerences by gender, while there is no strong evidence of overall diﬀer-
ences between the eﬀects on the proporƟon of all applicants geƫng an oﬀer and who
come from each gender, there is some evidence of males and females being aﬀected
diﬀerently by the introducƟon of an apƟtude test at diﬀerent points of the admissions
process. Males appear relaƟvely less likely to be called for an interview, while female
interviewees are subsequently less likely to be oﬀered a place. However, the staƟsƟcal
evidence is weaker in the case of the former.
In concluding, it is important to consider the issue of external validity and how relevant
these ﬁndings are beyond this immediate seƫng. Admissions procedures at the Univer-
sity of Oxford are relaƟvely similar to those at the University of Cambridge, which also
uses the TSA as part of its selecƟon processes to a wider range of courses. However,
these two universiƟes together make up about 1.5% of undergraduate places available
in the Higher EducaƟon sector during the period of analysis. Admissions procedures are
somewhat diﬀerent at other highly selecƟve universiƟes in England, parƟcularly in that
many applicants are oﬀered a place without having been interviewed. Nevertheless, we
should note that these other highly selecƟve universiƟes are increasingly using selec-
Ɵon tests similar in nature to the TSA, especially for highly compeƟƟve courses, with the
LNAT (Law NaƟonal ApƟtude Test) for Law and the UKCAT (UK Clinical ApƟtude Test) for
Medicine both stressing their focus on skills and apƟtude rather than knowledge. Fur-
thermore, undergraduates who study at these highly selecƟve insƟtuƟons andwho study
these highly compeƟƟve subjects are more likely to enter highly inﬂuenƟal jobs. For ex-
ample, analysis by the Social Mobility and Child Poverty Commission ﬁnds that 75% of
senior judges went to the UniversiƟes of Oxford or Cambridge, while a further 20% went
to a Russell Group insƟtuƟon (Milburn, 2013, p.32).
To return to the quesƟon posed in the Ɵtle, I do not ﬁnd strong evidence that introducing
an apƟtude test to the admissions process of an elite university will have diﬀering ef-
fects on applicants’ chances of being oﬀered a place depending on their socioeconomic
status. Furthermore, while I do ﬁnd diﬀerences in the eﬀects of introducing the test on
each gender at diﬀerent points of the admissions process, I do not ﬁnd strong evidence
that the introducƟon of an apƟtude test aﬀects the relaƟve chances of admission by gen-
der.
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Chapter 5
Summary and conclusions
5.1 Summary
In this thesis I have analysed inequaliƟes in access to Higher EducaƟon (HE) in England.
I have provided important new evidence about this issue, making use of new data, re-
searching new areas, and taking innovaƟve approaches.
First, in Chapter 2, I esƟmated the household income gradient in university parƟcipa-
Ɵon for a recent cohort of young people in England; there was previously liƩle work on
socio-economic status gradients in access to university measured using income. Those
in the top ﬁŌh of the income distribuƟon are almost three Ɵmes as likely to aƩend uni-
versity as those in the boƩom ﬁŌh. This relaƟonship persisted, albeit smaller, even once
I controlled for a range of other confounding factors, including some that seem likely to
lead to an underesƟmate of the direct eﬀect of income on university parƟcipaƟon deci-
sions.
I built on this by analysing the income gradient in university applicaƟons, using the more
in depth informaƟon on the university admissions process available in the LSYPE. While
I found substanƟal income gradients in university aƩendance, most of this inequality
emerges at or before the point of applicaƟon: even aŌer controlling for prior aƩainment
and socioeconomic background a signiﬁcant applicaƟon gap remains. By contrast, the
household income gradient for aƩendance condiƟonal on having applied ismuch smaller:
those in the top ﬁŌh of the income distribuƟon are approximately 1.3 Ɵmes more likely
to aƩend than those in the boƩom ﬁŌh. Moreover, this diﬀerence disappears rapidly
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once controls for earlier educaƟonal aƩainment are added to the model.
I also analysed aƩendance at Russell Group universiƟes, a group of ‘high status’ insƟtu-
Ɵons. The gradient in aƩendance at a Russell Group university, condiƟonal on aƩending
any university, closes completely once I control for prior aƩainment and other socio-
economic characterisƟcs. Without beƩer data on the insƟtuƟon choices of university
applicants, it is impossible to analyse this Russell Group admissions gradient fully. Never-
theless, this analysis provides fresh insights compared to previouswork in this ﬁeld.
Second, in Chapter 3, I assessed the role of socio-economic status in explaining changes in
university expectaƟons between ages 14 and 17. I analysed transiƟons in young people’s
expectaƟons from being ‘likely to apply’ to being ‘unlikely to apply’ and vice versa. I
took the innovaƟve approach of using duraƟon modelling techniques to analyse changes
in expectaƟons directly. My ﬁndings conﬁrm that this is a period when a great deal of
change occurs in young people’s expectaƟons. They also highlight that this change is
not just from being ‘likely to apply’ to being ‘unlikely to apply’, but rather runs in both
direcƟons.
Importantly, I found that young people’s socioeconomic background does have a signif-
icant associaƟon with changes in expectaƟons: while young people across the socio-
economic status distribuƟon start their adolescence with high educaƟonal expectaƟons,
those from less advantaged backgrounds are much more likely to revise their expecta-
Ɵons downwards and much less likely to raise their expectaƟons during this period. This
ﬁnding persisted, even once I controlled for prior academic aƩainment and other po-
tenƟal confounding factors, suggesƟng that a substanƟal porƟon of the socio-economic
status gap in university applicaƟons opens during this period.
Furthermore, I examined how young people respond to new informaƟon on their aca-
demic aƩainment provided by the results of examinaƟons taken at age 16. Unsurpris-
ingly, these results do aﬀect the probability of changing from reporƟng being ‘likely’ to
‘unlikely’ or vice versa. More interesƟngly, the results also suggest that the extent of
this responsiveness is aﬀected by socioeconomic status; young people from less advan-
taged backgrounds are more likely to respond to equivalent results at age 16 by lowering
their expectaƟons, but less likely to respond by raising their expectaƟons. As such, these
diﬀerences in response compound inequality in university expectaƟons.
Finally, in Chapter 4, I looked in depth at one aspect of entry to an elite university. Specif-
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ically, I esƟmated the eﬀect of the introducƟon of an apƟtude test as a screening device
in this context on the proporƟon of successful applicants by school type (state versus pri-
vate) and gender. The esƟmates were obtained by applying a diﬀerence in diﬀerences
approach to administraƟve data from theUniversity of Oxford, taking advantage of the in-
troducƟonof the Thinking Skills Assessment for Economics subjects, but not others.
Overall, I found no clear evidence of diﬀerenƟal eﬀects on the proporƟon of all appli-
cants oﬀered a place by individuals’ school type. Spliƫng the admissions process into
its consƟtuent parts: at ﬁrst glance, there appeared to be evidence that the reducƟon
in the proporƟon of applicants called to interview had a larger (negaƟve) eﬀect on the
proporƟon of all applicants geƫng an interviewwho come independent school, although
when examined more closely this was driven by peculiariƟes relaƟng to the ﬁrst year of
introducƟon. Furthermore, there is liƩle convincing evidence of heterogeneity by school
type in the proporƟon of interviewees oﬀered a place.
However, while my esƟmates suggested that introducing the test increased the propor-
Ɵon of interviewees geƫng an oﬀer overall, this was not found to be the case for women.
There is some evidence of males and females being aﬀected diﬀerently by the introduc-
Ɵon of an apƟtude test at diﬀerent points of the admissions process. Males appear rela-
Ɵvely less likely to be called for an interview, while female interviewees are subsequently
less likely to be oﬀered a place. Nevertheless, I do not ﬁnd strong evidence that the intro-
ducƟon of this apƟtude test to the admissions process of an elite university had diﬀering
eﬀects on applicants’ chances of being oﬀered a place depending on their gender over-
all.
5.2 Main conclusions
Amajor theme that has emerged from the consƟtuent chapters of this thesis is that socio-
economic inequaliƟes in access to Higher EducaƟon emerge before the point of applica-
Ɵon. They develop through socio-economic inequaliƟes in academic aƩainment, for ex-
ample asmeasured throughGCSE performance at age 16, andwidening inequaliƟes in ex-
pectaƟons of applying to university. Obviously, these two processes will be intertwined.
This suggests that reducing the extent of socio-economic inequality is more likely to be
achieved through policies that target young people from deprived backgrounds earlier
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in their educaƟonal careers. As well as concurring with much previous evidence on the
emergence of socio-economic inequality in educaƟonal aƩainment (Cunha et al., 2006),
this thesis develops the literature further by highlighƟng the ongoing link between in-
equality and educaƟonal decisions, such as the conƟnued associaƟon between house-
hold income and applicaƟon to university even once examinaƟon performance at age 16
is accounted for.
My results also suggest that universiƟes do not discriminate against students frompoorer
backgrounds; rather, such students are less likely to apply, for potenƟally a mulƟtude of
reasons. This ﬁnding persists when we consider speciﬁcally access to a group of the most
presƟgious insƟtuƟons (albeit with the data available, I could not esƟmate all relevant
stages of admissions, speciﬁcally whether young people choose tomake an applicaƟon to
such an insƟtuƟon). However, this should not be an excuse for universiƟes to assume that
the issue is somebody else’s problem. As I showed in Chapter 4, reforms to admissions
systems can make a diﬀerence to fair access, even if it only a small one. UniversiƟes
should rigorously evaluate their admissions procedures to ensure that these support the
aim of fair access, as deﬁned in Chapter 1.
In addiƟon, ﬁndings from Chapter 3 suggest thatmore could usefully be done tomaintain
the educaƟonal expectaƟons of academically able young people from less advantaged
families during their teenage years. A posiƟve implicaƟon of this is that it is not too late to
target policies, both to maintain and to raise educaƟonal expectaƟons, at bright individ-
uals from less advantaged backgrounds during this period of their lives. However, of the
two, raising expectaƟons of applying to university may be less eﬀecƟve than maintaining
expectaƟons. Furthermore, my results do suggest that expectaƟons become increasingly
ﬁxed as young people get older, further highlighƟng the need to target intervenƟons to-
wards the start of this period.
5.3 Future research
Unsurprisingly, as well as providing answers, this thesis raises new quesƟons. As such,
the ﬁndings presented in this thesis point to new areas of research. Below, I highlight
key issues raised by this thesis that future research could address in order to enhance
understanding of inequaliƟes in access to Higher EducaƟon in England.
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Due to the constantly evolving policy environment, ongoing work will be needed to anal-
yse whether the levels of and reasons for inequaliƟes are changing in response. Most
obviously, the further increases in undergraduate tuiƟon fees for students starƟng in or
aŌer September 2011, along with the changes to the ﬁnancial support systems available
(Chowdry et al., 2012), mean that analysis of inequality for a more recent cohort will be
important to understanding whether these reforms have made a diﬀerence to SES gra-
dients in access. Use of new, but comparable, data such as the recently commissioned
second cohort of the Longitudinal Study of Young People in England (LSYPE2) will hope-
fully make it easy for future research to analyse changes in the intervening period.
The work reported in Chapter 2 was unable to analyse all steps in the university admis-
sions process that I would have liked to. Most parƟcularly, not being able to idenƟfy
whether individuals applied to Russell Group universiƟes meant that I couldn’t address
the issue of income gradients in aƩending these insƟtuƟons, condiƟonal on having ap-
plied to at least one. Boliver (2013) has used data that were able to separate out these
two issues, but which did not have the detailed prior aƩainment data (parƟcularly perfor-
mance at age 16) or rich family background data, such as ameasure of household income,
that I was able to draw on. It would be possible to bring more certainty to this issue if the
necessary quesƟons are included in future surveys of this age range (such as the LSYPE2)
or if it were possible to analyse the NaƟonal Pupil Database (NPD) linked to UCAS univer-
sity applicaƟon and admissions data, although this would sƟll face the restricƟon of not
having rich measures of SES.
Furthermore, because of the data currently available, my work also leaves out the im-
portant step of graduaƟon from university and subsequent acƟviƟes (most commonly
entry to the labour market). There is some evidence that “pupils from independent and
selecƟve state schools, those from state schools with a low proporƟon of FSM-eligible
pupils and those from high-value-added state schools are [...] signiﬁcantly more likely to
drop out, signiﬁcantly less likely to complete their degree and signiﬁcantly less likely to
graduate with a ﬁrst or a 2:1 than their counterparts in non-selecƟve state schools, state
schools with a high proporƟon of FSM-eligible pupils and low-value-added state schools
respecƟvely” (Crawford, 2014, p.74), once confounding factors such as prior aƩainment
have been controlled for. This points to the condiƟonal SES gradient in receiving Higher
EducaƟon being potenƟally smaller than the SES gradient in aƩending university, but re-
lies on administraƟve data. In a few years, muchmore can be learnt about these issues by
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extending my analysis to analyse socio-economic inequality in drop-out, degree classiﬁ-
caƟon, and early data on labourmarket outcomes, using the same rich family background
data available in the LSYPE along with the forthcoming age 25 wave of data.
The importance of the subjects that young people choose to study, or are encouraged
to study, while at school for their chances of entering HE is another area that has not
received suﬃcient aƩenƟon (although there has been somework for much older cohorts
van de WerĬorst et al. (2003)). In parƟcular, diﬀering qualiﬁcaƟon choices at ages 14
and 16 being associated with SES may be an important part of the reason for the large
gradient in access to university that I have found. Future work using the LSYPE and linked
administraƟve data from the NPD and the Higher EducaƟon StaƟsƟcs Authority would
allow addiƟonal insights into this potenƟally important driver of inequality.
I highlighted in Chapter 4 that I could only assess how the chances of entry to the Univer-
sity of Oxford changed as a result of the introducƟon of the apƟtude test. With addiƟonal
data, linking these admissions data to degree examinaƟon results, it would be possible
to assess whether the eﬃciency gained in the admissions process from introducing an
apƟtude test is traded oﬀ against selecƟng the highest quality applicants for the course
(i.e. maximising their performance at the end of the course).
Finally, this thesis has concentrated exclusively on access to undergraduate higher ed-
ucaƟon. However, more work is needed to analyse the extent of inequality in access
to postgraduate courses, parƟcularly in light of the increasing proporƟon of young peo-
ple entering such courses and the addiƟonal returns to compleƟng such courses (Lindley
and Machin, 2011). The large upfront costs of many postgraduate courses suggests that
young people from disadvantaged backgrounds are less likely to be able to take advan-
tage these addiƟonal returns, and hence may be placed at a disadvantage in upper levels
of the labour market.
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Appendix A
Supplementary results from Chapter 2
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Table A.1: Models for university aƩendance, reporƟng marginal eﬀects at means
M1-Probit M2-Probit M3-Probit M4-Probit M8-LP (with FE) M5-Probit M6-Probit M7-Probit M9-LP (with FE)
1st quinƟle of household income (Low) -0.102 -0.033 -0.043 -0.044 -0.015 0.049 0.007 0.005 0.008
(0.017) (0.019) (0.023) (0.023) (0.017) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.016)
2nd quinƟle of household income -0.071 -0.055 -0.047 -0.049 -0.038 -0.011 -0.018 -0.019 -0.016
(0.019) (0.020) (0.022) (0.023) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.014)
4th quinƟle of household income 0.109 0.057 0.036 0.028 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.017 0.008
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015)
5th quinƟle of household income (High) 0.326 0.230 0.158 0.109 0.073 0.094 0.080 0.071 0.045
(0.020) (0.022) (0.024) (0.026) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.017)
KS2 Score -0.059 -0.014 0.016 -0.095 -0.033 -0.002 0.005 -0.004
(0.030) (0.033) (0.035) (0.018) (0.035) (0.037) (0.037) (0.018)
KS2 Score Squared 0.017 0.014 0.011 0.016 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Capped GCSE Score (Low) 0.011 0.010 0.009 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001)
Capped GCSE Score (High) 0.057 0.055 0.056 0.050
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Capped GCSE Score (High) Squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male -0.109 -0.118 -0.086 -0.022 -0.026 -0.021
(0.014) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010)
Lone Parent Family -0.070 -0.069 -0.045 -0.011 -0.011 -0.003
(0.020) (0.020) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.012)
Mother’s EducaƟon - No Quals -0.034 -0.026 -0.007 -0.010 -0.010 0.005
(0.023) (0.023) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.015)
Mother’s EducaƟon - Below GCSEs -0.041 -0.039 -0.031 -0.021 -0.022 -0.013
(0.030) (0.030) (0.020) (0.026) (0.026) (0.018)
Mother’s EducaƟon - A Levels 0.026 0.015 -0.002 0.003 0.001 -0.007
(0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
Mother’s EducaƟon - HE Below Degree 0.075 0.062 0.051 0.043 0.041 0.039
(0.022) (0.023) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.017)
Mother’s EducaƟon - Degree 0.075 0.058 0.033 0.007 0.005 0.001
(0.028) (0.028) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.020)
Father’s EducaƟon - No Quals 0.005 0.012 0.017 0.029 0.030 0.032
(0.024) (0.023) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.015)
Father’s EducaƟon - Below GCSEs 0.002 0.007 0.009 0.025 0.026 0.020
(0.031) (0.031) (0.022) (0.026) (0.026) (0.020)
Father’s EducaƟon - A Levels -0.006 -0.007 -0.001 -0.010 -0.011 -0.006
(0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015)
Father’s EducaƟon - HE Below Degree 0.083 0.082 0.070 0.061 0.059 0.053
(0.024) (0.024) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018)
Father’s EducaƟon - Degree 0.200 0.187 0.150 0.113 0.110 0.096
(0.026) (0.026) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.019)
KS3 School Type - CTC -0.032 -0.123
(0.069) (0.035)
KS3 School Type - FoundaƟon 0.005 -0.020
(0.021) (0.018)
KS3 School Type - Independent 0.380 0.082
(0.043) (0.036)
KS3 School Type - Voluntary Aided 0.081 0.016
(0.023) (0.020)
KS3 School Type - Voluntary Controlled 0.062 0.019
(0.042) (0.034)
Grammar School 0.197 0.073
(0.043) (0.042)
School has Sixth Form 0.045 0.034
(0.016) (0.014)
Region No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No
Ethnicity No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Month of Birth No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Sibling eﬀects No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
F Test . 318.497 34.675 30.591 45.718 323.044 42.302 36.731 105.037
Prob > F . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sub-sample size 7939 7939 7939 7939 7939 7939 7939 7939 7939
Notes: Stars indicate staƟsƟcal signiﬁcance:  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01. Marginal eﬀects esƟmated at sample means,
holding household equivalised income constant. Weighted using LSYPE Wave 7 respondent weights, which aƩempt to adjust for
oversampling and aƩriƟon. Standard errors (adjusted for school level clustering and straƟﬁcaƟon by deprivaƟon) reported in paren-
theses. Prior aƩainment variables are divided by 10, hence the coeﬃcient esƟmates represent the expected change in probability for
an addiƟonal 10 points. Base category for household equivalised income is middle (3rd) quinƟle group. Base category for parental
educaƟon is achieving GCSEs or equivalents. Base category for family type is married or cohabiƟng couple. Base category for KS3
School Type is Community School. Base category for sex is female. Sample: Wave 7 parƟcipants with valid responses for all variables
used in models. Marginal eﬀect for discrete variables is the change from base category.
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Table A.2: Models for university aƩendance, reporƟng marginal eﬀects at means -
Males
M1-Probit M2-Probit M3-Probit M4-Probit M8-LP (with FE) M5-Probit M6-Probit M7-Probit M9-LP (with FE)
1st quinƟle of household income (Low) -0.091 -0.019 -0.015 -0.010 0.011 0.070 0.040 0.039 0.025
(0.023) (0.026) (0.032) (0.031) (0.025) (0.027) (0.030) (0.030) (0.022)
2nd quinƟle of household income -0.053 -0.035 -0.024 -0.021 -0.017 0.010 0.009 0.009 -0.001
(0.024) (0.026) (0.030) (0.031) (0.024) (0.023) (0.027) (0.027) (0.021)
4th quinƟle of household income 0.093 0.048 0.029 0.023 0.023 0.020 0.022 0.020 0.012
(0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.029) (0.024) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.021)
5th quinƟle of household income (High) 0.337 0.250 0.160 0.125 0.094 0.112 0.087 0.089 0.057
(0.029) (0.030) (0.031) (0.033) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.024)
KS2 Score -0.071 -0.007 0.029 -0.095 0.009 0.062 0.076 0.033
(0.040) (0.044) (0.045) (0.030) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.028)
KS2 Score Squared 0.018 0.012 0.009 0.016 -0.002 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Capped GCSE Score (Low) 0.015 0.012 0.012 -0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001)
Capped GCSE Score (High) 0.045 0.044 0.045 0.049
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004)
Capped GCSE Score (High) Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lone Parent Family -0.078 -0.078 -0.056 -0.028 -0.028 -0.024
(0.026) (0.026) (0.020) (0.023) (0.023) (0.018)
Mother’s EducaƟon - No Quals -0.006 0.005 0.023 0.024 0.022 0.038
(0.032) (0.032) (0.026) (0.029) (0.029) (0.023)
Mother’s EducaƟon - Below GCSEs -0.000 0.001 -0.005 0.046 0.044 0.023
(0.041) (0.041) (0.030) (0.036) (0.036) (0.028)
Mother’s EducaƟon - A Levels 0.032 0.013 0.007 0.009 0.006 0.007
(0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Mother’s EducaƟon - HE Below Degree 0.086 0.076 0.076 0.074 0.074 0.069
(0.030) (0.031) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
Mother’s EducaƟon - Degree 0.081 0.067 0.039 0.024 0.022 0.011
(0.036) (0.037) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.030)
Father’s EducaƟon - No Quals 0.014 0.015 0.038 0.031 0.032 0.048
(0.032) (0.032) (0.025) (0.030) (0.030) (0.023)
Father’s EducaƟon - Below GCSEs 0.010 0.018 0.027 0.045 0.047 0.048
(0.044) (0.044) (0.033) (0.037) (0.037) (0.029)
Father’s EducaƟon - A Levels 0.014 0.012 0.019 0.004 0.002 0.004
(0.027) (0.027) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
Father’s EducaƟon - HE Below Degree 0.099 0.100 0.091 0.085 0.083 0.080
(0.032) (0.032) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027)
Father’s EducaƟon - Degree 0.213 0.204 0.187 0.117 0.117 0.123
(0.035) (0.036) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.030)
KS3 School Type - CTC 0.057 -0.113
(0.080) (0.085)
KS3 School Type - FoundaƟon 0.007 -0.025
(0.028) (0.023)
KS3 School Type - Independent 0.285 -0.004
(0.052) (0.043)
KS3 School Type - Voluntary Aided 0.085 0.003
(0.031) (0.026)
KS3 School Type - Voluntary Controlled 0.059 0.004
(0.051) (0.038)
Grammar School 0.190 0.082
(0.048) (0.049)
School has Sixth Form 0.035 0.030
(0.020) (0.017)
Region No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No
Ethnicity No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Month of Birth No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Sibling eﬀects No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
F Test . 162.024 16.644 16.483 19.541 137.261 21.056 18.589 45.576
Prob > F . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sub-sample size 3848 3848 3848 3848 3848 3848 3848 3848 3848
Notes: Stars indicate staƟsƟcal signiﬁcance:  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01. Marginal eﬀects esƟmated at sample means,
holding household equivalised income constant. Weighted using LSYPE Wave 7 respondent weights, which aƩempt to adjust for
oversampling and aƩriƟon. Standard errors (adjusted for school level clustering and straƟﬁcaƟon by deprivaƟon) reported in paren-
theses. Prior aƩainment variables are divided by 10, hence the coeﬃcient esƟmates represent the expected change in probability for
an addiƟonal 10 points. Base category for household equivalised income is middle (3rd) quinƟle group. Base category for parental
educaƟon is achieving GCSEs or equivalents. Base category for family type is married or cohabiƟng couple. Base category for KS3
School Type is Community School. Sample: Wave 7 parƟcipants with valid responses for all variables used in models. Marginal eﬀect
for discrete variables is the change from base category.
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Table A.3: Models for university aƩendance, reporƟng marginal eﬀects at means -
Females
M1-Probit M2-Probit M3-Probit M4-Probit M8-LP (with FE) M5-Probit M6-Probit M7-Probit M9-LP (with FE)
1st quinƟle of household income (Low) -0.118 -0.054 -0.078 -0.082 -0.056 0.029 -0.027 -0.031 -0.019
(0.025) (0.028) (0.036) (0.035) (0.027) (0.025) (0.030) (0.030) (0.025)
2nd quinƟle of household income -0.095 -0.083 -0.081 -0.086 -0.073 -0.034 -0.052 -0.056 -0.041
(0.026) (0.028) (0.033) (0.033) (0.024) (0.023) (0.027) (0.028) (0.022)
4th quinƟle of household income 0.121 0.062 0.045 0.034 0.014 0.018 0.020 0.016 0.008
(0.026) (0.027) (0.029) (0.029) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023)
5th quinƟle of household income (High) 0.313 0.202 0.144 0.084 0.042 0.076 0.067 0.047 0.023
(0.027) (0.032) (0.035) (0.033) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.025)
KS2 Score -0.055 -0.015 0.009 -0.090 -0.066 -0.047 -0.050 -0.045
(0.042) (0.046) (0.051) (0.027) (0.045) (0.047) (0.049) (0.028)
KS2 Score Squared 0.017 0.014 0.012 0.016 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Capped GCSE Score (Low) 0.009 0.008 0.007 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001)
Capped GCSE Score (High) 0.066 0.065 0.067 0.057
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004)
Capped GCSE Score (High) Squared -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lone Parent Family -0.065 -0.068 -0.043 0.005 0.003 0.006
(0.027) (0.027) (0.020) (0.023) (0.023) (0.018)
Mother’s EducaƟon - No Quals -0.063 -0.058 -0.036 -0.044 -0.045 -0.029
(0.034) (0.034) (0.026) (0.030) (0.031) (0.023)
Mother’s EducaƟon - Below GCSEs -0.074 -0.075 -0.053 -0.077 -0.081 -0.048
(0.042) (0.041) (0.031) (0.035) (0.036) (0.028)
Mother’s EducaƟon - A Levels 0.025 0.025 0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.015
(0.029) (0.028) (0.026) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Mother’s EducaƟon - HE Below Degree 0.072 0.056 0.036 0.017 0.013 0.016
(0.032) (0.032) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.025)
Mother’s EducaƟon - Degree 0.079 0.062 0.032 0.003 -0.002 -0.000
(0.043) (0.041) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.029)
Father’s EducaƟon - No Quals -0.002 0.011 -0.002 0.026 0.031 0.022
(0.033) (0.033) (0.025) (0.027) (0.028) (0.023)
Father’s EducaƟon - Below GCSEs -0.009 -0.008 -0.006 0.004 0.005 0.004
(0.044) (0.044) (0.034) (0.035) (0.036) (0.030)
Father’s EducaƟon - A Levels -0.031 -0.029 -0.023 -0.022 -0.023 -0.017
(0.029) (0.030) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.023)
Father’s EducaƟon - HE Below Degree 0.057 0.051 0.040 0.032 0.031 0.017
(0.035) (0.034) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027)
Father’s EducaƟon - Degree 0.170 0.153 0.098 0.093 0.089 0.062
(0.040) (0.039) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.028)
KS3 School Type - CTC -0.108 -0.138
(0.134) (0.075)
KS3 School Type - FoundaƟon 0.006 -0.010
(0.030) (0.029)
KS3 School Type - Independent 0.488 0.192
(0.074) (0.056)
KS3 School Type - Voluntary Aided 0.069 0.019
(0.031) (0.028)
KS3 School Type - Voluntary Controlled 0.071 0.034
(0.057) (0.053)
Grammar School 0.207 0.052
(0.073) (0.065)
School has Sixth Form 0.054 0.038
(0.022) (0.020)
Region No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No
Ethnicity No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Month of Birth No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Sibling eﬀects No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
F Test . 167.699 18.579 15.485 21.510 173.221 25.854 21.337 50.766
Prob > F . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sub-sample size 4091 4091 4091 4091 4091 4091 4091 4091 4091
Notes: Stars indicate staƟsƟcal signiﬁcance:  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01. Marginal eﬀects esƟmated at sample means,
holding household equivalised income constant. Weighted using LSYPE Wave 7 respondent weights, which aƩempt to adjust for
oversampling and aƩriƟon. Standard errors (adjusted for school level clustering and straƟﬁcaƟon by deprivaƟon) reported in paren-
theses. Prior aƩainment variables are divided by 10, hence the coeﬃcient esƟmates represent the expected change in probability for
an addiƟonal 10 points. Base category for household equivalised income is middle (3rd) quinƟle group. Base category for parental
educaƟon is achieving GCSEs or equivalents. Base category for family type is married or cohabiƟng couple. Base category for KS3
School Type is Community School. Sample: Wave 7 parƟcipants with valid responses for all variables used in models. Marginal eﬀect
for discrete variables is the change from base category.
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Table A.4: Models for university applicaƟon, reporƟng marginal eﬀects at means
M1-Probit M2-Probit M3-Probit M4-Probit M8-LP (with FE) M5-Probit M6-Probit M7-Probit M9-LP (with FE)
1st quinƟle of household income (Low) -0.114 -0.044 -0.060 -0.060 -0.037 0.051 -0.009 -0.010 -0.005
(0.020) (0.022) (0.025) (0.025) (0.019) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.017)
2nd quinƟle of household income -0.075 -0.059 -0.048 -0.048 -0.045 -0.014 -0.023 -0.023 -0.024
(0.021) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.018) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.016)
4th quinƟle of household income 0.111 0.060 0.040 0.032 0.029 0.023 0.024 0.021 0.016
(0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.017) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.016)
5th quinƟle of household income (High) 0.315 0.237 0.176 0.125 0.080 0.133 0.117 0.102 0.052
(0.020) (0.022) (0.024) (0.025) (0.019) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.017)
KS2 Score -0.128 -0.103 -0.090 -0.051 -0.020 0.000 -0.000 -0.018
(0.031) (0.036) (0.037) (0.022) (0.036) (0.041) (0.042) (0.022)
KS2 Score Squared 0.022 0.020 0.019 0.013 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Capped GCSE Score (Low) 0.012 0.010 0.010 0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Capped GCSE Score (High) 0.043 0.042 0.042 0.063
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003)
Capped GCSE Score (High) Squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male -0.117 -0.125 -0.094 -0.033 -0.036 -0.028
(0.016) (0.015) (0.011) (0.016) (0.016) (0.010)
Lone Parent Family -0.072 -0.071 -0.057 -0.005 -0.007 -0.012
(0.022) (0.022) (0.015) (0.023) (0.023) (0.014)
Mother’s EducaƟon - No Quals -0.027 -0.019 -0.016 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001
(0.025) (0.025) (0.019) (0.026) (0.026) (0.017)
Mother’s EducaƟon - Below GCSEs -0.033 -0.031 -0.036 -0.019 -0.020 -0.017
(0.028) (0.029) (0.022) (0.030) (0.031) (0.020)
Mother’s EducaƟon - A Levels 0.027 0.013 -0.003 -0.003 -0.008 -0.009
(0.024) (0.024) (0.019) (0.025) (0.026) (0.017)
Mother’s EducaƟon - HE Below Degree 0.093 0.076 0.057 0.070 0.065 0.045
(0.025) (0.026) (0.019) (0.026) (0.026) (0.017)
Mother’s EducaƟon - Degree 0.102 0.084 0.044 0.027 0.022 0.016
(0.033) (0.034) (0.021) (0.034) (0.034) (0.019)
Father’s EducaƟon - No Quals -0.024 -0.017 -0.011 0.001 0.002 0.009
(0.025) (0.025) (0.019) (0.025) (0.025) (0.017)
Father’s EducaƟon - Below GCSEs -0.015 -0.010 -0.003 0.011 0.011 0.010
(0.031) (0.031) (0.025) (0.031) (0.031) (0.022)
Father’s EducaƟon - A Levels -0.008 -0.009 -0.001 -0.012 -0.015 -0.005
(0.022) (0.022) (0.018) (0.023) (0.023) (0.016)
Father’s EducaƟon - HE Below Degree 0.077 0.076 0.066 0.064 0.063 0.050
(0.026) (0.027) (0.021) (0.028) (0.028) (0.019)
Father’s EducaƟon - Degree 0.200 0.179 0.108 0.133 0.126 0.060
(0.031) (0.031) (0.020) (0.032) (0.033) (0.018)
KS3 School Type - CTC -0.051 -0.191
(0.108) (0.051)
KS3 School Type - FoundaƟon 0.014 -0.022
(0.026) (0.026)
KS3 School Type - Independent 0.489 0.176
(0.065) (0.049)
KS3 School Type - Voluntary Aided 0.095 0.023
(0.026) (0.030)
KS3 School Type - Voluntary Controlled 0.036 -0.009
(0.047) (0.042)
Grammar School 0.155 0.001
(0.049) (0.060)
School has Sixth Form 0.069 0.067
(0.017) (0.017)
Region No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No
Ethnicity No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Month of Birth No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Sibling eﬀects No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
F Test . 276.757 27.272 25.733 41.017 261.631 38.370 33.360 98.650
Prob > F . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sub-sample size 7939 7939 7939 7939 7939 7939 7939 7939 7939
Notes: Stars indicate staƟsƟcal signiﬁcance:  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01. Marginal eﬀects esƟmated at sample means,
holding household equivalised income constant. Weighted using LSYPE Wave 7 respondent weights, which aƩempt to adjust for
oversampling and aƩriƟon. Standard errors (adjusted for school level clustering and straƟﬁcaƟon by deprivaƟon) reported in paren-
theses. Prior aƩainment variables are divided by 10, hence the coeﬃcient esƟmates represent the expected change in probability for
an addiƟonal 10 points. Base category for household equivalised income is middle (3rd) quinƟle group. Base category for parental
educaƟon is achieving GCSEs or equivalents. Base category for family type is married or cohabiƟng couple. Base category for KS3
School Type is Community School. Base category for sex is female. Sample: Wave 7 parƟcipants with valid responses for all variables
used in models. Marginal eﬀect for discrete variables is the change from base category.
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Table A.5: Models for university applicaƟon, reporƟng marginal eﬀects at means - Males
M1-Probit M2-Probit M3-Probit M4-Probit M8-LP (with FE) M5-Probit M6-Probit M7-Probit M9-LP (with FE)
1st quinƟle of household income (Low) -0.091 -0.016 -0.008 -0.004 0.010 0.087 0.054 0.052 0.032
(0.027) (0.030) (0.034) (0.034) (0.028) (0.033) (0.036) (0.036) (0.026)
2nd quinƟle of household income -0.044 -0.026 -0.000 0.006 -0.007 0.027 0.031 0.033 0.006
(0.028) (0.029) (0.033) (0.034) (0.026) (0.029) (0.033) (0.033) (0.024)
4th quinƟle of household income 0.109 0.067 0.050 0.044 0.042 0.041 0.046 0.044 0.027
(0.028) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.026) (0.029) (0.032) (0.032) (0.023)
5th quinƟle of household income (High) 0.336 0.268 0.195 0.149 0.101 0.152 0.124 0.118 0.063
(0.028) (0.031) (0.035) (0.034) (0.027) (0.032) (0.035) (0.035) (0.025)
KS2 Score -0.134 -0.083 -0.056 -0.035 0.027 0.073 0.086 0.041
(0.044) (0.049) (0.050) (0.033) (0.051) (0.057) (0.057) (0.032)
KS2 Score Squared 0.022 0.018 0.015 0.011 -0.005 -0.008 -0.009 -0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Capped GCSE Score (Low) 0.013 0.011 0.010 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Capped GCSE Score (High) 0.034 0.038 0.038 0.061
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.004)
Capped GCSE Score (High) Squared 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Lone Parent Family -0.101 -0.101 -0.079 -0.044 -0.044 -0.047
(0.030) (0.031) (0.023) (0.031) (0.031) (0.021)
Mother’s EducaƟon - No Quals 0.004 0.014 0.002 0.048 0.044 0.024
(0.036) (0.036) (0.028) (0.037) (0.037) (0.026)
Mother’s EducaƟon - Below GCSEs 0.021 0.023 -0.005 0.068 0.067 0.027
(0.041) (0.041) (0.034) (0.042) (0.042) (0.031)
Mother’s EducaƟon - A Levels 0.058 0.034 0.012 0.030 0.023 0.013
(0.031) (0.031) (0.027) (0.035) (0.035) (0.025)
Mother’s EducaƟon - HE Below Degree 0.098 0.080 0.075 0.093 0.086 0.068
(0.035) (0.035) (0.029) (0.035) (0.035) (0.026)
Mother’s EducaƟon - Degree 0.116 0.097 0.054 0.052 0.046 0.030
(0.041) (0.042) (0.031) (0.044) (0.044) (0.028)
Father’s EducaƟon - No Quals -0.033 -0.032 -0.006 -0.014 -0.013 0.009
(0.034) (0.034) (0.028) (0.036) (0.036) (0.026)
Father’s EducaƟon - Below GCSEs -0.013 -0.003 0.001 0.024 0.027 0.022
(0.045) (0.045) (0.036) (0.044) (0.044) (0.033)
Father’s EducaƟon - A Levels -0.014 -0.018 0.018 -0.027 -0.031 0.002
(0.030) (0.030) (0.026) (0.030) (0.030) (0.023)
Father’s EducaƟon - HE Below Degree 0.101 0.102 0.092 0.104 0.102 0.080
(0.037) (0.038) (0.032) (0.039) (0.040) (0.029)
Father’s EducaƟon - Degree 0.233 0.215 0.164 0.147 0.143 0.104
(0.041) (0.041) (0.030) (0.043) (0.043) (0.027)
KS3 School Type - CTC 0.090 -0.160
(0.134) (0.138)
KS3 School Type - FoundaƟon -0.010 -0.059
(0.033) (0.030)
KS3 School Type - Independent 0.426 0.085
(0.082) (0.060)
KS3 School Type - Voluntary Aided 0.100 0.002
(0.037) (0.038)
KS3 School Type - Voluntary Controlled -0.003 -0.075
(0.058) (0.050)
Grammar School 0.190 0.050
(0.050) (0.061)
School has Sixth Form 0.078 0.084
(0.024) (0.023)
Region No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No
Ethnicity No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Month of Birth No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Sibling eﬀects No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
F Test . 125.976 14.171 14.824 18.068 124.877 19.550 16.965 41.087
Prob > F . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sub-sample size 3848 3848 3848 3848 3848 3848 3848 3848 3848
Notes: Stars indicate staƟsƟcal signiﬁcance:  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01. Marginal eﬀects esƟmated at sample means,
holding household equivalised income constant. Weighted using LSYPE Wave 7 respondent weights, which aƩempt to adjust for
oversampling and aƩriƟon. Standard errors (adjusted for school level clustering and straƟﬁcaƟon by deprivaƟon) reported in paren-
theses. Prior aƩainment variables are divided by 10, hence the coeﬃcient esƟmates represent the expected change in probability for
an addiƟonal 10 points. Base category for household equivalised income is middle (3rd) quinƟle group. Base category for parental
educaƟon is achieving GCSEs or equivalents. Base category for family type is married or cohabiƟng couple. Base category for KS3
School Type is Community School. Sample: Wave 7 parƟcipants with valid responses for all variables used in models. Marginal eﬀect
for discrete variables is the change from base category.
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Table A.6: Models for university applicaƟon, reporƟng marginal eﬀects at means -
Females
M1-Probit M2-Probit M3-Probit M4-Probit M8-LP (with FE) M5-Probit M6-Probit M7-Probit M9-LP (with FE)
1st quinƟle of household income (Low) -0.145 -0.080 -0.114 -0.113 -0.091 0.011 -0.073 -0.072 -0.043
(0.028) (0.030) (0.036) (0.035) (0.029) (0.033) (0.039) (0.039) (0.026)
2nd quinƟle of household income -0.113 -0.101 -0.098 -0.101 -0.091 -0.058 -0.086 -0.089 -0.058
(0.028) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.026) (0.032) (0.035) (0.035) (0.023)
4th quinƟle of household income 0.107 0.047 0.030 0.019 0.005 0.001 0.004 -0.002 -0.003
(0.027) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030) (0.025) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.023)
5th quinƟle of household income (High) 0.290 0.199 0.168 0.106 0.052 0.110 0.109 0.084 0.035
(0.027) (0.030) (0.037) (0.036) (0.027) (0.036) (0.039) (0.039) (0.025)
KS2 Score -0.137 -0.119 -0.120 -0.059 -0.070 -0.058 -0.071 -0.084
(0.042) (0.048) (0.049) (0.032) (0.052) (0.057) (0.057) (0.033)
KS2 Score Squared 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.014 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.006
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Capped GCSE Score (Low) 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.000
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Capped GCSE Score (High) 0.052 0.050 0.049 0.071
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004)
Capped GCSE Score (High) Squared 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lone Parent Family -0.049 -0.052 -0.045 0.029 0.024 0.005
(0.029) (0.028) (0.022) (0.031) (0.031) (0.020)
Mother’s EducaƟon - No Quals -0.055 -0.049 -0.020 -0.049 -0.047 -0.012
(0.035) (0.034) (0.028) (0.036) (0.036) (0.024)
Mother’s EducaƟon - Below GCSEs -0.080 -0.082 -0.061 -0.101 -0.104 -0.058
(0.038) (0.038) (0.033) (0.042) (0.042) (0.030)
Mother’s EducaƟon - A Levels 0.004 0.001 -0.006 -0.034 -0.036 -0.024
(0.033) (0.033) (0.027) (0.036) (0.036) (0.025)
Mother’s EducaƟon - HE Below Degree 0.093 0.078 0.057 0.051 0.048 0.037
(0.034) (0.034) (0.028) (0.037) (0.037) (0.025)
Mother’s EducaƟon - Degree 0.098 0.088 0.044 0.021 0.019 0.018
(0.048) (0.048) (0.030) (0.050) (0.051) (0.026)
Father’s EducaƟon - No Quals -0.013 -0.002 -0.020 0.016 0.018 0.010
(0.035) (0.035) (0.028) (0.035) (0.035) (0.025)
Father’s EducaƟon - Below GCSEs -0.020 -0.018 -0.018 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003
(0.044) (0.044) (0.036) (0.045) (0.046) (0.032)
Father’s EducaƟon - A Levels -0.005 -0.002 -0.026 0.006 0.003 -0.017
(0.033) (0.033) (0.027) (0.037) (0.037) (0.025)
Father’s EducaƟon - HE Below Degree 0.047 0.041 0.043 0.021 0.020 0.023
(0.038) (0.038) (0.029) (0.041) (0.041) (0.027)
Father’s EducaƟon - Degree 0.152 0.127 0.046 0.103 0.092 0.020
(0.044) (0.045) (0.030) (0.047) (0.048) (0.026)
KS3 School Type - CTC -0.157 -0.233
(0.198) (0.157)
KS3 School Type - FoundaƟon 0.040 0.018
(0.034) (0.039)
KS3 School Type - Independent 0.593 0.339
(0.081) (0.065)
KS3 School Type - Voluntary Aided 0.082 0.031
(0.035) (0.041)
KS3 School Type - Voluntary Controlled 0.089 0.072
(0.061) (0.061)
Grammar School 0.124 -0.092
(0.111) (0.132)
School has Sixth Form 0.067 0.062
(0.023) (0.026)
Region No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No
Ethnicity No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Month of Birth No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Sibling eﬀects No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
F Test . 141.563 15.185 14.806 21.796 135.105 20.761 19.032 52.397
Prob > F . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sub-sample size 4091 4091 4091 4091 4091 4091 4091 4091 4091
Notes: Stars indicate staƟsƟcal signiﬁcance:  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01. Marginal eﬀects esƟmated at sample means,
holding household equivalised income constant. Weighted using LSYPE Wave 7 respondent weights, which aƩempt to adjust for
oversampling and aƩriƟon. Standard errors (adjusted for school level clustering and straƟﬁcaƟon by deprivaƟon) reported in paren-
theses. Prior aƩainment variables are divided by 10, hence the coeﬃcient esƟmates represent the expected change in probability for
an addiƟonal 10 points. Base category for household equivalised income is middle (3rd) quinƟle group. Base category for parental
educaƟon is achieving GCSEs or equivalents. Base category for family type is married or cohabiƟng couple. Base category for KS3
School Type is Community School. Sample: Wave 7 parƟcipants with valid responses for all variables used in models. Marginal eﬀect
for discrete variables is the change from base category.
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Table A.7: Models for university aƩendance, condiƟonal on having applied, reporƟng
marginal eﬀects at means
M1-Probit M2-Probit M3-Probit M4-Probit M8-LP (with FE) M5-Probit M6-Probit M7-Probit M9-LP (with FE)
1st quinƟle of household income (Low) -0.052 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.015 0.052 0.032 0.029 0.026
(0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.033) (0.038) (0.038) (0.028)
2nd quinƟle of household income -0.042 -0.020 -0.015 -0.016 0.007 0.010 0.005 0.004 0.016
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.024)
4th quinƟle of household income 0.049 0.024 0.020 0.017 0.007 0.015 0.019 0.018 0.008
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.021)
5th quinƟle of household income (High) 0.124 0.080 0.052 0.037 0.024 0.062 0.050 0.047 0.022
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.021)
KS2 Score 0.029 0.050 0.070 0.144 -0.026 -0.003 0.010 -0.018
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.039) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.043)
KS2 Score Squared 0.004 0.003 0.001 -0.005 0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Capped GCSE Score (Low) 0.018 0.016 0.015 0.016
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004)
Capped GCSE Score (High) 0.049 0.048 0.049 0.054
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006)
Capped GCSE Score (High) Squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male -0.044 -0.049 -0.038 -0.012 -0.019 -0.003
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.020) (0.020) (0.015)
Lone Parent Family -0.031 -0.028 -0.031 -0.007 -0.005 -0.007
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.029) (0.029) (0.020)
Mother’s EducaƟon - No Quals -0.025 -0.021 -0.017 -0.033 -0.031 -0.014
(0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.037) (0.037) (0.027)
Mother’s EducaƟon - Below GCSEs -0.023 -0.021 -0.024 -0.012 -0.013 -0.006
(0.034) (0.033) (0.037) (0.047) (0.047) (0.036)
Mother’s EducaƟon - A Levels 0.017 0.012 0.006 0.019 0.015 0.006
(0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.029) (0.029) (0.022)
Mother’s EducaƟon - HE Below Degree 0.021 0.015 0.017 0.014 0.012 0.011
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.033) (0.033) (0.022)
Mother’s EducaƟon - Degree 0.020 0.012 0.006 0.000 -0.003 0.001
(0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.037) (0.037) (0.023)
Father’s EducaƟon - No Quals 0.027 0.029 0.036 0.046 0.046 0.041
(0.024) (0.024) (0.028) (0.034) (0.034) (0.027)
Father’s EducaƟon - Below GCSEs 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.018
(0.033) (0.033) (0.038) (0.046) (0.046) (0.037)
Father’s EducaƟon - A Levels -0.011 -0.013 -0.002 -0.026 -0.027 -0.006
(0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.031) (0.031) (0.023)
Father’s EducaƟon - HE Below Degree 0.043 0.042 0.034 0.069 0.066 0.036
(0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.035) (0.035) (0.024)
Father’s EducaƟon - Degree 0.102 0.098 0.090 0.097 0.096 0.066
(0.027) (0.027) (0.023) (0.038) (0.038) (0.023)
KS3 School Type - CTC -0.014 -0.085
(0.090) (0.129)
KS3 School Type - FoundaƟon -0.017 -0.034
(0.019) (0.028)
KS3 School Type - Independent 0.120 0.028
(0.040) (0.059)
KS3 School Type - Voluntary Aided 0.025 0.009
(0.021) (0.027)
KS3 School Type - Voluntary Controlled 0.059 0.049
(0.045) (0.062)
Grammar School 0.145 0.145
(0.040) (0.059)
School has Sixth Form -0.003 -0.005
(0.016) (0.022)
Region No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No
Ethnicity No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Month of Birth No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Sibling eﬀects No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
F Test . 75.598 7.946 6.939 8.011 87.876 13.256 11.353 15.817
Prob > F . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sub-sample size 4887 4887 4887 4887 4887 4887 4887 4887 4887
Notes: Stars indicate staƟsƟcal signiﬁcance:  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01. Marginal eﬀects esƟmated at sample means,
holding household equivalised income constant. Weighted using LSYPE Wave 7 respondent weights, which aƩempt to adjust for
oversampling and aƩriƟon. Standard errors (adjusted for school level clustering and straƟﬁcaƟon by deprivaƟon) reported in paren-
theses. Prior aƩainment variables are divided by 10, hence the coeﬃcient esƟmates represent the expected change in probability for
an addiƟonal 10 points. Base category for household equivalised income is middle (3rd) quinƟle group. Base category for parental
educaƟon is achieving GCSEs or equivalents. Base category for family type is married or cohabiƟng couple. Base category for KS3
School Type is Community School. Base category for sex is female. Sample: Wave 7 parƟcipants with valid responses for all variables
used in models. Marginal eﬀect for discrete variables is the change from base category.
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Table A.8: Models for university aƩendance, condiƟonal on having applied, reporƟng
marginal eﬀects at means - Male
M1-Probit M2-Probit M3-Probit M4-Probit M8-LP (with FE) M5-Probit M6-Probit M7-Probit M9-LP (with FE)
1st quinƟle of household income (Low) -0.081 -0.002 -0.003 0.001 0.010 0.057 0.044 0.047 0.041
(0.043) (0.041) (0.043) (0.042) (0.046) (0.053) (0.061) (0.060) (0.045)
2nd quinƟle of household income -0.059 -0.024 -0.018 -0.014 0.027 0.013 0.016 0.017 0.033
(0.040) (0.039) (0.038) (0.037) (0.043) (0.050) (0.052) (0.052) (0.040)
4th quinƟle of household income 0.026 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.018 -0.004 0.007 0.009 0.017
(0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.034)
5th quinƟle of household income (High) 0.126 0.083 0.061 0.056 0.052 0.072 0.066 0.078 0.041
(0.033) (0.035) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.050) (0.049) (0.049) (0.035)
KS2 Score 0.041 0.082 0.111 0.203 0.038 0.099 0.121 0.045
(0.055) (0.056) (0.056) (0.064) (0.089) (0.091) (0.092) (0.071)
KS2 Score Squared 0.004 0.002 -0.001 -0.008 -0.001 -0.006 -0.008 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005)
Capped GCSE Score (Low) 0.026 0.023 0.023 0.023
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.007)
Capped GCSE Score (High) 0.033 0.035 0.037 0.051
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010)
Capped GCSE Score (High) Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Lone Parent Family -0.027 -0.024 -0.047 -0.009 -0.010 -0.032
(0.033) (0.032) (0.037) (0.044) (0.043) (0.034)
Mother’s EducaƟon - No Quals -0.007 -0.004 -0.016 -0.012 -0.015 -0.004
(0.040) (0.040) (0.047) (0.052) (0.053) (0.044)
Mother’s EducaƟon - Below GCSEs -0.006 -0.004 0.013 0.056 0.051 0.067
(0.051) (0.050) (0.059) (0.068) (0.068) (0.057)
Mother’s EducaƟon - A Levels -0.005 -0.013 0.013 0.002 -0.003 0.039
(0.032) (0.032) (0.039) (0.044) (0.043) (0.038)
Mother’s EducaƟon - HE Below Degree 0.048 0.043 0.062 0.063 0.065 0.077
(0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.049) (0.049) (0.036)
Mother’s EducaƟon - Degree 0.025 0.020 0.021 0.015 0.012 0.028
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.055) (0.055) (0.039)
Father’s EducaƟon - No Quals 0.064 0.063 0.089 0.095 0.097 0.100
(0.039) (0.039) (0.045) (0.054) (0.054) (0.044)
Father’s EducaƟon - Below GCSEs 0.065 0.070 0.037 0.090 0.095 0.056
(0.055) (0.054) (0.064) (0.072) (0.072) (0.060)
Father’s EducaƟon - A Levels 0.041 0.037 0.018 0.030 0.028 -0.002
(0.033) (0.033) (0.039) (0.045) (0.045) (0.038)
Father’s EducaƟon - HE Below Degree 0.068 0.069 0.052 0.107 0.104 0.058
(0.039) (0.038) (0.041) (0.051) (0.052) (0.039)
Father’s EducaƟon - Degree 0.127 0.126 0.092 0.117 0.120 0.069
(0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.056) (0.055) (0.039)
KS3 School Type - CTC -0.014 -0.109
(0.084) (0.143)
KS3 School Type - FoundaƟon 0.011 -0.009
(0.030) (0.042)
KS3 School Type - Independent 0.067 -0.060
(0.062) (0.085)
KS3 School Type - Voluntary Aided 0.041 0.011
(0.030) (0.042)
KS3 School Type - Voluntary Controlled 0.107 0.086
(0.063) (0.083)
Grammar School 0.139 0.149
(0.050) (0.073)
School has Sixth Form -0.021 -0.024
(0.024) (0.032)
Region No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No
Ethnicity No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Month of Birth No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Sibling eﬀects No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
F Test . 43.081 3.995 4.088 3.852 38.867 6.164 5.628 8.051
Prob > F . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sub-sample size 2218 2218 2218 2218 2218 2218 2218 2218 2218
Notes: Stars indicate staƟsƟcal signiﬁcance:  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01. Marginal eﬀects esƟmated at sample means,
holding household equivalised income constant. Weighted using LSYPE Wave 7 respondent weights, which aƩempt to adjust for
oversampling and aƩriƟon. Standard errors (adjusted for school level clustering and straƟﬁcaƟon by deprivaƟon) reported in paren-
theses. Prior aƩainment variables are divided by 10, hence the coeﬃcient esƟmates represent the expected change in probability for
an addiƟonal 10 points. Base category for household equivalised income is middle (3rd) quinƟle group. Base category for parental
educaƟon is achieving GCSEs or equivalents. Base category for family type is married or cohabiƟng couple. Base category for KS3
School Type is Community School. Sample: Wave 7 parƟcipants with valid responses for all variables used in models. Marginal eﬀect
for discrete variables is the change from base category.
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Table A.9: Models for university aƩendance, condiƟonal on having applied, reporƟng
marginal eﬀects at means - Female
M1-Probit M2-Probit M3-Probit M4-Probit M8-LP (with FE) M5-Probit M6-Probit M7-Probit M9-LP (with FE)
1st quinƟle of household income (Low) -0.030 0.014 0.017 0.010 0.019 0.050 0.036 0.028 0.025
(0.034) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.039) (0.041) (0.049) (0.049) (0.037)
2nd quinƟle of household income -0.028 -0.016 -0.006 -0.009 0.001 0.008 0.004 -0.000 0.012
(0.036) (0.034) (0.031) (0.031) (0.035) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.034)
4th quinƟle of household income 0.067 0.043 0.036 0.029 0.022 0.030 0.035 0.029 0.018
(0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027) (0.031) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.030)
5th quinƟle of household income (High) 0.122 0.078 0.050 0.027 0.011 0.053 0.047 0.031 0.009
(0.027) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.031) (0.041) (0.045) (0.043) (0.030)
KS2 Score 0.026 0.041 0.057 0.106 -0.048 -0.050 -0.041 -0.056
(0.044) (0.045) (0.046) (0.057) (0.079) (0.080) (0.081) (0.062)
KS2 Score Squared 0.004 0.003 0.001 -0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Capped GCSE Score (Low) 0.011 0.012 0.010 0.011
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.006)
Capped GCSE Score (High) 0.059 0.059 0.060 0.059
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008)
Capped GCSE Score (High) Squared -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lone Parent Family -0.043 -0.042 -0.039 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015
(0.026) (0.025) (0.028) (0.038) (0.038) (0.026)
Mother’s EducaƟon - No Quals -0.041 -0.039 -0.031 -0.058 -0.057 -0.036
(0.034) (0.034) (0.041) (0.051) (0.051) (0.039)
Mother’s EducaƟon - Below GCSEs -0.020 -0.021 -0.011 -0.048 -0.049 -0.023
(0.043) (0.043) (0.053) (0.064) (0.064) (0.052)
Mother’s EducaƟon - A Levels 0.035 0.035 0.019 0.032 0.032 0.001
(0.030) (0.029) (0.032) (0.042) (0.042) (0.030)
Mother’s EducaƟon - HE Below Degree 0.010 0.004 -0.002 -0.016 -0.019 -0.019
(0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.044) (0.044) (0.030)
Mother’s EducaƟon - Degree 0.021 0.011 -0.004 -0.004 -0.010 -0.017
(0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.053) (0.051) (0.034)
Father’s EducaƟon - No Quals -0.002 0.005 0.010 0.003 0.007 0.022
(0.033) (0.033) (0.040) (0.049) (0.048) (0.039)
Father’s EducaƟon - Below GCSEs -0.009 -0.008 0.007 -0.029 -0.027 -0.002
(0.041) (0.041) (0.055) (0.062) (0.061) (0.052)
Father’s EducaƟon - A Levels -0.053 -0.050 -0.023 -0.074 -0.072 -0.020
(0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.047) (0.047) (0.032)
Father’s EducaƟon - HE Below Degree 0.022 0.017 -0.010 0.037 0.033 -0.005
(0.034) (0.033) (0.036) (0.049) (0.048) (0.035)
Father’s EducaƟon - Degree 0.081 0.074 0.070 0.075 0.072 0.050
(0.036) (0.036) (0.033) (0.054) (0.053) (0.032)
KS3 School Type - CTC -0.007 -0.051
(0.115) (0.153)
KS3 School Type - FoundaƟon -0.034 -0.047
(0.024) (0.038)
KS3 School Type - Independent 0.165 0.119
(0.050) (0.074)
KS3 School Type - Voluntary Aided 0.013 0.005
(0.025) (0.036)
KS3 School Type - Voluntary Controlled 0.020 0.016
(0.048) (0.075)
Grammar School 0.150 0.141
(0.056) (0.081)
School has Sixth Form 0.005 0.003
(0.020) (0.030)
Region No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No
Ethnicity No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Month of Birth No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Sibling eﬀects No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
F Test . 36.353 4.343 3.771 3.947 50.524 7.808 6.498 7.875
Prob > F . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sub-sample size 2669 2669 2669 2669 2669 2669 2669 2669 2669
Notes: Stars indicate staƟsƟcal signiﬁcance:  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01. Marginal eﬀects esƟmated at sample means,
holding household equivalised income constant. Weighted using LSYPE Wave 7 respondent weights, which aƩempt to adjust for
oversampling and aƩriƟon. Standard errors (adjusted for school level clustering and straƟﬁcaƟon by deprivaƟon) reported in paren-
theses. Prior aƩainment variables are divided by 10, hence the coeﬃcient esƟmates represent the expected change in probability for
an addiƟonal 10 points. Base category for household equivalised income is middle (3rd) quinƟle group. Base category for parental
educaƟon is achieving GCSEs or equivalents. Base category for family type is married or cohabiƟng couple. Base category for KS3
School Type is Community School. Sample: Wave 7 parƟcipants with valid responses for all variables used in models. Marginal eﬀect
for discrete variables is the change from base category.
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A.1 Models for access to Russell Group universiƟes
Table A.10: Models for Russell Group aƩendance, reporƟng marginal eﬀects at means
M1-Probit M2-Probit M3-Probit M4-Probit M8-LP (with FE) M5-Probit M6-Probit M7-Probit M9-LP (with FE)
1st quinƟle of household income (Low) -0.102 -0.033 -0.043 -0.044 -0.015 0.049 0.007 0.005 0.008
(0.017) (0.019) (0.023) (0.023) (0.017) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.016)
2nd quinƟle of household income -0.071 -0.055 -0.047 -0.049 -0.038 -0.011 -0.018 -0.019 -0.016
(0.019) (0.020) (0.022) (0.023) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.014)
4th quinƟle of household income 0.109 0.057 0.036 0.028 0.020 0.019 0.019 0.017 0.008
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015)
5th quinƟle of household income (High) 0.326 0.230 0.158 0.109 0.073 0.094 0.080 0.071 0.045
(0.020) (0.022) (0.024) (0.026) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.017)
KS2 Score -0.059 -0.014 0.016 -0.095 -0.033 -0.002 0.005 -0.004
(0.030) (0.033) (0.035) (0.018) (0.035) (0.037) (0.037) (0.018)
KS2 Score Squared 0.017 0.014 0.011 0.016 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Capped GCSE Score (Low) 0.011 0.010 0.009 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001)
Capped GCSE Score (High) 0.057 0.055 0.056 0.050
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Capped GCSE Score (High) Squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male -0.109 -0.118 -0.086 -0.022 -0.026 -0.021
(0.014) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010)
Lone Parent Family -0.070 -0.069 -0.045 -0.011 -0.011 -0.003
(0.020) (0.020) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.012)
Mother’s EducaƟon - No Quals -0.034 -0.026 -0.007 -0.010 -0.010 0.005
(0.023) (0.023) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.015)
Mother’s EducaƟon - Below GCSEs -0.041 -0.039 -0.031 -0.021 -0.022 -0.013
(0.030) (0.030) (0.020) (0.026) (0.026) (0.018)
Mother’s EducaƟon - A Levels 0.026 0.015 -0.002 0.003 0.001 -0.007
(0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
Mother’s EducaƟon - HE Below Degree 0.075 0.062 0.051 0.043 0.041 0.039
(0.022) (0.023) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.017)
Mother’s EducaƟon - Degree 0.075 0.058 0.033 0.007 0.005 0.001
(0.028) (0.028) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.020)
Father’s EducaƟon - No Quals 0.005 0.012 0.017 0.029 0.030 0.032
(0.024) (0.023) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.015)
Father’s EducaƟon - Below GCSEs 0.002 0.007 0.009 0.025 0.026 0.020
(0.031) (0.031) (0.022) (0.026) (0.026) (0.020)
Father’s EducaƟon - A Levels -0.006 -0.007 -0.001 -0.010 -0.011 -0.006
(0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015)
Father’s EducaƟon - HE Below Degree 0.083 0.082 0.070 0.061 0.059 0.053
(0.024) (0.024) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018)
Father’s EducaƟon - Degree 0.200 0.187 0.150 0.113 0.110 0.096
(0.026) (0.026) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.019)
KS3 School Type - CTC -0.032 -0.123
(0.069) (0.035)
KS3 School Type - FoundaƟon 0.005 -0.020
(0.021) (0.018)
KS3 School Type - Independent 0.380 0.082
(0.043) (0.036)
KS3 School Type - Voluntary Aided 0.081 0.016
(0.023) (0.020)
KS3 School Type - Voluntary Controlled 0.062 0.019
(0.042) (0.034)
Grammar School 0.197 0.073
(0.043) (0.042)
School has Sixth Form 0.045 0.034
(0.016) (0.014)
Region No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No
Ethnicity No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Month of Birth No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Sibling eﬀects No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
F Test . 318.497 34.675 30.591 45.718 323.044 42.302 36.731 105.037
Prob > F . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sub-sample size 7939 7939 7939 7939 7939 7939 7939 7939 7939
Notes: Stars indicate staƟsƟcal signiﬁcance:  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01. Marginal eﬀects esƟmated at sample means,
holding household equivalised income constant. Weighted using LSYPE Wave 7 respondent weights, which aƩempt to adjust for
oversampling and aƩriƟon. Standard errors (adjusted for school level clustering and straƟﬁcaƟon by deprivaƟon) reported in paren-
theses. Prior aƩainment variables are divided by 10, hence the coeﬃcient esƟmates represent the expected change in probability for
an addiƟonal 10 points. Base category for household equivalised income is middle (3rd) quinƟle group. Base category for parental
educaƟon is achieving GCSEs or equivalents. Base category for family type is married or cohabiƟng couple. Base category for KS3
School Type is Community School. Base category for sex is female. Sample: Wave 7 parƟcipants with valid responses for all variables
used in models. Marginal eﬀect for discrete variables is the change from base category.
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Table A.11: Models for Russell Group aƩendance, condiƟonal on university aƩendance,
reporƟng marginal eﬀects at means
M1-Probit M2-Probit M3-Probit M4-Probit M8-LP (with FE) M5-Probit M6-Probit M7-Probit M9-LP (with FE)
1st quinƟle of household income (Low) -0.052 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.015 0.052 0.032 0.029 0.026
(0.027) (0.025) (0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.033) (0.038) (0.038) (0.028)
2nd quinƟle of household income -0.042 -0.020 -0.015 -0.016 0.007 0.010 0.005 0.004 0.016
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.024)
4th quinƟle of household income 0.049 0.024 0.020 0.017 0.007 0.015 0.019 0.018 0.008
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.021)
5th quinƟle of household income (High) 0.124 0.080 0.052 0.037 0.024 0.062 0.050 0.047 0.022
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.021)
KS2 Score 0.029 0.050 0.070 0.144 -0.026 -0.003 0.010 -0.018
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.039) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.043)
KS2 Score Squared 0.004 0.003 0.001 -0.005 0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Capped GCSE Score (Low) 0.018 0.016 0.015 0.016
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004)
Capped GCSE Score (High) 0.049 0.048 0.049 0.054
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006)
Capped GCSE Score (High) Squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male -0.044 -0.049 -0.038 -0.012 -0.019 -0.003
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.020) (0.020) (0.015)
Lone Parent Family -0.031 -0.028 -0.031 -0.007 -0.005 -0.007
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.029) (0.029) (0.020)
Mother’s EducaƟon - No Quals -0.025 -0.021 -0.017 -0.033 -0.031 -0.014
(0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.037) (0.037) (0.027)
Mother’s EducaƟon - Below GCSEs -0.023 -0.021 -0.024 -0.012 -0.013 -0.006
(0.034) (0.033) (0.037) (0.047) (0.047) (0.036)
Mother’s EducaƟon - A Levels 0.017 0.012 0.006 0.019 0.015 0.006
(0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.029) (0.029) (0.022)
Mother’s EducaƟon - HE Below Degree 0.021 0.015 0.017 0.014 0.012 0.011
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.033) (0.033) (0.022)
Mother’s EducaƟon - Degree 0.020 0.012 0.006 0.000 -0.003 0.001
(0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.037) (0.037) (0.023)
Father’s EducaƟon - No Quals 0.027 0.029 0.036 0.046 0.046 0.041
(0.024) (0.024) (0.028) (0.034) (0.034) (0.027)
Father’s EducaƟon - Below GCSEs 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.018
(0.033) (0.033) (0.038) (0.046) (0.046) (0.037)
Father’s EducaƟon - A Levels -0.011 -0.013 -0.002 -0.026 -0.027 -0.006
(0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.031) (0.031) (0.023)
Father’s EducaƟon - HE Below Degree 0.043 0.042 0.034 0.069 0.066 0.036
(0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.035) (0.035) (0.024)
Father’s EducaƟon - Degree 0.102 0.098 0.090 0.097 0.096 0.066
(0.027) (0.027) (0.023) (0.038) (0.038) (0.023)
KS3 School Type - CTC -0.014 -0.085
(0.090) (0.129)
KS3 School Type - FoundaƟon -0.017 -0.034
(0.019) (0.028)
KS3 School Type - Independent 0.120 0.028
(0.040) (0.059)
KS3 School Type - Voluntary Aided 0.025 0.009
(0.021) (0.027)
KS3 School Type - Voluntary Controlled 0.059 0.049
(0.045) (0.062)
Grammar School 0.145 0.145
(0.040) (0.059)
School has Sixth Form -0.003 -0.005
(0.016) (0.022)
Region No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No
Ethnicity No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Month of Birth No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Sibling eﬀects No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
F Test . 75.598 7.946 6.939 8.011 87.876 13.256 11.353 15.817
Prob > F . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sub-sample size 4887 4887 4887 4887 4887 4887 4887 4887 4887
Notes: Stars indicate staƟsƟcal signiﬁcance:  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01. Marginal eﬀects esƟmated at sample means,
holding household equivalised income constant. Weighted using LSYPE Wave 7 respondent weights, which aƩempt to adjust for
oversampling and aƩriƟon. Standard errors (adjusted for school level clustering and straƟﬁcaƟon by deprivaƟon) reported in paren-
theses. Prior aƩainment variables are divided by 10, hence the coeﬃcient esƟmates represent the expected change in probability for
an addiƟonal 10 points. Base category for household equivalised income is middle (3rd) quinƟle group. Base category for parental
educaƟon is achieving GCSEs or equivalents. Base category for family type is married or cohabiƟng couple. Base category for KS3
School Type is Community School. Base category for sex is female. Sample: Wave 7 parƟcipants with valid responses for all variables
used in models. Marginal eﬀect for discrete variables is the change from base category.
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Appendix B
MulƟple regression models for Chapter 3
- full regression tables and
supplementary models
B.1 Full regression tables
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Table B.1: EsƟmated eﬀects on risk of transiƟon from reporƟng being ‘likely to apply’ to
university to reporƟng being ‘unlikely to apply’ to university: hazard raƟos
M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 M4C M5 M5C
Age 16 0.89 0.90 0.91 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.95
( 0.04)** ( 0.04)** ( 0.04)** ( 0.04) ( 0.04) ( 0.04) ( 0.04) ( 0.04)
Age 17 0.74 0.77 0.85 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.97 0.97
( 0.03)*** ( 0.03)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)* ( 0.05)* ( 0.05)* ( 0.05) ( 0.05)
SES Q1 (Low) 1.46 1.54 1.13 1.10 1.14
( 0.09)*** ( 0.10)*** ( 0.08)* ( 0.07) ( 0.08)**
SES Q2 1.40 1.31 1.17 1.16 1.16
( 0.08)*** ( 0.08)*** ( 0.07)** ( 0.07)** ( 0.07)**
SES Q4 0.75 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80
( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)***
SES Q5 (High) 0.33 0.39 0.47 0.47 0.49
( 0.03)*** ( 0.03)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)***
SES Z-Score 0.71 0.72
( 0.02)*** ( 0.02)***
Male 1.49 1.53 1.49 1.50 1.50 1.51
( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)***
Ethnicity: Mixed 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.62 0.61 0.60
( 0.06)*** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.06)*** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.06)***
Ethnicity: Indian 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.16
( 0.02)*** ( 0.02)*** ( 0.02)*** ( 0.02)*** ( 0.02)*** ( 0.02)***
Ethnicity: Pakistani 0.27 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.22
( 0.03)*** ( 0.03)*** ( 0.03)*** ( 0.03)*** ( 0.03)*** ( 0.03)***
Ethnicity: Bangladeshi 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.25 0.27 0.25
( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.04)***
Ethnicity: Black Caribbean 0.37 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.27
( 0.05)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)***
Ethnicity: Black African 0.20 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
( 0.04)*** ( 0.03)*** ( 0.03)*** ( 0.03)*** ( 0.03)*** ( 0.03)***
Ethnicity: Other 0.27 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.23
( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)***
AƩended Independent School 0.30 0.27 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.30
( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)***
AƩended Grammar School 0.23 0.37 0.38 0.37 0.39 0.38
( 0.05)*** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)***
AƩended School with Sixth Form 0.84 0.86 0.86 0.87 0.86 0.86
( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)***
Experienced workless household 0.97 0.88 0.83 0.76 0.85 0.78
( 0.06) ( 0.06)** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)***
Ever experienced family separaƟon 0.96 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.95
( 0.07) ( 0.07) ( 0.07) ( 0.07) ( 0.07) ( 0.07)
Local Youth Unemployment Rate / 10 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.95
( 0.04) ( 0.04) ( 0.04) ( 0.04) ( 0.04) ( 0.04)
KS2 Z-Score 0.56 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.61
( 0.01)*** ( 0.02)*** ( 0.02)*** ( 0.02)*** ( 0.02)***
KS4 Z-Score (AŌer results) 0.67 0.67 0.50 0.60
( 0.03)*** ( 0.03)*** ( 0.06)*** ( 0.03)***
KS4 Z-Score * SES Q1 1.62
( 0.25)***
KS4 Z-Score * SES Q2 1.47
( 0.22)**
KS4 Z-Score * SES Q4 1.19
( 0.18)
KS4 Z-Score * SES Q5 0.96
( 0.21)
KS4 Z-Score * SES Z-Score 0.79
( 0.05)***
Geographical p p p p p p
Number and order of siblings p p p p p p
Months of birth and interview p p p p p p p p
F test of diﬀerence from previous model . 113.10 25.82 248.18 63.78 101.97 3.77 16.26
p-value of above test staƟsƟc . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number of individuals 9,247 9,247 9,247 9,247 9,247 9,247 9,247 9,247
Notes: ReporƟng hazard raƟos. Standard errors (clustered by individual’s school) in parentheses. Weighted using Wave 2 survey
design and non-response weights. Stars indicate staƟsƟcal signiﬁcance:  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01. EsƟmated risks
are relaƟve to the following base categories: Age 15, SES quinƟle group 3, aƩended a non-selecƟve state school, white, and female.
Tests of model ﬁt are relaƟve to the model one column to the leŌ, with the following excepƟons: M4C is relaƟve toM3, M5 is relaƟve
to M4, and M5C is relaƟve to M4C.
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Table B.2: EsƟmated eﬀects on risk of transiƟon from reporƟng being ‘unlikely to apply’
to university to reporƟng being ‘likely to apply’ to university: hazard raƟos
M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 M4C M5 M5C
Age 16 0.88 0.88 0.90 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
( 0.05)** ( 0.05)** ( 0.05)* ( 0.05)* ( 0.05)* ( 0.05)* ( 0.05)* ( 0.05)*
Age 17 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.76 0.76 0.75 0.74
( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)***
SES Q1 (Low) 0.76 0.70 0.79 0.81 0.79
( 0.06)*** ( 0.06)*** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)** ( 0.07)***
SES Q2 0.89 0.88 0.91 0.91 0.91
( 0.06)* ( 0.06)* ( 0.06) ( 0.06) ( 0.06)
SES Q4 1.29 1.25 1.16 1.15 1.13
( 0.10)*** ( 0.09)*** ( 0.08)** ( 0.08)* ( 0.08)*
SES Q5 (High) 1.94 1.92 1.71 1.67 1.68
( 0.17)*** ( 0.16)*** ( 0.15)*** ( 0.14)*** ( 0.14)***
SES Z-Score 1.28 1.29
( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)***
Male 0.60 0.60 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62
( 0.03)*** ( 0.03)*** ( 0.03)*** ( 0.03)*** ( 0.03)*** ( 0.03)***
Ethnicity: Mixed 1.50 1.55 1.56 1.54 1.58 1.55
( 0.19)*** ( 0.20)*** ( 0.20)*** ( 0.20)*** ( 0.20)*** ( 0.20)***
Ethnicity: Indian 2.85 3.33 3.23 3.27 3.24 3.27
( 0.48)*** ( 0.51)*** ( 0.50)*** ( 0.51)*** ( 0.51)*** ( 0.50)***
Ethnicity: Pakistani 3.62 4.27 4.17 4.35 4.18 4.31
( 0.44)*** ( 0.58)*** ( 0.55)*** ( 0.58)*** ( 0.55)*** ( 0.57)***
Ethnicity: Bangladeshi 4.69 5.26 4.92 5.16 4.96 5.17
( 0.61)*** ( 0.70)*** ( 0.65)*** ( 0.67)*** ( 0.66)*** ( 0.67)***
Ethnicity: Black Caribbean 2.77 3.21 3.15 3.08 3.20 3.10
( 0.43)*** ( 0.47)*** ( 0.45)*** ( 0.45)*** ( 0.46)*** ( 0.45)***
Ethnicity: Black African 4.87 6.40 6.08 6.15 6.11 6.11
( 1.01)*** ( 1.35)*** ( 1.27)*** ( 1.35)*** ( 1.28)*** ( 1.33)***
Ethnicity: Other 3.15 3.56 3.53 3.64 3.53 3.62
( 0.49)*** ( 0.62)*** ( 0.59)*** ( 0.59)*** ( 0.60)*** ( 0.59)***
AƩended Independent School 1.29 1.37 1.33 1.34 1.32 1.32
( 0.39) ( 0.36) ( 0.33) ( 0.34) ( 0.33) ( 0.33)
AƩended Grammar School 1.77 1.05 0.99 0.96 0.96 0.94
( 0.34)*** ( 0.22) ( 0.20) ( 0.20) ( 0.20) ( 0.19)
AƩended School with Sixth Form 1.07 1.04 1.04 1.03 1.04 1.03
( 0.06) ( 0.05) ( 0.05) ( 0.05) ( 0.05) ( 0.05)
Experienced workless household 0.99 1.03 1.07 1.09 1.07 1.08
( 0.07) ( 0.07) ( 0.08) ( 0.07) ( 0.08) ( 0.07)
Ever experienced family separaƟon 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.10 1.10
( 0.09) ( 0.09) ( 0.09) ( 0.09) ( 0.09) ( 0.09)
Local Youth Unemployment Rate / 10 1.06 1.03 1.04 1.03 1.04 1.03
( 0.06) ( 0.06) ( 0.05) ( 0.05) ( 0.05) ( 0.05)
KS2 Z-Score 1.55 1.45 1.45 1.45 1.45
( 0.05)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)***
KS4 Z-Score (AŌer results) 1.73 1.74 1.90 1.88
( 0.11)*** ( 0.12)*** ( 0.31)*** ( 0.14)***
KS4 Z-Score * SES Q1 0.80
( 0.14)
KS4 Z-Score * SES Q2 0.91
( 0.19)
KS4 Z-Score * SES Q4 1.43
( 0.36)
KS4 Z-Score * SES Q5 0.67
( 0.16)*
KS4 Z-Score * SES Z-Score 1.18
( 0.09)**
Geographical p p p p p p
Number and order of siblings p p p p p p
Months of birth and interview p p p p p p p p
F test of diﬀerence from previous model . 34.70 14.62 110.58 69.98 68.80 2.50 4.54
p-value of above test staƟsƟc . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.03
Number of individuals 5,330 5,330 5,330 5,330 5,330 5,330 5,330 5,330
Notes: ReporƟng hazard raƟos. Standard errors (clustered by individual’s school) in parentheses. Weighted using Wave 2 survey
design and non-response weights. Stars indicate staƟsƟcal signiﬁcance:  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01. EsƟmated risks
are relaƟve to the following base categories: Age 15, SES quinƟle group 3, aƩended a non-selecƟve state school, white, and female.
Tests of model ﬁt are relaƟve to the model one column to the leŌ, with the following excepƟons: M4C is relaƟve toM3, M5 is relaƟve
to M4, and M5C is relaƟve to M4C.
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B.2 WeighƟng data using ﬁnal wave aƩriƟon weights
One of the advantages of duraƟon modelling is that we can treat missing outcome data
at ‘censored’, rather than having top drop the respondent from our analysis. However,
doing so will only result in unbiased esƟmates under the assumpƟon that missing data
censoring is ‘uninformaƟve’ (Clark et al., 2003, p.236). In this appendix, I repeat my anal-
ysis, restricƟng the sample only to those sƟll parƟcipaƟng in the survey at Wave 4 (when
the response rate relaƟve to Wave 1 has fallen to 73% (Collingwood et al., 2010, p.52)),
and weighƟng the analysis the LSYPE-provided aƩriƟon and non-response weights for
Wave 4.
In other respects, the regression setup remains the same as for the analysis in the main
body of the paper. I report the results from these analyses in Tables B.3 and B.4. Reas-
suringly, I do not ﬁnd any qualitaƟve diﬀerences from the results presented in Chapter
3.
B.3 MulƟple regressionmodels accounƟng for unobserved
heterogeneity
Unobserved heterogeneity is a problem in many staƟsƟcal analyses. However, it has the
potenƟal to cause parƟcular bias in the case of duraƟon analysis, including “downward
bias in the Ɵme eﬀects [and, as a result,] spurious eﬀects of Ɵme-varying covariates”
(Vermunt, 2001, p.1). These are caused by changes in the composiƟon of the sample
we are analysing at each Ɵme point: individuals who are sƟll at risk at later Ɵme points
are less likely to switch to reporƟng being ‘unlikely to apply’ partly because the most
likely to switch have already done so. Obviously, some of the characterisƟcs in the model
will control for observable changes in composiƟon, but not all of such changes will be
observable. In addiƟon, aƩempƟng to account for unobserved heterogeneity also helps
to account for the shared covariance of using mulƟple spells from the same individual
(Steele, 2005, p.16-19).
Many duraƟon models aƩempt to control for unobserved heterogeneity between indi-
viduals.¹ A popular method to account for unobserved heterogeneity is by introducing
¹These are oŌen referred to as ‘frailty’ models, since, in epidemiological applicaƟons, the unobserved
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Table B.3: EsƟmated eﬀects on risk of transiƟon from reporƟng being ‘likely to apply’ to
university to reporƟng being ‘unlikely to apply’ to university: hazard raƟos (Wave 4
weights applied, excludes individuals not in sample at age 17)
M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 M4C M5 M5C
Age 16 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
( 0.04)** ( 0.04)** ( 0.04)* ( 0.05) ( 0.05) ( 0.05) ( 0.05) ( 0.05)
Age 17 0.80 0.84 0.93 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.07 1.08
( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.04) ( 0.05) ( 0.05) ( 0.05) ( 0.05) ( 0.06)
SES Q1 (Low) 1.51 1.57 1.15 1.12 1.14
( 0.09)*** ( 0.11)*** ( 0.08)** ( 0.08)* ( 0.08)*
SES Q2 1.43 1.32 1.17 1.15 1.15
( 0.09)*** ( 0.08)*** ( 0.07)** ( 0.07)** ( 0.07)**
SES Q4 0.74 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.78
( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)***
SES Q5 (High) 0.33 0.39 0.47 0.47 0.48
( 0.03)*** ( 0.03)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)***
SES Z-Score 0.72 0.72
( 0.02)*** ( 0.02)***
Male 1.46 1.49 1.47 1.47 1.47 1.48
( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)***
Ethnicity: Mixed 0.65 0.63 0.61 0.62 0.60 0.59
( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)***
Ethnicity: Indian 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.16
( 0.02)*** ( 0.02)*** ( 0.02)*** ( 0.02)*** ( 0.02)*** ( 0.02)***
Ethnicity: Pakistani 0.26 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.20
( 0.03)*** ( 0.03)*** ( 0.03)*** ( 0.02)*** ( 0.03)*** ( 0.02)***
Ethnicity: Bangladeshi 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.27 0.25
( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)***
Ethnicity: Black Caribbean 0.37 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.27
( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)***
Ethnicity: Black African 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.15
( 0.03)*** ( 0.03)*** ( 0.03)*** ( 0.03)*** ( 0.03)*** ( 0.03)***
Ethnicity: Other 0.27 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.23
( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)***
AƩended Independent School 0.27 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.28
( 0.06)*** ( 0.06)*** ( 0.06)*** ( 0.06)*** ( 0.06)*** ( 0.06)***
AƩended Grammar School 0.24 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.40
( 0.05)*** ( 0.08)*** ( 0.08)*** ( 0.08)*** ( 0.08)*** ( 0.08)***
AƩended School with Sixth Form 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85
( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)***
Experienced workless household 1.02 0.95 0.89 0.82 0.91 0.85
( 0.06) ( 0.06) ( 0.06)* ( 0.06)*** ( 0.06) ( 0.06)**
Ever experienced family separaƟon 0.98 0.97 0.93 0.93 0.95 0.95
( 0.07) ( 0.07) ( 0.07) ( 0.07) ( 0.07) ( 0.07)
Local Youth Unemployment Rate / 10 0.95 0.93 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.93
( 0.04) ( 0.04) ( 0.04) ( 0.04) ( 0.04) ( 0.04)
KS2 Z-Score 0.56 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.61
( 0.01)*** ( 0.02)*** ( 0.02)*** ( 0.02)*** ( 0.02)***
KS4 Z-Score (AŌer results) 0.61 0.62 0.44 0.56
( 0.03)*** ( 0.03)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.03)***
KS4 Z-Score * SES Q1 1.56
( 0.22)***
KS4 Z-Score * SES Q2 1.60
( 0.23)***
KS4 Z-Score * SES Q4 1.27
( 0.19)
KS4 Z-Score * SES Q5 1.06
( 0.22)
KS4 Z-Score * SES Z-Score 0.82
( 0.05)***
Geographical p p p p p p
Number and order of siblings p p p p p p
Months of birth and interview p p p p p p p p
F test of diﬀerence from previous model . 118.90 25.78 258.97 90.29 110.35 3.86 11.16
p-value of above test staƟsƟc . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number of individuals 8,616 8,616 8,616 8,616 8,616 8,616 8,616 8,616
Notes: ReporƟng hazard raƟos. Standard errors (clustered by individual’s school) in parentheses. Weighted using Wave 4 survey
design and non-response weights. Stars indicate staƟsƟcal signiﬁcance:  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01. EsƟmated risks
are relaƟve to the following base categories: Age 15, SES quinƟle group 3, aƩended a non-selecƟve state school, white, and female.
Tests of model ﬁt are relaƟve to the model one column to the leŌ, with the following excepƟons: M4C is relaƟve toM3, M5 is relaƟve
to M4, and M5C is relaƟve to M4C.
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Table B.4: EsƟmated eﬀects on risk of transiƟon from reporƟng being ‘unlikely to apply’
to university to reporƟng being ‘likely to apply’ to university: hazard raƟos (Wave 4
weights applied, excludes individuals not in sample at age 17)
M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 M4C M5 M5C
Age 16 0.88 0.88 0.90 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
( 0.05)** ( 0.05)** ( 0.05)* ( 0.05) ( 0.05)* ( 0.05)* ( 0.05)* ( 0.05)*
Age 17 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.81 0.81 0.79 0.79
( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)***
SES Q1 (Low) 0.77 0.70 0.81 0.82 0.80
( 0.06)*** ( 0.06)*** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)** ( 0.07)***
SES Q2 0.90 0.89 0.92 0.93 0.92
( 0.06) ( 0.06) ( 0.06) ( 0.06) ( 0.06)
SES Q4 1.34 1.28 1.19 1.18 1.17
( 0.10)*** ( 0.10)*** ( 0.09)** ( 0.09)** ( 0.09)**
SES Q5 (High) 1.98 1.97 1.73 1.69 1.71
( 0.17)*** ( 0.17)*** ( 0.15)*** ( 0.15)*** ( 0.15)***
SES Z-Score 1.29 1.29
( 0.04)*** ( 0.05)***
Male 0.60 0.60 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.62
( 0.03)*** ( 0.03)*** ( 0.03)*** ( 0.03)*** ( 0.03)*** ( 0.03)***
Ethnicity: Mixed 1.50 1.57 1.58 1.56 1.60 1.57
( 0.22)*** ( 0.22)*** ( 0.22)*** ( 0.22)*** ( 0.22)*** ( 0.22)***
Ethnicity: Indian 2.73 3.26 3.17 3.20 3.17 3.19
( 0.47)*** ( 0.52)*** ( 0.52)*** ( 0.52)*** ( 0.51)*** ( 0.51)***
Ethnicity: Pakistani 3.66 4.24 4.15 4.33 4.15 4.29
( 0.49)*** ( 0.63)*** ( 0.60)*** ( 0.62)*** ( 0.60)*** ( 0.62)***
Ethnicity: Bangladeshi 5.02 5.71 5.31 5.58 5.33 5.58
( 0.69)*** ( 0.79)*** ( 0.72)*** ( 0.75)*** ( 0.72)*** ( 0.75)***
Ethnicity: Black Caribbean 2.72 3.12 3.08 3.01 3.14 3.03
( 0.46)*** ( 0.51)*** ( 0.49)*** ( 0.48)*** ( 0.50)*** ( 0.48)***
Ethnicity: Black African 5.83 8.68 7.90 8.07 7.99 8.10
( 1.20)*** ( 1.72)*** ( 1.57)*** ( 1.68)*** ( 1.61)*** ( 1.69)***
Ethnicity: Other 3.32 3.73 3.72 3.86 3.69 3.80
( 0.57)*** ( 0.71)*** ( 0.67)*** ( 0.68)*** ( 0.67)*** ( 0.68)***
AƩended Independent School 1.32 1.41 1.35 1.36 1.34 1.34
( 0.39) ( 0.35) ( 0.33) ( 0.34) ( 0.33) ( 0.33)
AƩended Grammar School 1.75 1.00 0.95 0.92 0.92 0.90
( 0.36)*** ( 0.22) ( 0.21) ( 0.20) ( 0.20) ( 0.20)
AƩended School with Sixth Form 1.08 1.05 1.04 1.04 1.05 1.04
( 0.06) ( 0.06) ( 0.06) ( 0.05) ( 0.06) ( 0.05)
Experienced workless household 1.04 1.09 1.13 1.15 1.13 1.14
( 0.08) ( 0.08) ( 0.09) ( 0.08)* ( 0.09) ( 0.08)*
Ever experienced family separaƟon 1.13 1.14 1.14 1.14 1.15 1.14
( 0.09) ( 0.10) ( 0.10) ( 0.10) ( 0.10) ( 0.10)
Local Youth Unemployment Rate / 10 1.08 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05
( 0.06) ( 0.06) ( 0.06) ( 0.06) ( 0.06) ( 0.06)
KS2 Z-Score 1.58 1.49 1.48 1.48 1.48
( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)***
KS4 Z-Score (AŌer results) 1.64 1.65 1.74 1.78
( 0.11)*** ( 0.11)*** ( 0.31)*** ( 0.14)***
KS4 Z-Score * SES Q1 0.84
( 0.16)
KS4 Z-Score * SES Q2 0.96
( 0.22)
KS4 Z-Score * SES Q4 1.52
( 0.40)
KS4 Z-Score * SES Q5 0.70
( 0.18)
KS4 Z-Score * SES Z-Score 1.17
( 0.09)**
Geographical p p p p p p
Number and order of siblings p p p p p p
Months of birth and interview p p p p p p p p
F test of diﬀerence from previous model . 33.73 13.10 114.97 53.38 60.11 2.44 4.08
p-value of above test staƟsƟc . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.04
Number of individuals 4,864 4,864 4,864 4,864 4,864 4,864 4,864 4,864
Notes: ReporƟng hazard raƟos. Standard errors (clustered by individual’s school) in parentheses. Weighted using Wave 4 survey
design and non-response weights. Stars indicate staƟsƟcal signiﬁcance:  p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01. EsƟmated risks
are relaƟve to the following base categories: Age 15, SES quinƟle group 3, aƩended a non-selecƟve state school, white, and female.
Tests of model ﬁt are relaƟve to the model one column to the leŌ, with the following excepƟons: M4C is relaƟve toM3, M5 is relaƟve
to M4, and M5C is relaƟve to M4C.
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an individual-level random eﬀect (Wooldridge, 2002, ch.10). These sƟll allow inclusion
of individual-level (i.e. non-Ɵme-varying) covariates and are relaƟvely eﬃcient, which
is important when there are only a small number of observaƟons for each individual.
However, it makes the assumpƟon that the individual-level random eﬀect is not corre-
lated with the included explanatory variables, which is almost certainly not strictly jusƟ-
ﬁed.
The alternaƟve that does not make this assumpƟon (nor any assumpƟon about the dis-
tribuƟon of the unobserved heterogeneity) is esƟmaƟon of individual-level ﬁxed eﬀects.
However, this approach would prevent me from being able to esƟmate the eﬀect of any
Ɵme-invariant covariates, which are maƩers of interest for this paper. Furthermore, it is
unlikely that the individual-level ﬁxed eﬀect would be well esƟmated with so few obser-
vaƟons per person in many cases: this can cause its own problems (Vermunt, 2001, p.11-
12). As such, despite its assumpƟons not being fully met, I use random eﬀects modelling.
This is preferable to simply assuming unobserved heterogeneity is not an issue.
Onemust also make an assumpƟon about the distribuƟon of the individual-level random
eﬀects, with popular distribuƟons including the Gamma distribuƟon (Meyer, 1990), a
normal distribuƟon with mean zero (Jenkins, 2004, ch. 8.2), or non-parametric discrete
mixing distribuƟon (latent class analysis) (Heckman and Singer, 1984). For the models
reported in this secƟon, I assume a normal distribuƟon for the random eﬀects. However,
I have also esƟmated models with a discrete mixing distribuƟon; these models have two
mass points, with Gateaux derivaƟves used to test the whether addiƟonal mass points
would provide a beƩer ﬁt. This alternaƟve assumpƟon makes liƩle diﬀerence to the es-
Ɵmated associaƟon between SES and probability of transiƟon.
I esƟmate regression models of the form:
log(  log(1  dit)) = (age) + xit + i (B.1)
where  is an individual-level error term,which is assumed tobenormally-distributed:
 s N(0; 2) (B.2)
propensity of an individual to fall sick could be thought of as their frailty.
169
and uncorrelated with the explanatory variables:
Cov(i; xit) = Cov("it; xit) = 0 (B.3)
I esƟmate models including the same variables as in the main body of the paper (other
than the addiƟon of a random eﬀect). I esƟmate these models using adapƟve quadra-
ture with 8 integraƟon points, making use of the soŌware GLLAMM (Rabe-Hesketh and
Skrondal, 2006). This allowsme to include individual-level random eﬀects, while sƟll with
accounƟng for the complex survey design of the data (most notably the sampling and at-
triƟonweighƟng scheme, and the clustering of standard errors at the school-level).
B.3.1 Regression tables
The results of thesemodels are reported in regression tables similar to those in Appendix
B.1. Models for M0 are not reported, as these would not reliably converge. This would
seem to be due to an over-reliance on the random eﬀects to explain diﬀerences between
individuals in this model with very few explanatory variables.
In addiƟon to what is reported for models without random eﬀects, the tables also show
the esƟmated variance of the random eﬀect and the results of a likelihood raƟo test of
the diﬀerence between the model and the counterpart model with no random eﬀect.
In each case, the model that accounts for unobserved heterogeneity does provide addi-
Ɵonal explanatory power.
Themodels for transiƟon from ‘likely to unlikely’ are reported in Table B.5, while themod-
els for ‘unlikely to likely’ are reported in Table B.6. This analysis provide broadly similar
evidence on the associaƟon between SES and probability of transiƟon as models in the
main body of the thesis. However, there is a somewhat diﬀerent paƩern of associaƟon
between age and probability of transiƟon aŌer accounƟng for unobserved heterogeneity
between individuals.
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Table B.5: EsƟmated eﬀects on risk of transiƟon from reporƟng being ‘likely’ to apply to
university to reporƟng being ‘unlikely’ to apply to university: hazard raƟos
M1 M2 M3 M4 M4C M5 M5C
Age 16 1.24 1.21 1.24 1.23 1.24 1.23 1.23
( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)***
Age 17 1.10 1.16 1.22 1.27 1.28 1.34 1.36
( 0.06)* ( 0.07)** ( 0.08)*** ( 0.08)*** ( 0.08)*** ( 0.09)*** ( 0.09)***
SES Q1 (Low) 1.77 1.81 1.20 1.17 1.19
( 0.16)*** ( 0.17)*** ( 0.11)** ( 0.10)* ( 0.10)*
SES Q2 1.66 1.46 1.25 1.23 1.22
( 0.15)*** ( 0.12)*** ( 0.10)*** ( 0.10)*** ( 0.10)**
SES Q4 0.67 0.73 0.77 0.77 0.77
( 0.06)*** ( 0.06)*** ( 0.06)*** ( 0.06)*** ( 0.06)***
SES Q5 (High) 0.22 0.30 0.41 0.41 0.43
( 0.02)*** ( 0.03)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)***
SES Z-Score 0.65 0.66
( 0.03)*** ( 0.03)***
Male 1.75 1.76 1.71 1.72 1.71 1.72
( 0.10)*** ( 0.10)*** ( 0.10)*** ( 0.10)*** ( 0.10)*** ( 0.10)***
Ethnicity: Mixed 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.50
( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)***
Ethnicity: Indian 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.10
( 0.02)*** ( 0.02)*** ( 0.02)*** ( 0.02)*** ( 0.02)*** ( 0.02)***
Ethnicity: Pakistani 0.17 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12
( 0.02)*** ( 0.02)*** ( 0.02)*** ( 0.02)*** ( 0.02)*** ( 0.02)***
Ethnicity: Bangladeshi 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.15
( 0.03)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.03)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.03)***
Ethnicity: Black Caribbean 0.26 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
( 0.05)*** ( 0.03)*** ( 0.03)*** ( 0.03)*** ( 0.03)*** ( 0.03)***
Ethnicity: Black African 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.09
( 0.03)*** ( 0.02)*** ( 0.02)*** ( 0.02)*** ( 0.02)*** ( 0.02)***
Ethnicity: Other 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.15
( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)***
AƩended Independent School 0.22 0.20 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.24
( 0.06)*** ( 0.06)*** ( 0.06)*** ( 0.06)*** ( 0.06)*** ( 0.07)***
AƩended Grammar School 0.15 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.35
( 0.03)*** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)***
AƩended School with Sixth Form 0.81 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.84
( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)***
Experienced workless household 0.96 0.87 0.83 0.74 0.84 0.76
( 0.08) ( 0.07) ( 0.07)** ( 0.06)*** ( 0.07)** ( 0.06)***
Ever experienced family separaƟon 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.98
( 0.09) ( 0.09) ( 0.09) ( 0.09) ( 0.09) ( 0.09)
Local Youth Unemployment Rate / 10 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.96
( 0.05) ( 0.05) ( 0.05) ( 0.05) ( 0.05) ( 0.05)
KS2 Z-Score 0.44 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.48
( 0.02)*** ( 0.02)*** ( 0.02)*** ( 0.02)*** ( 0.02)***
KS4 Z-Score (AŌer results) 0.59 0.59 0.42 0.53
( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.06)*** ( 0.04)***
KS4 Z-Score * SES Q1 1.72
( 0.32)***
KS4 Z-Score * SES Q2 1.65
( 0.30)***
KS4 Z-Score * SES Q4 1.22
( 0.23)
KS4 Z-Score * SES Q5 0.98
( 0.24)
KS4 Z-Score * SES Z-Score 0.78
( 0.06)***
Geographical p p p p p p
Number and order of siblings p p p p p p
Months of birth and interview p p p p p p p
2 test of diﬀerence from previous model . 667.42 397.97 63.32 183.09 13.76 12.53
p-value of above test staƟsƟc . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Variance of Random Eﬀect 2.19 1.64 1.33 1.31 1.34 1.29 1.31
LR test of diﬀ. from non-RE model (2) 385.48 271.36 231.84 241.99 253.91 232.91 241.32
p-value of above test staƟsƟc 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number of individuals 9,247 9,247 9,247 9,247 9,247 9,247 9,247
Notes: ReporƟng hazard raƟos. Standard errors (clustered by individual’s school) in parentheses. Weighted
usingWave 2 survey design and non-response weights. Stars indicate staƟsƟcal signiﬁcance:  p < 0:10, 
p < 0:05,  p < 0:01. EsƟmated risks are relaƟve to the following base categories: Age 15, SES quinƟle
group 3, aƩended a non-selecƟve state school, white, and female. Tests of model ﬁt are relaƟve to the
model one column to the leŌ, with the following excepƟons: M4C is relaƟve to M3, M5 is relaƟve to M4,
and M5C is relaƟve to M4C.
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Table B.6: EsƟmated eﬀects on risk of transiƟon from reporƟng being ‘unlikely’ to apply
to university to reporƟng being ‘likely’ to apply to university: hazard raƟos
M1 M2 M3 M4 M4C M5 M5C
Age 16 1.04 1.06 1.04 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03
( 0.07) ( 0.07) ( 0.07) ( 0.06) ( 0.07) ( 0.06) ( 0.06)
Age 17 0.74 0.73 0.73 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.87
( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.05)*** ( 0.07) ( 0.07) ( 0.07)* ( 0.07)*
SES Q1 (Low) 0.70 0.64 0.76 0.78 0.75
( 0.07)*** ( 0.07)*** ( 0.08)*** ( 0.08)** ( 0.08)***
SES Q2 0.84 0.84 0.89 0.89 0.88
( 0.07)** ( 0.07)** ( 0.07) ( 0.07) ( 0.07)
SES Q4 1.37 1.34 1.20 1.18 1.17
( 0.14)*** ( 0.13)*** ( 0.11)* ( 0.11)* ( 0.11)*
SES Q5 (High) 2.54 2.42 2.01 1.95 1.96
( 0.31)*** ( 0.28)*** ( 0.23)*** ( 0.22)*** ( 0.22)***
SES Z-Score 1.36 1.37
( 0.06)*** ( 0.06)***
Male 0.52 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54
( 0.03)*** ( 0.03)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)*** ( 0.04)***
Ethnicity: Mixed 1.80 1.81 1.80 1.78 1.82 1.80
( 0.32)*** ( 0.31)*** ( 0.30)*** ( 0.30)*** ( 0.30)*** ( 0.30)***
Ethnicity: Indian 4.19 4.85 4.76 4.85 4.77 4.81
( 0.93)*** ( 0.96)*** ( 0.96)*** ( 0.98)*** ( 0.96)*** ( 0.96)***
Ethnicity: Pakistani 5.55 6.85 6.56 6.93 6.58 6.84
( 0.97)*** ( 1.22)*** ( 1.15)*** ( 1.23)*** ( 1.15)*** ( 1.21)***
Ethnicity: Bangladeshi 7.76 8.25 7.75 8.14 7.85 8.16
( 1.46)*** ( 1.50)*** ( 1.40)*** ( 1.47)*** ( 1.41)*** ( 1.46)***
Ethnicity: Black Caribbean 3.87 4.51 4.35 4.21 4.42 4.24
( 0.82)*** ( 0.96)*** ( 0.90)*** ( 0.87)*** ( 0.91)*** ( 0.87)***
Ethnicity: Black African 7.92 10.20 9.62 9.92 9.75 9.84
( 2.37)*** ( 2.88)*** ( 2.69)*** ( 2.83)*** ( 2.75)*** ( 2.80)***
Ethnicity: Other 4.35 5.02 5.03 5.18 5.04 5.11
( 0.96)*** ( 1.21)*** ( 1.17)*** ( 1.17)*** ( 1.18)*** ( 1.17)***
AƩended Independent School 1.38 1.54 1.48 1.51 1.46 1.49
( 0.61) ( 0.63) ( 0.57) ( 0.59) ( 0.56) ( 0.58)
AƩended Grammar School 2.06 1.08 1.03 0.98 1.00 0.97
( 0.61)** ( 0.32) ( 0.30) ( 0.29) ( 0.29) ( 0.29)
AƩended School with Sixth Form 1.09 1.06 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.05
( 0.08) ( 0.07) ( 0.07) ( 0.07) ( 0.07) ( 0.07)
Experienced workless household 0.98 1.04 1.09 1.12 1.08 1.11
( 0.09) ( 0.09) ( 0.09) ( 0.09) ( 0.09) ( 0.09)
Ever experienced family separaƟon 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.10 1.10
( 0.11) ( 0.11) ( 0.11) ( 0.11) ( 0.11) ( 0.11)
Local Youth Unemployment Rate / 10 1.05 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03
( 0.07) ( 0.07) ( 0.06) ( 0.06) ( 0.06) ( 0.06)
KS2 Z-Score 1.71 1.59 1.58 1.58 1.58
( 0.07)*** ( 0.06)*** ( 0.06)*** ( 0.06)*** ( 0.06)***
KS4 Z-Score (AŌer results) 1.78 1.78 1.97 1.96
( 0.13)*** ( 0.13)*** ( 0.35)*** ( 0.17)***
KS4 Z-Score * SES Q1 0.79
( 0.16)
KS4 Z-Score * SES Q2 0.90
( 0.21)
KS4 Z-Score * SES Q4 1.53
( 0.46)
KS4 Z-Score * SES Q5 0.63
( 0.17)*
KS4 Z-Score * SES Z-Score 1.20
( 0.10)**
Geographical p p p p p p
Number and order of siblings p p p p p p
Months of birth and interview p p p p p p p
2 test of diﬀerence from previous model . 334.66 210.08 61.99 123.07 9.78 4.56
p-value of above test staƟsƟc . 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.03
Variance of Random Eﬀect 1.51 1.28 1.04 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.99
LR test of diﬀ. from non-RE model (2) 178.19 144.84 111.63 101.51 100.05 101.96 100.23
p-value of above test staƟsƟc 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number of individuals 5,330 5,330 5,330 5,330 5,330 5,330 5,330
Notes: ReporƟng hazard raƟos. Standard errors (clustered by individual’s school) in parentheses. Weighted
usingWave 2 survey design and non-response weights. Stars indicate staƟsƟcal signiﬁcance:  p < 0:10, 
p < 0:05,  p < 0:01. EsƟmated risks are relaƟve to the following base categories: Age 15, SES quinƟle
group 3, aƩended a non-selecƟve state school, white, and female. Tests of model ﬁt are relaƟve to the
model one column to the leŌ, with the following excepƟons: M4C is relaƟve to M3, M5 is relaƟve to M4,
and M5C is relaƟve to M4C.
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Appendix C
DuraƟon modelling likelihood
Using the esƟmaƟon methods detailed by Jenkins (1995) and, earlier, by Allison (1982),
makes esƟmaƟon of the duraƟon models in this paper signiﬁcantly easier. The method
makes use of the fact that we can rewrite the likelihood funcƟon for our duraƟonmodels
in the same form as that for a binary dependent variable regression model. This also
requires that we reorganise the dataset so that there is one observaƟon for each period
each individual is at risk of making the transiƟon of interest. In this appendix, I walk
through the steps that lead to this ‘easy esƟmaƟon’ method.¹
I start by seƫng up the duraƟon model. I index parƟcipants as i and spell Ɵme as t.
Each spell includes an indicator deﬁning whether a transiƟon has occurred by the point
of observaƟon. I call this indicator i and deﬁne it thus:
i = 1 if the spell ends with transiƟon
= 0 otherwise (C.1)
The cumulaƟve distribuƟon funcƟon is the probability that transiƟon has occurred by
Ɵme t:
Fit = Pr(Ti < t) (C.2)
where t 2 f1; 2; 3; :::g
¹This exposiƟon owes much to Allison (1982), Jenkins (1995) and Box-Steﬀensmeier and Jones (2004,
p.71-72).
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The converse of this is the survival funcƟon i.e. the probability that the transiƟon has not
occurred by Ɵme t:
Sit = 1  Fit = Pr(Ti  t) (C.3)
The probability density funcƟon is the probability that transiƟon occurs at Ɵme t:
fit = Pr(Ti = t) (C.4)
Using the above, we also want to know the probability that transiƟon occurs at Ɵme t,
given that it has not occurred up to that point. This is known as the hazard rate, and can
bewriƩen using the probability density and survival funcƟons (i.e. equaƟons C.4 and C.3)
by simple applicaƟon of the law of condiƟonal probability:
hit = Pr(Ti = tjTi  t)
=
fit
Sit
(C.5)
Since the hazard rate is of interest, we nowalso deﬁne our probability density and survival
funcƟons in terms of it. First, the probability density funcƟon. It is the probability that
the transiƟon occurred at Ɵme T (hiT ), but did not occur (1   hit) in any of the earlier
Ɵme periods (t = 1; 2; :::; T   1):
Pr(Ti = t) = fiTi = hiTi
Ti 1Y
t=1
(1  hit)
=
hiTi
1  hiTi
TiY
t=1
(1  hit) (C.6)
As it will be useful in wriƟng the likelihood funcƟon in an easily esƟmable form, I also
mulƟply through by (1   hiTi) (by increasing the upper limit of the product to Ti from
Ti   1) and also divide through by it (as can be easily seen on the leŌ).
Likewise, the survival funcƟon is just the stream of probabiliƟes that the event did not
occur in any Ɵme periods up to and including T :
Pr(Ti  t) = SiTi =
TiY
t=1
(1  hit) (C.7)
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Finally, before we can write down the likelihood funcƟon, we need to make some basic
assumpƟons about the distribuƟon of our data. Speciﬁcally, assume that our observa-
Ɵons are independent and that the outcome takes a Bernoulli distribuƟon:
g1;2;:::;n() = [ independence ] =
nY
i=1
fi()
g1;2;:::;n() = [ Bernoulli ] =
nY
i=1
ii (1  i)1 i
where n is the observed outcome for each observaƟon n. In our parƟcular case, there-
fore,  is whether or not the transiƟon of interest occurs. We deﬁned the probability of
this event above.
As such, we’re now ready to write down likelihood funcƟon. This is simply a maƩer of
ﬁlling in our events of interest, i.e. the probability that the transiƟon occurs (given that
it hasn’t before) and the probability that the event doesn’t occur instead of the  place-
holder.
L =
nY
i=1
[Pr(Ti = t)]
i [Pr(Ti  t)]1 i (C.8)
=
nY
i=1
[fiTi ]
i [SiTi ]
1 i (C.9)
SubsƟtuƟng in from our deﬁniƟons of the hazard rate above and then rearranging we can
get:
L =
nY
i=1
0@" hiTi
1  hiTi
TiY
t=1
(1  hit)
#i " TiY
t=1
(1  hit)
#1 i1A (C.10)
=
nY
i=1
0@ hiTi
1  hiTi
i " TiY
t=1
(1  hit)
#i " TiY
t=1
(1  hit)
#1 i1A
=
nY
i=1
0@ hiTi
1  hiTi
i " TiY
t=1
(1  hit)
#11A
=
nY
i=1
 
hiTi
1  hiTi
i " TiY
t=1
(1  hit)
#!
(C.11)
By inspecƟng EquaƟon C.10, we can see that spells that end in transiƟon (n = 1) con-
tribute to the leŌ part of the likelihood funcƟon, while spells that do not end in transiƟon
(n = 0) contribute to the right part. This follows from the inclusion of  and 1    as
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powers in the respecƟve parts of the funcƟon. Although this is no longer obvious aŌer
rearrangement to EquaƟon C.11, it is a useful way to think about the contribuƟon each in-
dividual makes, especially when it comes to the diﬀerences when applied to a rearranged
dataset below.
Taking logarithms, we ﬁnd that the corresponding log-likelihood funcƟon is:
l =
nX
i=1
i log

hiTi
(1  hiTi)

+
nX
i=1
TiX
t=1
log(1  hit) (C.12)
While we could just proceed using this likelihood funcƟon, esƟmaƟonwould require spe-
cialist programming andmaximisaƟonwould be computaƟonally intensive. Instead, with
a liƩle work, we can rewrite this funcƟon as something more familiar. To do this, we de-
ﬁne a new variable dit:
dit = 1 if i = 1 \ ti = Ti
= 0 otherwise (C.13)
This is the same dit as deﬁned in the main body of the paper. One can see that it diﬀers
from i in that it exists for all values of t, but is only equal to 1 for the ﬁnal observaƟon
of a spell. Recalling our observaƟon about EquaƟon C.10, that each individual makes
at most one contribuƟon to the part of the likelihood funcƟon relevant the occurrence
of the transiƟon. When we reorganise our dataset, with one observaƟon for each Ɵme
period an individual is in a posiƟon to make a transiƟon, we sƟll only want the period in
which the individual does make the transiƟon to contribute to that part of the likelihood.
dit provides for this. As such, we can rewrite and rearrange the log-likelihood funcƟon
thus:
l =
nX
i=1
TiX
t=1
dit: log

hit
1  hit

+
nX
i=1
TiX
t=1
log(1  hit) (C.14)
=
nX
i=1
TiX
t=1
dit: log(hit) +
nX
i=1
TiX
t=1
(1  dit) log(1  hit)
=
nX
i=1
TiX
t=1
[dit: log(hit) + (1  dit) log(1  hit)] (C.15)
This is idenƟcal to the log-likelihood funcƟon for a binary regression, apart from the ad-
diƟonal summaƟon across mulƟple Ɵme periods. It follows that we can simply use a bi-
176
nary regression model, such as logisƟc regression or complementary log-log regression,
applied to a dataset reorganised so that we observe all values of dit (rather than just one
observaƟon per spell, with a single indicator i) to carry out our esƟmaƟon.
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Appendix D
Example quesƟons from the Thinking
Skills Assessment
The Thinking Skills Assessment (TSA) used for admissions to the University of Oxford is
made up of two secƟons. Firstly, a ninety minute, ﬁŌy quesƟon, mulƟple choice secƟon
to assess problem solving and criƟcal thinking skills. Second, a thirty minute wriƟng task,
in which individuals may choose from four possible tasks.
The following quesƟons from the ﬁrst secƟon are reproduced from the freely available
specimen test on the Admissions TesƟng Service website (Admissions TesƟng Service,
2014), but are copyright of the University of Cambridge Local ExaminaƟons Syndicate
(UCLES) 2007.
1. Every motorist pays the same amount for road tax, regardless of how much they use
the roads: someone who covers as liƩle as 1 000 miles pays the same as someone who
covers 20 000. This is unfair. Road tax should be scrapped and the money raised by an
increase in the tax on car fuel. Making this change would ensure that those who use
the roads more would pay more. This would not only be a fairer system, but could also
bring in more revenue. Which of the following best illustrates the principle underlying
the argument above?
A People should receive free medical treatment only if they cannot aﬀord to pay for it.
B People who travel to work every day by train should pay a lower fare than those who
travel only occasionally.
C People who earn more than double the average wage should be made to pay much
178
higher charges for dental treatment.
D Television channels should be paid for by subscripƟon so that only those people who
watch them should be made to pay.
E Telephone charges should be higher for business customers than for domesƟc cus-
tomers because they are using the system only to make money.
2. Every year in Britain there are nearly 25 000 car ﬁres, yet it is esƟmated that only
ﬁve per cent of motorists travel with a ﬁre exƟnguisher in their car. If more motorists
could be encouraged to carry ﬁre exƟnguishers then the number of car ﬁres could be
considerably reduced. Which of the following is the best statement of the ﬂaw in the
argument above?
A It ignores the fact that millions of motorists never experience a car ﬁre.
B It assumes that carrying a ﬁre exƟnguisher will enable ﬁres to be put out.
C It implies that the occurrence of car ﬁres is related to the lack of an exƟnguisher.
D It overlooks the possibility that ﬁres might not be put out with an exƟnguisher.
E It ignores the fact that there are diﬀerent exƟnguishers for diﬀerent kinds of ﬁres.
3. School examinaƟon results in England this year reinforce the trend in improving pass
rates. There is, however, no other evidence of improvements in school leavers’ abiliƟes
- such as the data coming from employers or universiƟes. One can reasonably conclude,
therefore, that teachers are simply succeeding in coaching their pupils beƩer for exami-
naƟons than in previous years. Which one of the following is an underlying assumpƟon
of the above argument?
A School examinaƟon results are a reliable indicator of pupils’ abiliƟes.
B The level of diﬃculty of examinaƟons has not been falling.
C Employers’ expectaƟons of school leavers are unrealisƟc.
D Teachers in previous years did not aƩempt to coach pupils for examinaƟons.
E AbiliƟes of school pupils vary from year to year.
179
Appendix E
Supplementary results for Chapter 4
In this appendix, I build on the iniƟal analysis from SecƟon 4.5 and in parƟcular Table
4.4. I report esƟmates of the eﬀect of introducing the TSA on the overall proporƟon of
applicants oﬀered a place, proporƟon of applicants called to interview, and proporƟon of
interviewees oﬀered a place, reporƟng the results in Tables E.1, E.2 and E.3, respecƟvely.
In each column of these tables, the DiD esƟmates of policy impact are shown either by
rows giving the interacƟon between Economics and policy on () or by rows giving the
interacƟon between Economics and treatment years (8, 9 and 10), depending on the
model. I will not discuss Model 1 in each case, since they are so similar to the analysis
from Table 4.4 in SecƟon 4.5.
Table E.1 shows that in none of the years when the policy is on is a staƟsƟcally signiﬁcant
interacƟon term between the year of applicaƟon and being in the treatment group iden-
Ɵﬁed. This conﬁrms the earlier analysis that the introducƟon of the apƟtude test does
not seem to aﬀect the proporƟon of applicants who are oﬀered places. Adding in college-
level variables, including the average GCSE performance of applicants to the college and
a measure of college performance in undergraduate degrees, also has liƩle esƟmated
eﬀect on our outcomes of interest. This model also shows an unsurprising relaƟonship
between the average number of GCSE A*s held by applicants to a college and the pro-
porƟon of those applicants who get a place. In addiƟon, the R2 of the model increases
signiﬁcantly.
According to the simple diﬀerence in diﬀerence model the proporƟon of applicants who
get an interview has a negaƟve and staƟsƟcally signiﬁcant relaƟonship with the intro-
ducƟon of the TSA. Once again, this seems to be conﬁrmed by Table E.2’s model allowing
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Table E.1: ProporƟon of all applicants geƫng an oﬀer: diﬀerence in diﬀerences
esƟmates
(1) (2) (3)
Simple Years Controls
Constant () 0.284 0.284 -0.013
(0.006) (0.006) (0.209)
Treated () -0.034 -0.034 -0.038
(0.016) (0.016) (0.012)
Policy On () -0.043
(0.005)
2008 (8) -0.017 -0.031
(0.005) (0.011)
2009 (9) -0.057 -0.080
(0.006) (0.006)
2010 (10) -0.051 -0.078
(0.006) (0.008)
Treated*Policy On () -0.013
(0.014)
Treated*2008 (8) -0.029 -0.026
(0.018) (0.016)
Treated*2009 (9) -0.018 -0.017
(0.012) (0.012)
Treated*2010 (10) 0.004 -0.003
(0.016) (0.015)
Mean No. of GCSEs (State) -0.011
(0.015)
Mean No. of GCSEs (Ind.) -0.026
(0.015)
Mean No. of A*s (State) 0.018
(0.008)
Mean No. of A*s (Ind.) 0.018
(0.006)
Norrington Score / 10 6.731
(1.408)
N 116 232 232
R2 0.271 0.269 0.565
Notes: Analysis excludes individuals for whom school type is unknown. For Simple model (1), Policy Oﬀ in
2005 and 2006; Policy On in 2008, 2009 and 2010. For other models, base category for years is pooling
of observaƟons for 2005 and 2006. Standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate staisƟcal signiﬁcance: *
p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
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Table E.2: ProporƟon of all applicants geƫng an interview: diﬀerence in diﬀerences
esƟmates
(1) (2) (3)
Simple Years Controls
Constant () 0.788 0.788 0.512
(0.007) (0.007) (0.352)
Treated () 0.041 0.041 0.035
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Policy On () -0.111
(0.005)
2008 (8) -0.075 -0.107
(0.007) (0.018)
2009 (9) -0.119 -0.153
(0.007) (0.010)
2010 (10) -0.133 -0.175
(0.007) (0.013)
Treated*Policy On () -0.144
(0.023)
Treated*2008 (8) -0.095 -0.088
(0.022) (0.022)
Treated*2009 (9) -0.204 -0.199
(0.029) (0.027)
Treated*2010 (10) -0.141 -0.151
(0.028) (0.028)
Mean No. of GCSEs (State) 0.011
(0.026)
Mean No. of GCSEs (Ind.) -0.052
(0.030)
Mean No. of A*s (State) 0.022
(0.011)
Mean No. of A*s (Ind.) 0.029
(0.010)
Norrington Score / 10 5.313
(1.989)
N 116 232 232
R2 0.721 0.613 0.715
Notes: Analysis excludes individuals for whom school type is unknown. For Simple model (1), Policy Oﬀ in
2005 and 2006; Policy On in 2008, 2009 and 2010. For other models, base category for years is pooling
of observaƟons for 2005 and 2006. Standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate staisƟcal signiﬁcance: *
p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
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diﬀerent eﬀects by year: all coeﬃcients on the interacƟon between the treatment group
and years when the policy is on are negaƟve and signiﬁcant. However, it is important to
note that these vary signiﬁcantly from year to year: this suggests a more complex picture
than our single esƟmate suggested.
Table E.3: ProporƟon of all interviewees geƫng an oﬀer: diﬀerence in diﬀerences
esƟmates
(1) (2) (3)
Simple Years Controls
Constant () 0.360 0.360 0.097
(0.007) (0.007) (0.251)
Treated () -0.058 -0.058 -0.068
(0.019) (0.019) (0.014)
Policy On () -0.005
(0.005)
2008 (8) 0.014 -0.005
(0.006) (0.009)
2009 (9) -0.021 -0.058
(0.007) (0.008)
2010 (10) -0.004 -0.048
(0.007) (0.010)
Treated*Policy On () 0.034
(0.018)
Treated*2008 (8) -0.009 -0.011
(0.023) (0.022)
Treated*2009 (9) 0.061 0.064
(0.021) (0.020)
Treated*2010 (10) 0.063 0.034
(0.023) (0.022)
Mean No. of GCSEs (State) -0.022
(0.015)
Mean No. of GCSEs (Ind.) -0.022
(0.025)
Mean No. of A*s (State) 0.022
(0.011)
Mean No. of A*s (Ind.) 0.025
(0.007)
Norrington Score / 10 5.965
(1.609)
N 116 232 231
R2 0.126 0.101 0.361
Notes: Analysis excludes individuals for whom school type is unknown. For Simple model (1), Policy Oﬀ in
2005 and 2006; Policy On in 2008, 2009 and 2010. For other models, base category for years is pooling
of observaƟons for 2005 and 2006. Standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate staisƟcal signiﬁcance: *
p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
Table E.3 conﬁrms the picture of an increase in the proporƟon of interviewees who re-
ceive an oﬀer, oﬀseƫng the declining numbers who get an interview at all. One addi-
Ɵonal feature is notable: in the ﬁrst year with the policy on (2008) we cannot reject the
null hypothesis of no impact.
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E.1 EsƟmatedeﬀects of the introducƟonof an apƟtude test
on an area-level deprivaƟon index
Using the same approach to analysing stages of the admissions process as that used in
SecƟon 4.8, I also consider the eﬀect of introducing the TSA on another proxy for ap-
plicants’ SES. I use the average area deprivaƟon level of applicants’ schools, measured
using the Income DeprivaƟon AﬀecƟng Children Index (IDACI) that I described in SecƟon
4.4.
The IDACI is constructed as the percentage of all children aged 0-15 living in income de-
prived families (McLennan et al., 2011, p.22-23) within a Lower Layer Super Output Area
(geographical districts covering the UK containing between 400 and 1,200 households
(Oﬃce of NaƟonal StaƟsƟcs, 2014)). This is reported to the nearest whole percent. Nev-
ertheless, it gives more potenƟal discriminaƟon than the simple independent/state split
used in my main analysis. Figure E.1 shows the graph of a kernel density esƟmate of
the school IDACI of individuals in the dataset. It shows that the distribuƟon is highly
skewed, with applicants to the University of Oxford highly concentrated in schools in
low-deprivaƟon areas. This is also reﬂected in the diﬀerence between the mean (13%)
and the median (9%). Unfortunately, school IDACI is missing in more cases (11.1%) than
school type (2.2%): 11.4% of applicants at independent schools, 6.5% of applicants at
state schools, and 83.4% of applicants with some other or missing school type have no
school IDACI recorded.
While it would be beƩer to use the IDACI for the young person’s area of residence (rather
than that of their school), this was not available for reasons of conﬁdenƟality. However,
analysis using the Longitudinal Study of Young People in England (following a cohort of
roughly similar age to those in the administraƟve data) shows that the IDACI score of a
young person’s school’s area is correlated with their own socioeconomic status. I report
the results in Table E.4. The correlaƟon between the IDACI score for the area where a
young person lives is posiƟvely correlated with the IDACI score of the area where their
school is situated (Pearson’s correlaƟon coeﬃcient = 0.46). More fundamentally, the
IDACI score of the area where a young person’s school is situated is weakly negaƟvely
correlated (since one is a measure of disadvantage and the other a measure of advan-
tage) with their household income (Pearson’s correlaƟon coeﬃcient = -0.21).
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Figure E.1: Kernel density distribuƟon of IDACI score
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Notes: Solid verƟcal line indicates mean, dashed verƟcal line indicates median, and doƩed verƟcal lines
indicate upper and lower quarƟles. Excludes individuals for whom school IDACI was not recorded.
Table E.4: Average characterisƟcs of Longitudinal Study of Young People in England
cohort members by IDACI quinƟle group of their school’s area
IDACI quinƟle group of school’s area
CharacterisƟc 5th 4th 3rd 2nd 1st
(Advantaged) (Disadvantaged)
IDACI score of young 15 18 23 28 39
person’s home area (%)
Household Income 22,579 21,355 18,017 17,158 14,233
(£)
Mother has a degree 30 26 22 20 14
(%)
Father has higher managerial 43 39 31 29 20
or professional occupaƟon (%)
Family in ﬁnancial diﬃculƟes 6 6 7 9 11
(%)
Family living in socially 15 18 22 29 41
rented housing (%)
Young person aƩends 6 5 0 5 0
independent school (%)
Notes: Data from the Longitudinal Study of Young People in England (LSYPE). Average characterisƟcs for
LSYPE cohort members who aƩend schools in each of ﬁve quinƟles groups deﬁned by the IDACI score of
the school’s area. CharacterisƟcs are measured at Wave 1 of the LSYPE, at age 14 years, except in case
of income, which is averaged over measurements are ages 14, 15 and 16. Income is in 2003–2004 prices.
CalculaƟons courtesy of Claire Crawford of the InsƟtute for Fiscal Studies/University of Warwick.
185
Using a conƟnuous outcome variable also allows analysis of changes to diﬀerent parts of
the distribuƟon of applicants’ schools’ area deprivaƟon, not just changes to the mean.
Although the method I use is not quanƟle regression (Koenker and BasseƩ, 1978; Par-
ente and Santos Silva, 2013), it shares some of the same intuiƟon. As in earlier secƟons
of the paper I use college-level least squares regression, but rather than only using as
observaƟons the mean deprivaƟon level of applicants (or interviewees, or those oﬀered
a place), I also use models with observaƟons constructed as the lower quarƟles (Q25),
medians or upper quarƟles (Q75) of the school IDACI for a given college, course, year
combinaƟon.
Such changes are maƩers of interest since a shiŌ in the mean deprivaƟon level alone
could result from a number of diﬀerent changes in the underlying distribuƟon of appli-
cants, interviewees or those oﬀered a place. To illustrate this, let us consider two noƟonal
shiŌs in the deprivaƟon distribuƟon of interviewees which could have idenƟcal eﬀects
on the mean deprivaƟon of applicants. We might see an eﬀect that only shiŌs the lower
quarƟle of the deprivaƟon distribuƟon of interviewees and has no impact on the median
or the upper quarƟle. This would suggest that the policy change is ﬁltering out some
of the applicants from most advantaged schools, but these are being replaced by appli-
cants only slightly above them on the deprivaƟon distribuƟon. The eﬀect is not having
a broader impact further up the distribuƟon. AlternaƟvely, we might see an eﬀect that
shiŌs the lower quarƟle of the distribuƟon of interviewees somewhat less than our ﬁrst
change, but also shiŌs the median interviewee’s deprivaƟon level. This would imply a
somewhat broader eﬀect, with those at the boƩom of the deprivaƟon distribuƟon being
replaced by applicants signiﬁcantly further down (albeit without much eﬀect on those
aƩending schools in the most deprived areas).
I report the results from regression models similar to those from SecƟon 4.6, with the
coeﬃcient on the interacƟon between the policy on and treatment group () recovering
the DiD esƟmate, for each stage of the admissions process in Tables E.5, E.6 and E.7. The
esƟmates of the policy are in units of the IDACI. For example, an esƟmate of 1 implies
an esƟmated 1 percentage point increase in the mean, median or quarƟle deprivaƟon
of applicants, interviewees or those oﬀered a place. As such, their magnitudes are not
comparable with esƟmates in SecƟon 4.8. As with themain analysis, I include controls for
the average GCSE performance by state and independent school applicants, interviewees
or aƩendees and college Norrington score.
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Table E.5: School IDACI of applicants - changes at the mean, lower quarƟle, median and
upper quarƟle of colleges’ distribuƟons: diﬀerence in diﬀerences esƟmates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Q25 Median Q75
Constant () 5.997 7.754 6.175 -25.776
(9.765) (5.248) (10.976) (28.401)
Treated () -0.332 -0.085 -0.220 0.324
(0.355) (0.229) (0.407) (0.729)
Policy On () 0.679 0.397 0.567 0.581
(0.381) (0.191) (0.482) (1.064)
Treated*Policy On () 0.333 0.131 0.260 0.048
(0.422) (0.227) (0.445) (0.933)
Mean No. of GCSEs (State) 0.583 -0.638 -0.733 5.009
(0.966) (0.364) (1.228) (2.722)
Mean No. of GCSEs (Ind.) -0.076 0.481 0.930 -0.625
(0.616) (0.366) (0.588) (1.676)
Mean No. of A*s (State) -0.348 0.344 0.511 -2.649
(0.222) (0.138) (0.326) (0.952)
Mean No. of A*s (Ind.) -0.874 -0.684 -1.383 -1.001
(0.285) (0.192) (0.294) (0.503)
Norrington Score / 10 138.105 11.166 108.495 285.789
(59.907) (33.449) (66.867) (158.560)
N 162 162 162 162
R2 0.177 0.217 0.195 0.243
Notes: Analysis excludes individuals for whom school IDACI is unknown. Policy Oﬀ in 2005 and 2006;
Policy On in 2008, 2009 and 2010. Standard errors, clustered by college-subject group combinaƟon, in
parentheses. Stars indicate staisƟcal signiﬁcance: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
We see from Table E.5, in common with the analysis in SecƟon 4.8, no staƟsƟcally signif-
icant esƟmated eﬀect on the mean IDACI of applicants’ schools. If anything, the results
esƟmate an increase in the mean area deprivaƟon level of applicants’ schools equivalent
to 3 addiƟonal children in the average area living in incomedeprivaƟon per 1000 children.
Examining diﬀerent points of the distribuƟon adds liƩle addiƟonal informaƟon, since all
the esƟmates are staƟsƟcally insigniﬁcant and show no obvious paƩern.
Turning to those called to interview, the results for themean again concordwith thosewe
might expect from the earlier analysis by school type. Table E.6 shows no staƟsƟcally sig-
niﬁcant diﬀerence in the mean IDACI, although the esƟmate is again posiƟve. EsƟmates
for diﬀerent points of the distribuƟon are again staƟsƟcally insigniﬁcant from one an-
other or zero, but show some suggesƟon that the eﬀect is larger in the areas with higher
income deprivaƟon (although none are as large as the esƟmate at the mean).
Finally, considering changes in the mean school-level IDACI of those who get an oﬀer
(Table E.7) shows somewhat larger absolute esƟmates than analysis of the interviewees.
However, it is worth noƟng than, unlike at earlier stages and in the analysis of the propor-
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Table E.6: School IDACI of interviewees - changes at the mean, lower quarƟle, median
and upper quarƟle of colleges’ distribuƟons: diﬀerence in diﬀerences esƟmates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Q25 Median Q75
Constant () 0.359 6.164 4.558 -25.371
(11.886) (5.506) (13.058) (30.838)
Treated () -0.249 -0.155 0.072 0.766
(0.386) (0.288) (0.475) (0.778)
Policy On () 0.260 0.410 0.392 0.288
(0.503) (0.281) (0.632) (1.247)
Treated*Policy On () 0.532 0.005 0.174 0.375
(0.431) (0.319) (0.421) (0.927)
Mean No. of GCSEs (State) 0.077 -0.774 -1.492 3.110
(1.253) (0.445) (1.409) (3.241)
Mean No. of GCSEs (Ind.) 0.985 0.854 1.878 0.657
(0.677) (0.370) (0.722) (1.496)
Mean No. of A*s (State) -0.225 0.140 0.437 -1.796
(0.287) (0.136) (0.317) (1.101)
Mean No. of A*s (Ind.) -0.748 -0.487 -1.282 -1.152
(0.269) (0.233) (0.307) (0.733)
Norrington Score / 10 120.216 -3.341 102.596 331.748
(68.653) (34.824) (63.018) (161.009)
N 162 162 162 162
R2 0.096 0.148 0.193 0.160
Notes: Analysis excludes individuals for whom school IDACI is unknown. Policy Oﬀ in 2005 and 2006;
Policy On in 2008, 2009 and 2010. Standard errors, clustered by college-subject group combinaƟon, in
parentheses. Stars indicate staisƟcal signiﬁcance: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
Ɵons from state school, the esƟmates are negaƟve. None of the esƟmates are staƟsƟcally
signiﬁcant, so we can have liƩle conﬁdence in this ﬁnding, especially as it is inconsistent
with most of the analysis.
E.2 Within state school variaƟon
While the above analysis includes all applicants, I now restrict my aƩenƟon to changes
in the distribuƟon of the school-level IDACI just within state school applicants. There is
more than one reason for doing this. First, the vast majority of the populaƟon aƩend
state schools and the average socioeconomic status of young people aƩending these
schools varies signiﬁcantly. As such, it would be possible for there to be large changes in
the socioeconomic status of applicants, interviewees and those oﬀered a place without
observing any changes in variables relaƟng to school type. This analysis assesses whether
this is indeed the case.
The second reason is thatwemight bemore concerned about the relevance of the school-
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Table E.7: School IDACI of applicants oﬀered a place - changes at the mean, lower
quarƟle, median and upper quarƟle of colleges’ distribuƟons: diﬀerence in diﬀerences
esƟmates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Q25 Median Q75
Constant () 9.266 7.591 0.264 22.195
(11.152) (4.368) (13.478) (21.765)
Treated () 0.597 0.286 0.914 2.290
(0.807) (0.425) (0.778) (1.627)
Policy On () 0.224 0.438 0.197 0.746
(0.549) (0.234) (0.669) (1.148)
Treated*Policy On () -0.493 -0.304 -0.943 -1.466
(0.890) (0.403) (0.844) (1.919)
Mean No. of GCSEs (State) -0.196 -0.223 0.353 -0.756
(1.206) (0.404) (1.210) (2.484)
Mean No. of GCSEs (Ind.) 0.921 0.080 0.491 1.249
(0.516) (0.303) (0.642) (1.278)
Mean No. of A*s (State) 0.428 -0.210 0.459 0.303
(0.467) (0.191) (0.474) (0.890)
Mean No. of A*s (Ind.) -0.627 -0.179 -1.011 -0.866
(0.460) (0.238) (0.414) (0.927)
Norrington Score / 10 -35.798 7.594 54.127 -85.952
(61.934) (38.353) (74.826) (113.906)
N 114 114 114 114
R2 0.051 0.061 0.085 0.046
Notes: Analysis excludes individuals for whom school IDACI is unknown. Policy Oﬀ in 2005 and 2006;
Policy On in 2008, 2009 and 2010. Standard errors, clustered by college-subject group combinaƟon, in
parentheses. Stars indicate staisƟcal signiﬁcance: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
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area IDACI in the case of independent schools: youngpeoplewho go to such schools oŌen
travel further to aƩend, parƟcularly as they are farmore likely to oﬀer boarding provision.
As such, excluding individuals from independent schools may give a more reliable idea
about changes in individual-level socioeconomic status using school-level data.
The mean school-level IDACI of applicants from state schools (15%) is higher than that
from independent schools (10%). We see the same when considering the median ap-
plicant in each case, with IDACI of 12% for the median state school applicant and of 5%
for the median independent school applicant. The overall diﬀerence in the two distri-
buƟons is shown by plots of the kernel density of the IDACI for independent and state
school applicants in Figure E.2.
Figure E.2: Kernel density distribuƟon of IDACI by school type
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Notes: Solid verƟcal line indicates mean, dashed verƟcal line indicates median, and doƩed verƟcal lines
indicate upper and lower quarƟles for state school applicants. Excludes individuals for whom school IDACI
was not recorded.
The design of the results tables is the same as those earlier in this secƟon. I report the
analyses for each stage of the admissions process in Tables E.8, E.9 and E.10. Sincewe are
only considering those from state school, I only control for the averageGCSE performance
of state school applicants and college’s Norrington score, not the mean performance of
independent school applicants.
When it comes to state school applicants, the results for the mean again concord with
ﬁndings from the analysis in SecƟon 4.8. We see from Table E.8 very liƩle esƟmated
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Table E.8: School IDACI of state school applicants - changes at the mean, lower quarƟle,
median and upper quarƟle of colleges’ distribuƟons: diﬀerence in diﬀerences esƟmates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Q25 Median Q75
Constant () 21.910 6.471 17.106 42.621
(16.160) (8.822) (16.748) (32.004)
Treated () -0.251 0.318 -0.157 0.025
(0.458) (0.299) (0.506) (0.996)
Policy On () 0.132 -0.088 0.033 0.637
(0.588) (0.351) (0.713) (1.266)
Treated*Policy On () 0.156 0.032 0.328 -0.016
(0.686) (0.342) (0.692) (1.380)
Mean No. of GCSEs (State) -0.105 -0.005 -0.424 -0.989
(1.502) (0.869) (1.640) (3.087)
Mean No. of A*s (State) 0.332 0.320 0.385 0.202
(0.770) (0.163) (0.560) (1.300)
Norrington Score / 10 -106.586 -43.790 -49.398 -175.889
(105.165) (39.161) (82.454) (180.250)
N 162 162 162 162
R2 0.065 0.043 0.042 0.063
Notes: Analysis excludes individuals for whom school IDACI is unknown. Policy Oﬀ in 2005 and 2006;
Policy On in 2008, 2009 and 2010. Standard errors, clustered by college-subject group combinaƟon, in
parentheses. Stars indicate staisƟcal signiﬁcance: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
Table E.9: School IDACI of state school interviewees - changes at the mean, lower
quarƟle, median and upper quarƟle of colleges’ distribuƟons: diﬀerence in diﬀerences
esƟmates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Q25 Median Q75
Constant () 18.853 5.060 11.968 23.917
(16.708) (12.625) (23.914) (26.112)
Treated () -0.208 0.318 0.154 0.843
(0.474) (0.376) (0.629) (1.113)
Policy On () -0.606 -0.447 -0.566 -0.413
(0.827) (0.570) (1.168) (1.226)
Treated*Policy On () 0.088 0.104 -0.243 -0.883
(0.781) (0.506) (0.846) (1.788)
Mean No. of GCSEs (State) -0.128 0.317 0.207 -0.012
(1.503) (1.131) (2.249) (2.217)
Mean No. of A*s (State) 0.621 0.407 0.561 0.093
(0.551) (0.168) (0.496) (1.089)
Norrington Score / 10 -88.883 -81.945 -88.896 -47.000
(104.392) (39.732) (84.930) (222.590)
N 162 162 162 162
R2 0.038 0.057 0.021 0.008
Notes: Analysis excludes individuals for whom school IDACI is unknown. Policy Oﬀ in 2005 and 2006;
Policy On in 2008, 2009 and 2010. Standard errors, clustered by college-subject group combinaƟon, in
parentheses. Stars indicate staisƟcal signiﬁcance: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
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Table E.10: School IDACI of state school applicants oﬀered a place - changes at the
mean, lower quarƟle, median and upper quarƟle of colleges’ distribuƟons: diﬀerence in
diﬀerences esƟmates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Q25 Median Q75
Constant () 40.251 13.050 22.562 47.482
(16.971) (7.928) (15.437) (32.317)
Treated () 0.507 0.672 0.286 2.469
(0.929) (0.502) (1.040) (1.886)
Policy On () 0.305 0.103 -0.171 0.329
(0.852) (0.425) (0.768) (1.539)
Treated*Policy On () -0.908 -0.692 -1.104 -2.362
(1.077) (0.662) (1.027) (2.226)
Mean No. of GCSEs (State) -1.666 -0.422 -0.589 -0.990
(1.715) (0.814) (1.582) (3.146)
Mean No. of A*s (State) 0.751 0.040 0.074 0.753
(0.518) (0.291) (0.536) (1.048)
Norrington Score / 10 -199.970 -58.965 -87.129 -326.103
(105.383) (64.206) (92.494) (185.568)
N 116 116 116 116
R2 0.063 0.050 0.043 0.057
Notes: Analysis excludes individuals for whom school IDACI is unknown. Policy Oﬀ in 2005 and 2006;
Policy On in 2008, 2009 and 2010. Standard errors, clustered by college-subject group combinaƟon, in
parentheses. Stars indicate staisƟcal signiﬁcance: * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
eﬀect on the mean area deprivaƟon level of applicants’ schools, although the esƟmate is
posiƟve. Likewise with Table E.9 for the mean school-level IDACI among interviewees. In
neither case does analysing the quanƟles provide any obvious addiƟon to the narraƟve:
in all cases the diﬀerence in diﬀerences esƟmates are not staƟsƟcally signiﬁcant from
either zero or each other.
Finally, I consider the changes in the school-level IDACI of those state school applicants
who get an oﬀer (Table E.10). As with the analysis of all those oﬀered a place, the
change in mean IDACI of those from state schools oﬀered a place is esƟmated to be
negaƟve. However, this Ɵme the esƟmate is rather larger, but sƟll far from staƟsƟcal
signiﬁcance.
E.3 Discussion
Analysis considering changes at diﬀerent quanƟles is more diﬃcult to interpret a single
esƟmate of changes in means. However, its results have the potenƟal to provide more
informaƟon on the nature of the impact.
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In this analysis, while the point esƟmates at diﬀerent quanƟles do vary from one another
and from the esƟmated changes in means, these diﬀerences are never staƟsƟcally signif-
icant from zero or each other. Nevertheless, that we see some variaƟon is suggesƟve of
diﬀering impacts across the deprivaƟon distribuƟon. Furthermore, there is liƩle sign of
a consistent paƩern towards one end of the distribuƟon or the other.
Nevertheless, the point esƟmates we see tend to back up the story of very liƩle socioe-
conomic change resulƟng from the introducƟon of the TSA, as seen in the main analy-
sis.
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